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Abstract
The writings of John Dewey (1859-1952) and Simone Weil (1909-1943) were
analyzed with a view to answering 3 main questions: What is wisdom? How is wisdom
connected to experience? How does one educate for a love of wisdom? Using a
dialectical method whereby Dewey (a pragmatist) was critiqued by Weil (a Christian
Platonist) and vice versa, commonalities and differences were identified and clarified.
For both, wisdom involved the application of thought to specific, concrete
problems in order to secure a better way of life. For Weil, wisdom was centered on a
love of truth that involved a certain way of applying one's attention to a concrete or
theoretical problem. Weil believed that nature was subject to a divine wisdom and that a
truly democratic society had supernatural roots. Dewey believed that any attempt to
move beyond nature would stunt the growth of wisdom. For him, wisdom could be
nourished only by natural streams-even if some of them were given a divine designation.
For both, wisdom emerged through the discipline of work understood as
intelligent activity, a coherent relationship between thinking and acting. Although Weil
and Dewey differed on how they distinguished these 2 activities, they both advocated a
type of education which involved practical experience and confronted concrete problems.
Whereas Dewey viewed each problem optimistically with the hope of solving it, Weil
saw wisdom in, contemplating insoluble contradictions. For both, educating for a love of
wisdom meant cultivating a student's desire to keep thinking in line with acting-wanting
to test ideas in action and striving to make sense of actions observed.
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CHAPTER ONE: WISDOM, JOHN DEWEY, AND SIMONE WElL
This dissertation attempts to explicate and compare the ideas of John Dewey and
Simone Weill on wisdom. It is a conceptual analysis which proceeds on the assumption
that cultivating a love of wisdom in a student is a teacher's highest calling. If this is true
-and I believe it is-then two questions immediately come to mind: What is wisdom?
How does one educate for a love of wisdom? Enlisting the aid of Dewey and Weil, this
dissertation tries to answer these questions.
In 1986 during my seventh year of teaching at the elementary level, I felt it was
time for a change and applied for a position at another school. As part of the application
process, I was required to write out answers to a few questions. The first one gave me
some pause: What is the purpose of education? I reflected on my experiences in the
classroom both as a student and as a teacher and on my growing concern with the
relationship between technology and education. The first part of my answer I remember
clearly: The purpose of education is more than the accumulation of information2 or the
mastery of skills; it is oriented to the attainment of knowledge and wisdom.
Although I didn't have a clear idea of what I meant by "wisdom," I was convinced
that an educational institution which ignored such a lofty goal would be "lowering its
1 Weil is pronounced "Vay."
2 Well before the invention of the electronic computer, one university president lamented
that educators "spread before their students more undigested information than the
human race has ever had before; much more than the human race knows how to use at
the present time. They produced a glut of facts to which we are not at this time entitled,
for no age is entitled to more facts than it has wisdom to assimilate" (Gannon, 1941, p.
29). Of course, this raises the question that if information needs to be digested before it is
assimilated, who should do the digesting on behalf of students if they cannot do it -
themselves?
2sights" and inhibiting its students from striving for excellence. I did not recall hearing the
word "wisdom" used in any of my university courses, and I suspected that this omission
reflected a prejudice against ancient ideas which had been rendered irrelevant through the
achievements of modern technological science. Not only was such a nebulous term
difficult to operationalize by the methods of social science; it was imbued with a value
orientation which could not be validated within a positivist paradigm unless it had been
"neutered" of its normative thrust. Furthermore, "wisdom" evoked images of a religious
past that had been "demythologized" and a speculative metaphysics that had been left
behind by analytical philosophy long ago. Perhaps we had unconsciously imbibed the
Hegelian notion that wisdom would naturally accompany the realization of a universal,
homogeneous state ("globalization") and that cultivating a love for wisdom
("philosophy") would no longer be necessary (Grant, 1964/1969, p. 90).
Imagine my surprise when I discovered that at about the same time as I had been
thinking abo~t wisdom as a goal for education, a number of researchers were seriously
attempting to transform this cardinal virtue into a psychological construct. Many of them
were lifespan developmental psychologists interested at looking at wisdom as a possible
benefit or ideal end state in aging. Robert Sternberg (1990b) had invited 18 colleagues-
mostly drawn from the field of psychology, three of whom held positions in schools of
education-to contribute to a volume devoted to assessing the state of research into
wisdom. Fifteen years later, Sternberg and Jordan (2005) have reassessed the field.
Interest in wisdom is growing among psychologists and philosophers. According
to Ardelt (2005), publications authored by psychologists which focus on wisdom have
3doubled every 5 years between 1980 and 2004 (p. xii). Similarly, those who hold
positions in academic departments of philosophy have been showing a greater interest in
wisdom. If one searches the Philosopher's Index database for citations that contain
"wisdom" as the main subject, slightly fewer than 200 entries are listed for the past 60
years. Nothing much appears prior to 1970. Citations since 1990 account for 60% of the
total. One third of the output has been published since 2000. Many of the citations are
commentaries on conceptions of wisdom formulated by previous philosophers such as
Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, or Nietzsche. Others explore wisdom at the crossroads of
Western and Eastern philosophy (Guorong, 2002) or at the intersection of philosophy and
religion (Clark, 2000). Some Polish philosophers are giving it their attention (Lorenc,
2001; Mis, 2001).
This dissertation focuses on psychological approaches to wisdom rather than
spiritual, religious, or philosophical approaches per see Philosophical approaches are
reviewed insofar as they address wisdom from a psychological perspective. Why? First,
it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to review everything written on wisdom in the
past 2 decades.3 Second, since Plato's Republic (Cornford, 1945) first examined the
virtues of the soul, philosophy (the love of wisdom) and psychology (the study of the
3 For those interested in consulting a wider selection of books and articles regarding
wisdom beyond that reviewed here, see the 49-page bibliography compiled by
Trowbridge (2007). Interestingly, it includes only one citation for Dewey and none for
Weil.
4soul) have been inextricably linked 4-until about a century ago when psychology emerged
from philosophy as a separate discipline in its attempt to use methods of inquiry adapted
from the natural sciences. I find it intriguing that researchers trained in a modern
paradigm of knowledge are attracted to a word that resonates with ancient conceptions of
virtue. Third, I attempt to show that the subjects of this dissertation, John Dewey and
Simone Weil, both began their implicit search for wisdom along psychological lines.
In this chapter, I will attempt two things: First, I will map out how psychological
research on wisdom has proceeded in the past 20 years with a view to assessing its
educational implications. Second, I will argue that a comparison of John Dewey and
Simone Weil promises to yield an intriguing psychological perspective on the question of
wisdom and how to educate for a love of it.
Wisdom Research
Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins, and Development (Sternberg, 1990b) exhibits a
coherence and collaboration that is uncommon among edited books: Each contributor
refers to the others in ways that make the reader wonder if they had co-ordinated
sabbaticals and attended a semester-long seminar together. In the Preface, Sternberg (p.
ix) outlines a four-stage model of knowledge development for any field: (a) people
become interested in studying a phenomenon; (b) some develop paradigms and attempt to
convince others of their worth; (c) "a small number of paradigms become prominent
4 In my view, the Republic (Cornford, 1945) should be read primarily as a work of
psychology. Reading it through the lens of political science can easily obscure the main
thrust of this classic work. Plato has Socrates and his friends constructing in their minds
an ideal society in order to describe in "large letters" the soul (psyche) of a just person.
The political theme supplements the psychological one, but it does not eclipse it.
5while others wither on the vine" (p. ix); and (d) the dominant paradigms become
problematic, and a search for new paradigms begins or the field becomes dormant.
Wisdom was published when research development was in the second stage. Fifteen
years later we seem to have arrived at the third stage. Of the 11 constructs described in
this book, 2 have become significant research ventures while the others seem to have
"withered on the vine."
First, this review will look at theories of wisdom that remain relatively
undeveloped (i.e., they have either not yet been tested through empirical methods, or they
are hypotheses generated by exploratory research and have not been followed up with
further testing and refining). Second, it will examine more closely developing theories of
wisdom, especially two dominant empirical projects: (a) the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm
developed by Paul Baltes and his associates and (b) the Balance Theory of Wisdom
developed by Robert Sternberg and his associates. Finally, the educational implications of
wisdom research will be assessed, and recent work on wisdom by educators will be
briefly reviewed.
Undeveloped Theories
In his most recent review of the research done on wisdom, Sternberg (2003, p.
147-151) follows the same tripartite division that he used to assess the field 13 years
earlier (Sternberg, 1990b): philosophical approaches, implicit-theoretical approaches, and
explicit-theoretical approaches. 5 The boundaries between these approaches are
5 The first two divisions are almost identical to their earlier versions (Sternberg, 1990b),
but the third division is qualitatively different. This reflects how the field has matured:
Explicit psychological theories of wisdom had not yet been identified in 1990. Baltes and
6permeable: When some psychologists investigate past conceptions of wisdom they may
study what previous philosophers have written about wisdom even though they label their
approach "implicit-theoretical" (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000, p. 124). In the same way,
implicit-theoretical approaches often form the basis for developing explicit theories: The
two dominant projects began this way (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Sternberg, 1990a). My
own review will use the same divisions.
Philosophical approaches. In the context ofthis review, I define a philosophical
approach as one in which an author speculates about wisdom or reports on what
philosophers or cultural traditions have said about wisdom. In the modern scientific
sense of the term, philosophical approaches have a pretheoretical function. They explore
possible avenues of inquiry which mayor may not be taken up by researchers whose task
it is to develop theories and hypotheses that can be verified or falsified empirically.
Since 1995, at least three philosophers of the AngloAmerican analytical tradition
have seriously tackled wisdom. Using a linguistic and logical rigour that is the hallmark
of analytical philosophy, Ryan (1999) takes apart 12 reasonable-sounding statements
about wisdom,6 rejects 11 of them, and concludes that a wise person "knows, in general,
how to live well and ... has a general appreciation of the true value of living well" (p.
135). A philosopher of science argues that wisdom rather than knowledge is the proper
Staudinger (2000, pp. 123-124) divide the wisdom field in two: implicit and explicit
theories.
6Ryan (1999) begins by questioning the idea inspired by Socrates that a person is wise if
he or she believes she is not wise: "I believe I am not wise and unfortunately, my belief
is true. Hence, it is clear that [the above idea] fails to state a sufficient condition for
wisdom" (p. 119).
7end for academic inquiry: Maxwell (2003, 2004, 2007) criticizes "knowledge-inquiry"
(conventional science) and calls for an intellectual revolution, proposing a model of
"wisdom-inquiry." His definition of wisdom resonates with Sternberg's balance theory:
"Wisdom is the desire, the active endeavour, and the capacity to discover and achieve
what is desirable and of value in life, both for oneself and for others" (Maxwell, 2003, p.
9). Kekes (1983, 2004) echoes the ancient notion that wisdom is connected to love of
truth and that the criterion of wisdom is not how much one knows but how well one
understands the significance of what one knows. Kekes (1995) identifies moral wisdom
as the psychological capacity "to judge rightly what should be done in particular
situations to make life better" (p. 5). Since he firmly believes that psychological studies
will fail to yield reliable empirical evidence on wisdom, it is intriguing that psychological
theorists and researchers continue to consult his work (Ardelt, 2003; Pasupathi,
Staudinger & Baltes, 2001; Sternberg,2001b).7
As a philosopher with an interest in psychology, Robinson (1990) sketches how
wisdom was conceived in the history of Western philosophy from its beginnings in
ancient Greece until the 20th century. He briefly reviews the predominant ancient schools
7Why is Kekes (1995) pessimistic about psychological studies of wisdom? In his view,
the exercise of moral wisdom usually entails an internal struggle with motivation that
cannot be seen by others from the outside:
It looks, therefore, that what is needed for the identification of morally wise
actions is autobiographical evidence. Such evidence, however, is rarely available;
and what there is of it is notoriously unreliable because of self-deception, the
desire to present ourselves in a favorable light, and lack of self-knowledge. Even
if these obstacles were overcome in exceptional cases, what would warrant the
ascription of moral wisdom is not isolated examples but an enduring pattern of
morally wise actions. The availability of reliable evidence for such patterns,
however, is even more exceptional. (p. 13)
8(Socratic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, Stoic, Christian) and some modern movements
(empiricism, scientism, romanticism). In addition to reviewing the Western tradition of
philosophy and psychology, the historical survey by Birren and Svensson (2005) briefly
looks at how wisdom was conceived by ancient Middle Eastern and Far Eastern societies.
They conclude that a particular concept of wisdom is biased towards the values of a
culture in which it emerges. Takahashi and Overton (2005) take this one step further by
initially contrasting Western and Eastern views on wisdom: Whereas Western analytical
approaches emphasize precision in conceptualization, Eastern holistic approaches
maintain an intentional vagueness with respect to defining wisdom. They argue for
empirical studies in wisdom which transcend this West-East dichotomy. In a similar
vein, Labouvie-Vief (1990) believes that an important task in recovering wisdom will be
in finding ways to integrate two modes of discourse that have been split off from each
other: mythos (embodied holistic thinking that uses a narrative mode prevalent in
Homeric Greece and "primitive" societies) and logos (analytical reasoning initiated by
Socrates that employs abstract logic). Like Lakoff and Johnson (1999), she addresses the
problem of the disembodied mind- the unfortunate legacy of Western rationalism.
In surveying how the conception of wisdom has changed from ancient times,
Csikszentmihalyi and Rathunde (1990) use "evolutionary hermeneutics" to understand
how wisdom had adaptive and survival value for previous generations. They argue that
this exercise is important for us today because "to ignore the hard-won insights of the past
about issues that are vital for survival is like blinding ourselves on purpose out of false
pride" (Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, p. 25). They maintain that three dimensions of
9wisdom can be meaningfully culled from the past for our benefit today: wisdom-as-
holistic-cognitive-process, wisdom-as-virtue, and wisdom-as-personal-good.
In summary, although philosophers and psychologists are looking at wisdom with
renewed interest, modem philosophical approaches do not directly develop theories of
wisdom that can be empirically verified or falsified. Rather, they serve to give direction
to those researchers who attempt to construct operational definitions of wisdom that can
be tested in the field or in the laboratory.
Implicit-theoretical approaches. Implicit-theoretical approaches attempt to
uncover folk conceptions held by people in various walks of life (people's subjective
beliefs about wisdom) and/or they analyze selected historical, cultural, or philosophical
documents. In a series of studies that eventually included approximately 500 adults from
three age cohorts (young, middle aged, senior), Chandler and Holliday (1990) conducted
a principal components analysis to yield five descriptors of persons considered wise:
They possessed exceptio.nal understanding, communication skills, general competence,
interpersonal skills, and social unobtrusiveness. Chandler and Holliday see great value in
trying to recover ancient notions of wisdom but caution that such an attempt is fraught
with difficulty if it is not done carefully and self-consciously. Looking to the critical
theory of Habermas, they urge researchers to move towards a multidimensional account
of wisdom, while at the same time cautioning them about the power of the modern
scientific-technical paradigm to reduce wisdom to a psychological construct that can be
operationalized in ways that may miss the mark.
In reviewing empirical work done on lay persons' beliefs about wisdom and using
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a framework of personality development derived from Erikson and others, Orwoll and
Perlmutter (1990) define wisdom as an integration of excellent cognitive skills with
extraordinary personality development. A wise person uses cognitive skills to understand
personal growth issues. Once these issues have been confronted and understood, the wise
person experiences personal growth that, in turn, enhances cognitive clarity. Such
personal growth, it seems, is a prerequisite for those who are considered wise: they have
transcended "personalistic perspectives and embrace collective and universal concerns"
(Orwoll &Perlmutter, p. 160).
In his analysis of historical, cultural and philosophical documents, Baltes
(Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005) enumerated seven facets of wisdom:
e addresses difficult problems regarding the meaning and conduct of life;
e represents truly outstanding knowledge, judgment, and advice;
e is a perfect integration of knowledge and character, mind and virtue;
e coordinates and promotes individual and societal growth;
e involves .balance and moderation;
e includes an awareness of the limits ofknowledge and uncertainties of the
world;
e is difficult to achieve but is easily recognized. (p. 112)
Explicit-theoretical approaches. Whereas implicit approaches derive theoretical
directions from empirical data collected from people or documents, explicit theories
develop psychological conceptions of wisdom that may be operationalized. Meacham
(1990) challenges the conventional wisdom of lifespan developmental psychology by
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suggesting that we lose it as we age. He points to Anne Frank, who exhibited
extraordinary wisdom at 13 years of age and to Solomon, who seemed to lose wisdom
over the course of his life as his wealth and fame increased. Meacham argues that
reasoning ability and interpersonal skills-as much as these may be related to or derived
from wisdom-do not get at the essence of wisdom, which he defines as a striving for
balance between knowing and doubting. If we are successful at maintaining this balance
as we age, he agues, our wisdom will become more profound as a result of life
experience, but the essence of wisdom is unchanged. Recent empirical studies suggest
that Meacham may be on to something. Wisdom-related knowledge seems to be acquired
in adolescence (Pasupathi, et aI, 2001; Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2003; Richardson &
Pasupathi, 2005), with no appreciable gain after age 25 (Staudinger, 1999).
Kramer (1990) identifies wisdom as the integration of cognition and affect. She
maintains that thinking and feeling cannot be separated: affect serves "to motivate and
sustain cognitive processing" (p. 280).
Echoing Meacham's (1990) concern regarding the limits of knowing and
recognizing that wisdom is connected to affective skills and personality development,
Kitchener and Brenner (1990) nevertheless focus on the higher order cognitive skills of
wise persons. These persons, they argue, are typically in the postforrnal stage, that is,
they function beyond Piaget's stage offorrnal operations. Wisdom entails knowing how
to make a judgment and choosing a course of action in the face of ill-defined problematic
situations and profound uncertainty.
Arlin (1990) suggests that wisdom involves more than attempting to solve ill-
12
defined problems: It looks for problems. Assuming a deep knowledge of a certain
domain, wisdom-as-problem-finding combines a sensitivity to anomalies with a
willingness to consider change and an eagerness to tackle important questions. Although
she has not developed her own conception of wisdom further, Arlin has used the Berlin
Wisdom Paradigm to define wise teachers (see below).
Pascual-Leone (1990) connects the growth of wisdom to the development of
volition or conation. Drawing on a range of ancient and modern philosophers, he builds a
symbolic processing model of the will in which a person moves from the will-to-will
(developing the strength to make choices and following through on them) to will-not-to-
will (renouncing one's personal choices for the sake of some greater good). As an
organismic process, wisdom-as-will-not-to-will incorporates
dynamic syntheses applying on manifold structures of great brain scope, structures
that integrate the analytical/formalized (left hemisphere!) with
holistic/experiential (right hemisphere!) knowledge, blending affective, personal,
and cognitive domains: syntheses that might simultaneously engage vastly
different areas of the cortex. (Pascual-Leone, p. 271)
Drawing on brain research and using a neo-Piagetian framework, Pascual-Leone (2000)
argues that the regular practice of meditation can accelerate the development of wisdom
in an individual.
With a special nod to Kramer (1990) and Pascual-Leone (1990), Birren and Fisher
(1990) sum up the work of their colleagues who contributed to Wisdom: Its Nature,
Origins, and Development (Sternberg, 1990b) by defining wisdom as "the integration of
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the affective, conative, and cognitive aspects of human abilities in response to life's tasks
and problems" (Birren & Fisher, p. 326).
Developing Theories
Since 1990, two theories have emerged which dominate psychological research in
wisdom: the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm and Sternberg's Balance Theory of Wisdom. Paul
Baltes and his colleagues at the Max Planck Institute in Germany were already leading the
field by 1990. They have developed a complex theory in the context of research in
lifespan development (Baltes, Gluck, & Kuntzmann, 2002; Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes
& Staudinger, 1993; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Pasupathi, Staudinger, & Baltes, 2001;
Smith, Staudinger, & Baltes, 1994; Staudinger, 1999; Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2003). A
sociologist has recently entered the lifespan development field to challenge this group:
Monika Ardelt has constructed an empirically-based conception of wisdom that critiques
the Berlin Paradigm (Ardelt, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2004). Finally, Sternberg's
balance theory has developed in conjunction with work on intelligence and creativity in
the context of educational psychology (Sternberg, 1990a, 1998, 2001 a, 2001 b, 2003;
Sternberg & Lubart, 2001). First, we will consider the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm and
Ardelt's critique of it. Then we will look at Sternberg's Balance Theory of Wisdom.
The Berlin wisdom paradigm. The core of the Berlin Paradigm was conceived
early in their work: Wisdom is "expert knowledge involving good judgment and advice
in the domain, fundamental pragmatics of life" (Baltes & Smith, 1990, p. 95). Using a
notion derived from the distinction between fluid and crystallized intelligence, Baltes and
Staudinger (1993) contrast two processes that normally develop in opposite directions as
14
the human brain ages: "fluid mechanics" that diminish in speed and flexibility over the
adult lifespan; and "crystallized pragmatics" that exhibit learning that has been gained
through life experience, a deposit of knowledge which is related to wisdom. One may not
be able to teach an old dog new tricks, but the old dog may know a thing or two about
tracking prey or avoiding skunks that a younger dog has yet to learn. Empirical studies
conducted by the group support the view that as we age "fluid mechanics" such as
working memory decrease in power. Surprisingly, "crystallized pragmatics" or wisdom-
related knowledge stays relatively stable across the adult life span (Baltes & Staudinger,
2000, p. 128).
The "crystallized pragmatics" or wisdom-related knowledge has five dimensions
or critiera (Smith et aI, 1994)~ (a) rich factual knowledge (knowing that), (b) rich
procedural knowledge (knowing how), (c) life-span contextualism (knowing where and
when-understanding that facts and procedures are embedded in changing contexts and
that timing and appropriateness should govern actions), (d) value relativism
(understanding other perspectives in relation to one's own while eschewing absolute
relativism), and (e) uncertainty (acknowledging the limits of one's knowledge and the
more-than-likely presence of unforeseen contingencies). The first two criteria are
considered necessary but not sufficient in attaining wisdom. The last three-life-span
contextualism, value relativism, and uncertainty-are believed to be more directly tied to
wisdom-related performance.
These five criteria have been tested through' a series of studies in which
participants were presented with life dilemmas of fictitious characters from three task
15
domains: life planning, life management, and life review. In the domain of life planning,
participants were asked to advise a 15-year-old girl who wanted to get married right
away. Participants were asked to think aloud their responses, which were taped and
transcribed. Trained to evaluate responses based on the five criteria, a number of raters
listened to the tapes, read the transcripts, and scored the responses. Two samples follow:
Low wisdom-related score
A 15-year-old girl wants to get married? No. No way, getting married at age
fifteen would be utterly wrong. One has to tell the girl that marriage is not
possible. (After further probing) It would be irresponsible to support such an idea.
No, this is just a crazy idea.
High wisdom-related score
Well, on the surface, this seems like an easy problem. On average, marriage for
15-year-old girls is not a good thing. But there are situations where the average
case does not fit. Perhaps in this instance, special life circumstances are involved,
such that the girl has a terminal illness. Or the girl has just lost her parents. And
also, this girl may live in another culture or historical period. Perhaps she was
raised with a value system different from ours. In addition, one has to talk about
adequate ways of talking with the girl and to consider her emotional state. (Baltes
& Staudinger, 2000, p. 136)
Since advancing age is no guarantee of advances in wisdom, the Berlin group
seeks to understand through more empirical work how three clusters of antecedent
variables may contribute to or subtract from the growth of wisdom: personal factors (e.g.,
16
intelligence, mental health, openness to experience), expertise-specific factors (e.g., life
experience, giving or receiving mentoring, motivational dispositions), and facilitative
experiential contexts (e.g., age, profession, education, historical period; Staudinger, 1999,
p.646).
In addition, they are investigating how selective optimization with compensation
(SOC) can help older people remain competent and wise (Baltes & Freund, 2003).
Eighty-year-old Arthur Rubinstein maintained his ability to perform piano recitals
because he "played fewer pieces (selection), practised these more often (optimization),
and used tempo contrasts to hide his loss in mechanical speed (compensation)" (Baltes &
Freund, p. 265).
Wisdom in three dimensions. Interpreting data from a sample of 120 elderly men
and women first interviewed in the late 1960s, Ardelt (1997) concludes that wisdom was
more positively correlated with life satisfaction than with objective circumstances such as
wealth or health. Borrowing from Clayton and Birren (1981), she defines wisdom as a
personality characteristic- not a knowledge system-which integrates cognitive, reflective,
and affective dimensions. Cognition enables one to see the truth of a situation; reflection
helps one to transcend one's subjectivity and overcome projections; the affective
component includes sympathy, empathy, and compassion for others. Although these
dimensions are conceptually distinct, they depend on each other to realize wisdom in a
person (Ardelt, 2000a, pp. 361-362).
To operationalize her construct, Ardelt (2003) designed a three-dimensional
wisdom scale with 14 items for the cognitive, 12 items for the reflective, and 13 items for
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the affective dimension. A sample of 180 older adults (ages 52 to 87, mean age of71)
were tested to assess the validity and reliability of the scale. After more testing and
refining, the scale will be used in longitudinal studies "to examine the predictors and the
development of wisdom across the life course and to investigate the relationship between
wisdom and age" (Ardelt, p. 315).
Ardelt (2004) takes issue with the Berlin group's operationalization of wisdom as
being primarily "expert knowledge." She contends that wisdom is not something that one
can possess in the same way as one can retain factual or procedural knowledge. Wisdom
literature is not wise, people are:
If it were indeed wisdom per se that could be found in the wisdom literature, two
people with similar intellectual capabilities (hardware) who read the same wisdom
text (software) would need to grow equally in wisdom. While this might be true
for (intellectual or theoretical) knowledge, I doubt that it is true for wisdom. (p.
260)
Since it is based on a weak premise, she argues, the Berlin group's construct of wisdom
may be faulty. Asking participants to give advice in the abstract to a fictitious character
does not necessarily prove that they are wise in their own lives. We all know people who
can advise others well but have difficulty reflecting clearly on their own lives.
Replying on behalf of the Berlin group, Baltes and Kunzmann (2004)
acknowledge that studying wise persons is one way to get at wisdom, but they have
chosen to study the concept as it is carried in literature or in people, which, they argue is
an equally valid approach. They consider wisdom to be an ideal end state and that wise
18
people are at best only approximations of it. Sternberg (2004) disputes Ardelt's
contention "that only people who follow their own advice should be considered wise.
Nelson Mandela has done many wise and wonderful things in his life. But he has also
made mistakes" (p. 287). Nevertheless, Ardelt's objections have strong empirical
support:
Decades of research on self-regulation as well as research on the therapeutical
process have demonstrated that it is much more difficult to obtain insight into
one's own life than into the difficulties and problems of others. Thus, we propose
that general wisdom is less difficult to attain than personal wisdom ... we expect
that wisdom encompassing both the personal and general dimension is very rare.
(Staudinger, Dormer, & Mickler, 2005)
Although Ardelt (2004) may be unfair in calling the Berlin Paradigm "cold
cognition," she is pointing to an area that needs to be further developed in both the Berlin
and the Sternberg theories (see below): If wisdom is a holistic cognitive process
(Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990), how do the affective and volitional components
connect with cognition? If attaining wisdom is an arduous task, what is there to motivate
people to develop it? Why should I "stick out my neck" for the common good?
Sternberg's balance theory ofwisdom. Even though he has formulated various
conceptual models of wisdom, Sternberg (1990a, 2001, 2003; Sternberg & Lubart, 2001)
has kept wisdom in the company of intelligence and creativity. From one angle, he sees
wisdom as a form of metacognition motivated by a desire to understand the underlying
presuppositions and limitations of knowledge. Using a metaphor of the three branches of
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government, Sternberg (1990a, p. 152) distinguishes three intellectual styles among
creativity, intelligence, and wisdom respectively as follows: legislative (creating new
ways of knowing), executive (applying conventional knowledge), and judicial
(understanding how knowledge is constructed). Sternberg (2001) employs an Hegelian
dialectic to describe the relationships among them: Wisdom attempts to synthesize or
balance the thesis of intelligence with the antithesis of creativity.
In one version of the balance theory of wisdom, Sternberg (1998) saw tacit
knowledge (a part of practical intelligence) as the core of wisdom. By definition, tacit
knowledge does not need to be expressed in words. A person can know how to be a
wonderful parent or teacher without having the ability to articulate and explain to others
how it is done; conversely, a person can talk a good line, but be unable to perform. It is
not uncommon for a writer to describe the beauty of a hockey play without having the
skills necessary to stick-handle on skates; conversely, highly skilled players often can
only mumble a few cliches to reporters in postgame interviews. Tacit knowing is having
a "feel" for a particular context, to "read" a certain situation correctly before acting.
Hence, Sternberg argues, it cannot be taught directly; it can only be learned through
practical experience. Good teachers have this kind of tacit knowledge, and their instincts
have been honed primarily in the crucible of teaching practice, not in the study of
educational texts. Indeed, tacit knowledge may be a necessary prerequisite for
understanding and appreciating what is communicated through lectures, discussions,
articles, ·or books.
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In the latest version of the theory,8 Sternberg (2003) has subsumed tacit
knowledge under "successful intelligence," which in its earlier form was called the
triachic theory of intelligence. The balance theory of wisdom is based on successful
intelligence - a theory which seeks to broaden the idea of intelligence beyond IQ. He has
maintained the unity of this construct by formulating a triarchic theory that embraces all
the environments in which intelligence can be applied without assuming the existence of
"multiple intelligences." Although Sternberg distinguishes three kinds of
thinking-analytical, creative, and practical-that address the continuum of reasoning from
"school smarts" to "street smarts," he maintains a unified model of intelligence.
How does he do this? First, at the base of the triachic theory is a set of problem-
solving components or processes that Sternberg (2003) believes underlie all aspects of
intelligence for any individual in any culture (p. 44). These processes involve three main
components that operate in tandem: metacognitive skills (the understanding and control
of one's own thinking), learning skills (the acquisition of knowledge), and thinking skills
(knowing how to analyze a problem, knowing how to generate a solution, knowing how
to apply a solution in a particular context). Second, these components operate through an
experiential .dimension where the relative ease or relative difficulty of processing is
determined by how familiar or how novel a problem appears to an individual. When
·components are applied to familiar problems abstracted from their contexts, analytical
thinking is employed. (p. 44). Schools emphasize analytical thinking, and IQ tests are
good at measuring it. When the components are applied to relatively novel kinds of tasks
8The following description has appeared in Professing Education (Windhorst, 2004).
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or situations, creative thinking is required (p. 44). Schools usually do not encourage
creative thinking as much as analytical thinking, especially when enterprising individuals
challenge conventional wisdom. Rarely, it seems, do students grapple with novel
problems that require inventiveness and imagination. Third, these problem-solving
components operate more or less successfully across a plurality of contexts or
environments-the domain of practical intelligence and tacit knowledge. Here the
youngster who barely passed grade school surprises former teachers when, as a grown-up,
he or she builds a flourishing business from the ground up. When confronted by a strange
and challenging environment, practical thinking is invoked when the components are
applied by adapting to the new context, by shaping it, or by selecting out and moving to
another one (p. 44).
Sternberg (2003) views intelligence and creativity as necessary but not sufficient
components of wisdom. Successful intelligence-"the ability to achieve success in life in
terms of one's personal standards, within one's sociocultural context" (p. 42)-is the basis
for his theory of wisdom. Wisdom seems to grow out of practical thinking in balancing
the three responses to an environment: Should one adapt to this environment, or shape it,
or select another one? Yet wisdom transcends successful practical thinking in that it
seeks the common good beyond one's own immediate interests:
Wisdom is the application of intelligence, creativity, and knowledge for a
common good by balancing one's own interests, other people's interests, and
higher level interests (e.g. organizational, community, cultural), through the
mediation of values, over the short and long terms, in order to adapt to, shape, and
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select environments. (R. J. Sternberg, personal communication, December 8,
2004)
Educational Implications
This next section will briefly examine how Arlin (1999) and Sternberg (PACE
Center, 2003a, 2003b) have translated the results of wisdom research in educational
terms. It will also review two more recent works by educators who look at wisdom from
an explicitly religious (Blomberg, 2007) or spiritual perspective (Miller, 2006).
Wise teachers. Arlin (1999) has applied the Berlin group's five criteria of
wisdom-related knowledge to the teaching profession:
Wise teachers possess: a) rich factual knowledge about teaching and about their
subject matter; b) rich procedural knowledge about teaching strategies and the
practical knowledge about when and how to use them; c) a sense of the context of
instruction and-the context in which students are being instructed; d) an awareness
of the relativism associated with variations of values and priorities of both their
peers and their students; e) an uncertainty of the effects of specific teaching
decisions coupled with a willingness to take risks and to try a variety of ways to
actively participate with the students in the learning process. (p. 13)
Wise-thinking curriculum. Ardelt (2000b) draws a sharp distinction between
intellectual knowledge and wisdom-related knowledge and argues that educational
programs for older people should focus more on wisdom. Sternberg (2001b, 2003)
maintains that wisdom should be an educational goal at all levels. His associates have
developed an eighth-grade history curriculum that applies his balance theory in actual
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classrooms. It was tested with a number of middle schools in Connecticut. I interviewed
two of the researchers who had developed the curriculum (Windhorst, 2004), examined
the course material (PACE Center, 2003a, 2003b), and talked over the phone with one of
the history teachers who had implemented it for part of a school year. Using primary
source materials and co-operative discussion groups, students pondered dilemmas faced
by Americans in the past and considered the common good by balancing the interests of
the parties involved. For example, in assessing what happened in the Boston Massacre of
1770, students read and evaluated three eyewitness accounts of the event: one by a British
officer, another by a Boston shoemaker, and the third by a Boston newspaper of the day.
As a former eighth-grade teacher with an interest in educating for wisdom, I felt the
curriculum was rich, engaging, and faithful to Sternberg's balance theory. As a Canadian,
I was sensitive to how this curriculum portrayed the United Empire Loyalists who did not
side with their anti-British neighbours and who eventually became the founders of
English-speaking Canada. Learning American history through such a curriculum, an
eighth-grade student in Connecticut would not automatically take the side of the
American revolutionaries who tarred and feathered these so-called Tories. Respecting
opposing positions without prejudice is an essential aim of educating for wisdom, and
this curriculum strives to do that.
Educatingfor Biblical wisdom. Blomberg (2007) writes for those who teach in
Christian schools. Guided by a Biblical view ofwisdom,9 Wisdom and Curriculum is
9Three books in the Bible are classified as wisdom literature. Proverbs provides much
practical advice on how to live well. Ecclesiastes describes one man's search for
happiness and the good life. The refrain that echoes throughout this book sounds like the
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nevertheless anchored in the messy world of practice. He defines wisdom as the
realization of value in a double sense-understanding the normative structure of God's
good creation and acting in such a way that these norms become more real in a world
stained by sin (pp. 85-93). Like Dewey (1929a, p. 5), Blomberg believes that norms or
values (or ethical and moral traits) are as much part of the natural world as "bare facts."
Indeed, values and facts cannot be separated in lived experience. However, unlike
Dewey, Blomberg believes that these norms or values have supernatural roots.
Blomberg's book can be read as a conversation about wisdom and how to teach
for it. (Indeed, 4 of the 11 chapters are composed as dialogues.) Unlike Sternberg's
associates who laid out detailed lesson plans (see above), Blomberg gives no recipes,
prescriptions, or formulas by which teachers can instruct for wisdom in Christian schools.
His final chapter on play, problem-posing, and purposeful response comes close, but even
here, in fine Deweyan fashion, he invites teachers to use his ideas as guidelines or
questions ,for designing their own curriculum. The Ontario of Alliance of Christian
Schools (2006) has developed a number ofprimary science and social studies units in
response to Blomberg's vision of wisdom.
Like Sternberg, Blomberg believes that schools can begin to teach for wisdom
only if they incorporate more learning activities that demand creative thinking and
practical reasoning. Blomberg (2007) gives the example of Bob Clifford, a leading
anguished cry of a modern existentialist: "Everything is meaningless!" Job explores the
problem of suffering-what does it mean when bad things happen to good people who
follow religiously the precepts of Proverbs? For a clear articulation of the Biblical
worldview out of which Blomberg writes, see Wolters (2005).
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engineering entrepreneur, who failed at school yet succeeded in the "real" world where
practical thinking is often rewarded. From my own experience comes an anecdote that
echoes this. A boy was barely passing grade 8 in a Christian elementary school. The
principal told his parents that based on the boy's poor academic performance, he would
never amount to much. Despite this dire prediction, the parents saw something in their
son which the principal missed. They had seen him work in the family business
(wholesale florists), and it did not surprise them when he eventually took over
management of the firm. When he hired me on as vacation relief in the summer, he
taught me his sales route by putting me in the driver's seat right away. I was forced to
pay attention to the route by experiencing it first-hand, not second-hand in the passenger's
seat, or third-hand through written directions. This boy had grown into a man who
seemed wiser than his former principal.
Educating for timeless learning. Miller (2006) is a teacher educator who
addresses wisdom from a holistic perspective. Educating for Wisdom and Compassion
invites teachers at any grade level to create conditions in their classrooms for what he
calls "timeless learning." If an educator is looking for ways to use a theoretical definition
of wisdom developed by an analytical philosopher or ways to apply a psychological
construct of wisdom in the classroom, Miller will disappoint. In fact, it seems that
wisdom is not really a concept for Miller, since he neglects to define it and rarely refers to
it. Is he reflecting the Eastern approach to wisdom which, as Takahashi and Overton
(2005) suggest, is intentionally vague? Instead, he draws from a wide variety of sources
(including representatives of various spiritual and religious traditions) to explicate
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timeless learning from which he believes wisdom will emerge. Timeless learning seeks
to develop teachers who are less harried by lock-step curricula and standardized tests, can
become more present for their students in the moment, and can develop in themselves and
in their students the types of things that escape immediate assessment but have a lifelong
impact: wisdom, compassion, joy, awe, wonder, wholeness, and a sense of purpose. Like
Pascual-Leone (2000), Miller believes that the regular practice of meditation in the
classroom can help to cultivate wisdom and offers his readers various ways on how this
can be done.
Why Compare John Dewey and Simone Weil?
In one of his earlier articles on wisdom, Sternberg (1990a) describes the wise
person has having a judicial intellectual style, that is, he or she seeks "to understand why
and what it means that people think what they think, say what they say, and do what they
do" (p. 154). I think it would be more accurate to call such a person a lover of wisdom-a
philosopher. In seeking to understand what the wisdom researchers are thinking, saying,
and doing, the following questions emerge: What are the theoretical paradigms in which
the major research projects on wisdom are embedded? What are the limits of these
paradigms? What are the ontological and epistemological presuppositions which form
the foundations of their theories? Are these assumptions warranted?
It seems that the two main players in the modern psychology of wisdom-the
Berlin paradigm and Sternberg's balance theory-share at the heart of their conceptions a
pragmatic orientation. Baltes and his colleagues identify the domain of wisdom to be the
"fundamental pragmatics of life." At the base of Stemberg's balance theory is practical
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thinking which is invoked when the problem-solving components of intelligence consider
how to respond to a precarious environment. At the heart of this practical base, there is
tacit knowledge which can only be learned through experience. The terms "pragmatic,"
"practical," "problem-solving," "responding to an environment," and "learning through
experience" bring to mind John Dewey. If it is true that the Berlin and Sternberg groups
are tacitly10 assuming a Deweyan position when they think about wisdom from a
psychological point of view, then it might be illuminating to uncover what Dewey's
position on wisdom was.
John Dewey's thought is still very current in academic circles. The Philosopher's
Index has over 300 citations, and the ERIC database lists more than double that. Yet,
there is very little that connects John Dewey with the topic of wisdom in any depth. Two
possible exceptions are Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art ofTeaching
(Garrison, 19_97) and Eros and the Good: Wisdom According to Nature (Gouinlock,
2004). Like Dewey, both authors eschew transcendent forms of good in considering how -
what humans believe to be good or goods are in reality discovered or constructed in the
warp and woof of the daily joys and struggles of life. Gouinlock borrows much from
Dewey's pragmatism in articulating an idea of moral wisdom grounded in nature.
Wisdom emerges when the pursuit of desired goods is tempered by a realistic
acknowledgement of the ways in which nature can assist or limit this pursuit. Taking a
more conservative stance than Dewey, Gouinlock emphasizes the importance of custom
10 Except for one brief citation by Birren and Svensson (2005, pp. 12-13), Dewey is
nowhere to be found in any of the reference lists compiled by the psychologists that I
have cited in this chapter.
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and the cultivation of certain virtues such as constancy in maintaining a healthy social
order.
Like Kekes (1995), Gouinlock (2004) acknowledges the existence of human
cupidity-what Christians would call sinfulness-in a way that Dewey would resist. It is
very likely that Dewey would have strongly disagreed with the following assertion: "Even
with the best of education, sometimes, not much can be done to develop a talented and
virtuous human being. Nature has made some persons impervious to such instruction" (p.
103). In Garrison's (1997) view, Dewey would certainly counter Gouinlock's
assertion-no matter how warranted it may seem: A teacher is called to bestow value on
such students by using sympathetic moral perception to imagine the possibilities for them
in the midst of what might seem like an impossible situation. Recounting a case study of
a boy who was on the verge of being placed on a remedial track, Garrison applauds the
efforts of one teacher who believed in him and successfully fought a system that was
ready to label him as somewhat "impervious" to normal classroom instruction. Even
though this boy was 3 or 4 years behind his peers in the ability to read and write, the
teacher had perceived a practical intelligence in him that no one else had. The teacher
believed that this intelligence and interest in practical things needed to be nurtured in the
reading and writing workshops of a regular classroom (pp. 178-202).
Although wisdom and Dewey are addressed by both Garrison (1997) and
Gouinlock (2004), neither attempts to elaborate Dewey's concept of wisdom in a direct or
systematic way. Gouinlock uses Deweyan pragmatism as a platform from which to
develop his own theory of wisdom. Garrison comes much closer to articulating Dewey's
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views on wisdom-in fact, he covers some of the same ground as I do in Chapter Two.
Nevertheless, he focuses more on uncovering Dewey's philosophy of eros than on
explicating his view of wisdom. 11
Granted that a case can be made for proposing a doctoral thesis on John Dewey's
concept of wisdom and how he might educate for it, why bring in Simone Weil? John
Dewey's position needs to be appraised by someone who holds foundational assumptions
that he rejected or found problematic. A comparison of two thinkers who seem so
opposed to each other can sometimes pull into bold relief ideas that would otherwise
remain hidden. A person often experiences this sort of thing in relationships with
different people. With one friend, the humorous side is evoked. With another, being
serious seems more "natural." What will Weil evoke from Dewey? What will Dewey
bring to light in Weil? In addition, when commonalities surprisingly emerge between
thinkers who inhabit radically different ontological and epistemological paradigms, the
shared conceptions seem more valid, or at least, more plausible. 12 On a more personal
note, Dewey and Weil represent two sides of my own thinking on education. How do I
connect my experiential understanding of teaching which resonates so well with Dewey's
pragmatism to my fascination with Weil's (1950/1959) assertion that "the Key to a
11 Garrison's (1997) thesis is analyzed further in Chapter 6 in conjunction with a
closer look at how love can operate in the search for wisdom.
12 Fishman (2007) found this to be the case in comparing a nontheist (John Dewey) with a
theist (Gabriel Marcel) on their views on hope. Similarly, when comparing a pragmatist
(Dewey) with someone who was very critical ofpragmatism (George Grant), I was
astonished to discover that their philosophical conceptions of technology were virtually
identical (Windhorst, 1995).
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Christian conception of studies is the realisation that prayer consists of attention" (p. 66)?
John Dewey (1859-1952) and Simone Weil (1909-1943) were philosophers in the
original sense: In their writings can be found a genuine love for wisdom. Yet, it would be
difficult to find two figures in the history of philosophy who would seem more opposed
to each other. Weil was a follower of Plato and became a Christian 5 years before she
died in relative obscurity at the youthful age of 34. In contrast, Dewey slowly and
carefully discarded the Christianity in which he grew up in tandem with eschewing the
absolute idealism of Hegel that captivated him as a young man. He established a name
for himself by espousing a down-to-earth-yet-thoughtful pragmatism well before he died
at the ripe old age of 92. Simone Weil critiqued the foundations of modernity as it came
to expression in her native France and wrote a treatise which envisioned a radically
different social order (Weil, 1952b). John Dewey embraced the modern spirit and
challenged his fellow Americans to build a more democratic society through
technological science and educational reform (Westbrook, 1991). She was a religious
mystic who believed in a "supernatural physics of the soul." He advocated a "natural
piety" that rigorously excluded serious contemplation of anything beyond the natural
realm, notwithstanding Kestenbaum's (2002) thesis that Dewey allowed the
"transcendent" more room in his thought than is generally believed. If Gouinlock (2004)
is correct in asserting that "the aims and possibilities of life are envisioned in very
different forms by the pragmatist and the Platonist" (p. 32), then what is the point of
comparing Dewey and Weil?
There are at least two references to Simone Weil in educational literature.
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Willinsky (1998) appreciates Weil's (1952b) reflections on collectivities and how they
can nourish or harm individuals who live inside them. Looking at multicultural
education, he uses her ideas as a basis for discussing how educators can help students
understand how identities and social categories are constructed.
In his philosophy of education, Walsh (1993) mentions both Weil and Dewey in a
chapter entitled "Basing Values on Love of the World" (pp. 105-115). He rank-orders
four kinds of value on which to base educational purposes: At the bottom are "possessive
values and vocational education" (Le., getting an education is worthwhile because it
increases one's chances at obtaining wealth, status, or power). Next in ascending order
are "experiential values." Here education is prized because it provides intellectual
challenges and adventures which can expand one's horizons and enrich one's experience.
Nevertheless, Walsh warns, those who pursue richness of experience for its own sake are
in danger of ending up with a world-weariness and a sense of futility. This is because
they make the mistake of
taking parasitic values as host values, while allowing the real host values to
languish in subordinate positions. The real host values are, particularly, the trio of
truth, respect, and justice, all so many basic acknowledgements of the independent
value of objects of experience. Experiential values depend in the end on such
acknowledgements. (Walsh, p. 108)
Right above experiential values are "ethical values" or respect for others, followed by the
fourth and highest level "ecstatic values" or a love for others, by which Walsh is referring
to Weil's contemplative regard for someone or something which is valuable or beautiful
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independent of the human bestowal of value onto it, her, or him. Walsh explains that by
ecstatic values "the reference is not to unusual 'peak experiences' but to a, perhaps
extraordinary, dimension of ordinary daily life. Think also of being absorbed by a
person, story, scene, etc." (p. 103).
Walsh's position is that ethical values cannot stand by themselves; they need to be
nourished by their connection to ecstatic values:
There is something inherently unstable about a position that makes respect for
persons the central virtue in our dealings with others. The ground on which it
tries to stand has a way of vanishing. If it is too embarrassed to acknowledge its
subsidiary to love, it risks collapsing back into a prudentially motivated regard for
others, a subscription to a social contract that promises in return for respect given.
(Walsh, 1993, p. 113)
If Walsh places Weil on the top of his scale, where does he place Dewey? While
acknowledging that Dewey is "still the educational philosopher most worth reading" (p.
109) and that he integrates ethical and experiential values in a coherent system, Walsh
asserts that his philosophy has a basic flaw: Dewey rejected the idea that "the objects of
experience can possess value in themselves" (p. 109). If one accepts Walsh's taxonomy
of educational values, then Dewey falls back to third place because (again, if we accept
Walsh's assertion that ethical values are dependent on ecstatic values) his ethical theory
has no firm ground on which to stand.
Walsh certainly puts Weil and Dewey in bold relief-but is he fair to Dewey or has
he constructed a "straw man"? No doubt, Garrison (1997) and Kestenbaum (2002) would
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argue the latter. Both might assert that Dewey upheld "ecstatic values" as Walsh defined
them: experiencing the extraordinary in the ordinary. In fact, Kestenbaum tacitly13
employs Simone Weil to support his position that Dewey was more interested in
transcendent values than is generally believed. Is Kestenbaum more accurate in his
picture of Dewey, or is Walsh? Is Kestenbaum reading into Dewey a Platonism that
Garrison would adamantly maintain isn't there? These questions will be considered in
due co_urse as this dissertation attempts to uncover Dewey's and Weil's views on wisdom
and education.
Although Kestenbaum (2002) points to a transcendent dimension that Weil and
Dewey might share, there are other grounds on which they could find a basis for
discussion. Both thinkers adopted a similar approach in pursuit of wisdom: For both,
experience was the foundational platform on which they constructed their ideas, and for
both, practical action was the -criterion for testing the validity of those same ideas. Even
though Dewey was much more explicit in connecting his notion of experience to his ideas
of nature (Dewey, 1929a), art (1934/1979), and education (1938/1963), Weil's respect for
experience is revealed in a statement that enucleates her thought: "Faith is the experience
that the intelligence is lighted up by love" (Weil, 1952-55/1956, p. 240). Dewey echoes
this: "That God is love is a more worthy idealization than that the divine is power. Since
love at its best brings illumination and wisdom, this meaning is as worthy as that the
13 Actually, Kestenbaum (2002, pp.17-18, 32-33) uses Iris Murdoch to bolster his
argument. I do not know if he is aware of it, but Murdoch was deeply influenced by Weil
and acknowledged her debt, especially to Weil's concept of attention which Kestenbaum
uses second-hand. See Murdoch (1985, pp. 34,40, 50, 104).
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divine is truth" (Dewey, 1929a, p. 167). However, for Weil, "idealizations" of God were
problematic. She shows this in one striking illustration (Cayley, 2002): Imagine two
people who have not experienced God. One is an atheist. The other believes in God.
Who is closer to God? The atheist is closer, because he doesn't have a false conception
of God which gets in the way. This raises all kinds of questions about how one can
properly interpret an experience, but it does demonstrate how fundamental the notion of
experience is in her thought.
This dissertation will analyze and compare the published writings of John Dewey
and Simone Weil on wisdom and how to educate for a love of it. Out of this comparative
analysis, a dialectical method will be devised whereby the views of one thinker will be
critiqued by the views of the other and vice versa.
The second and third chapters have an identical structure. Each chapter-the
second on Dewey and the third on Weil-is introduced by a biographical sketch and then
proceeds to an analysis that is structured around three questions: What is wisdom? How
is wisdom connected to experience? How does one educate for a love of wisdom?
In the fourth chapter, the analysis employs a dialectical or back-and-forth method:
Dewey's assertions are examined through the eyes of WeiI and vice-versa. While not
quite reaching the status of a dialogue, the chapter concludes with a brief imaginary
conversation between Dewey and Weil. The comparison attempts to answer three
questions: How is wisdom connected to experience from a psychological perspective?
How is wisdom connected to the social dimension of experience? How is wisdom
connected to nature?
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In the fifth chapter, the comparison of Dewey and Weil continues by examining
how one can educate for, and be educated by, a love of wisdom. After summarizing the
short history of Dewey's laboratory school, the discussion is guided by the following
question: How does one educate for love of wisdom, taking into account its connection to
experience and its connection to thinking?
In the sixth and final chapter, love is examined in its relationship to wisdom.
What does it mean to love wisdom? Do Dewey and Weil share the same love? Finally,
certain lines of inquiry are suggested for further research.
CHAPTER TWO: JOHN DEWEY AND THE LOVE OF WISDOM
In this chapter, a selection of John Dewey's writings will be analyzed to examine
his answers to the following questions: What is wisdom? How is wisdom connected to
experience? How does one educate for a love of wisdom? Before embarking on this
task, Dewey's life will be reviewed briefly. I draw on four sources for this biographical
sketch: Good (2006), Levine (n.d.), Rockefeller (1991), and Westbrook (1991). The
purpose of this short biography is to provide the reader with a context within which to
better understand and assess his ideas. If wisdom is deeply connected to practice, then
the deeds accomplished by a thinker may shed some light. However, readers must resist
the temptation to use biographical information to "psychologize" or explain away his
ideas, or worse, to provide ammunition for ad hominem attacks.
Biographical Sketch
John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont on 20 October 1859. His father
was a grocer who volunteered to fight for the Union in the Civil War. His mother was a
devout evangelical Christian who valued education-she was very concerned that John and
his two brothers were "right with Jesus" (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 37) and encouraged her
sons to read extensively and to set their sights on becoming the first Deweys to obtain
university degrees. Dewey completed his undergraduate studies at the University of
Vermont in 1879. For the next 3 years, he taught high school-2 years in Pennsylvania
and 1 year in Vermont. One evening during his time in Pennsylvania he had a mystical
experience in which he felt at one with the universe. According to Westbrook (1991):
"He would never lose touch with this feeling, though his interpretation of its meaning and
implications would change dramatically" (p. 8).
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Dissatisfied with highschool teaching and encouraged by having an article
accepted by the Journal ofSpeculative Philosophy, Dewey decided to enroll as a full-time
graduate student at the first American university dedicated to scientific research in the
modern sense-the fledgling Johns Hopkins in Baltimore. His most influential instructors
were the philosopher George Sylvester Morris, with whom he completed his training in
Hegelian philosophy, and the psychologist George Stanley Hall, with whom he developed
a growing appreciation for the experimental methods of modern science. At this stage of
his intellectual development, Hegel seemed to offer Dewey a way to hold onto the
insights of empirical science without letting go of a Christian idealism. More important,
Dewey was drawn to Hegel's elaborate synthesis which pictured reality as an ordered
whole of distinct-yet-related parts that could be experienced and known. Hegel rejected
all dualisms, especially the Kantian one between knowable phenomena (things-available-
to-experience) and unknowable noumena (things-beyond-experience). Dewey's lifelong
attack on "either/or thinking" echoed Hegel. After completing a dissertation on Kant's
psychology, Dewey received his doctorate from Hopkins in 1884 (Levine, n.d.).
Later that summer, he accepted an offer to teach philosophy at the University of
Michigan in Ann Arbor. Two years later he married a former student, Alice Chipman,
who had been nurtured in an environment that prized independent thinking. According to
Rockefeller (1991), the marriage to Alice transformed him: "By the end of his ten years in
Ann Arbol; the lonely, bookish, and self-conscious graduate student of the early 1880s
had become a well-adjusted, well-liked, and highly respected (if controversial), professor,
active citizen, and family man" (p. 149). In 1887, he published his first major work.
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Psychology attempted to combine neo-Hegelian idealism with the latest results in
empirical science. This was met with stinging criticism by many, including his former
teacher, George Stanley Hall, and fellow philosopher, William James (Westbrook, 1991,
pp. 26-28). He seemed to accept the rebuke from empiricists that "the Absolute" was a
concept that could only be postulated a priori, for Dewey soon abandoned it and
increasingly sought to ground his work in a Darwinian naturalism. His personal life
increasingly reflected his academic work in this regard. For example, overruling the
objections of his mother, he did not send his children to Sunday school, and even though
he maintained his membership in the First Congregational Church of Ann Arbor, the ties
to institutional Christianity were severed when he and his family moved to Chicago in
1894. The 10-year sojourn at the University of Michigan was interrupted by a year of
teaching at the University of Minnesota (1888-1889). Dewey returned to the University
of Michigan in 1889 to head the philosophy department after the untimely death of his
former mentor and colleague, G. S. Morris.
Influenced by his wife and the writings of British idealist Thomas Hill Green,
Dewey's thinking took a decisive, practical turn: He wanted to connect philosophy to the
wider life of society, to use philosophy as an instrument that could help people from all
social strata become more active and intelligent participants in a truly democratic form of
life. One striking example was his aborted attempt to enter the "real" life of newspaper
publishing in 1892. Franklin Ford, a utopian journalist, convinced Dewey to join him in
producing a newspaper free of commercial interests-Thought News-that would ostensibly
aid the reading public in thinking about social issues in a meaningful way. When Ford's
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grandiose announcement in the Detroit Tribune was lampooned by the local press, Dewey
distanced himself from the project, and it fell apart before the first issue was published
(Westbrook, 1991, pp. 51-58). Nevertheless, Dewey did not retreat into the ivory towers
of academe: The desire to connect his thinking with a wider public remained strong for
the rest of his life, and he continually looked for ways in which he could contribute as a
philosopher to strengthen the democratic currents of American society.
By the time Dewey accepted an offer to chair the philosophy department at the
newly formed University of Chicago in 1894, he had moved away from neo-Hegelian
idealism: 14 His philosophical attention focused less on metaphysics and more on ethics,
logical theory, and education. He attracted young scholars (such as George Herbert
Mead), whom he forged into a community of inquiry. Under his leadership they began to
build the logical and psychological foundations for an approach to philosophy that
followed the groundbreaking efforts of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, an
approach that would later be called "pragmatic."
Pursuing his interest in the practice of education, he founded the University of
Chicago Elementary School (1896-1903) to try out educational methods which assumed
that learning best occurred through active inquiry aimed at solving authentic problems.
Dewey (1899, 1902/1990) wanted this school to model "a genuine form of active
community life, instead of a place set apart in which to learn lessons" (p. 14). Putting
occupations at the core of the elementary curriculum, Dewey wanted children to learn and
14 Good (2006) distinguishes between neo-Hegelianism and Hegel. He argues that the
"Hegelian deposit" in Dewey's thinking was substantial and that Dewey never
abandoned a humanist/historicist reading of Hegel.
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grow through such authentic activities as woodworking, cooking, sewing, and gardening.
Unlike trade schools that emphasized training for the development of manual skills,
Dewey wanted the occupational experience to be educative (i.e., to balance and integrate
intellectual problem-solving with manual skill development). This meant that in tackling
a problematic situation, a child in his school was responsible for defining the problem, for
formulating a plan of action in tackling it, and for selecting appropriate materials and
tools to be used in implementing the plan. This included developing the capacity to
perceive errors along with the ability to correct them (Dewey, 1899,1902/1990, p. 133).
Of course, this whole process was guided by a teacher who had to develop the art of
appropriate intervention-knowing when to offer suggestions and when to back off.
With the publication of The School and Society in 1899 and The Child and the
Curriculum in 1902 (Dewey, 1899, 1902/1990), Dewey was becoming an influential
voice in educational reform. Nevertheless, the University of Chicago did not
wholeheartedly support Dewey's laboratory school. He had to scramble constantly for
funds to keep the school afloat, and finally, in 1904 when his wife's position as principal
of the school was terminated, Dewey resigned (Westbrook, 1991, pp. 111-113).
With plans to begin teaching philosophy and psychology the following year at
Columbia University in New York City, John Dewey embarked on a European vacation
with his wife and children. In Ireland, the family suffered its second tragic loss: Son
Gordon died of typhoid fever. (In 1895 son Morris had died of diphtheria during the first
family trip to Europe.) According to Rockefeller (1991):
The loss of Morris, Gordon, and the "Dewey School" was never forgotten, but it
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did not break his spirit. His gentle kindly disposition and fundamentally positive
attitude toward life remained intact. He continued to find a sustaining sense of
meaning in his life and work, which was carried on in a profoundly productive
way at Columbia. (p. 232)
His thinking on education continued to develop as he studied various school
reforms. On one occasion in 1913, he introduced Maria Montessori to a packed audience
in Carnegie Hall. His evaluation of the Montessori method gives us an insightful
glimpse into his own conceptions. It appeared in one chapter of Schools olTo-morrow
(1915), which he coauthored with his daughter Evelyn. Although they appreciated
Montessori's didactic materials as useful for very young children, Dewey and Dewey
criticized her method for its rigid structure, its distance from the problems that children
encounter outside of school, and its neglect of the social dimension in education:
Each pupil works independently on material that is self-corrective. But there is no
freedom allowed the child to create. He is free to choose which apparatus he will
use, but never to choose his own ends, never to bend a material to his own plans.
For the material is limited to a fixed number of things which must be handled in a
certain way. (pp. 157-158) 15
15 Reflecting the conventions of their time, Dewey and Weil used the masculine form
when referring to singular human beings in a generic sense of either gender or when
using such abstract terms as "mankind" or "man" which today would be more
appropriately designated as "humankind" or "humanity." In this and subsequent
chapters, I will use the feminine gender when referring to singular human beings to
counterbalance this. Although in ancient Greek and Jewish writings, wisdom is often
personified as a woman (Sophia), my purpose is to reduce awkwardness in
style-avoiding "his/her" in my own writing and dispensing with "[sic]" when citing
Dewey or Weil.
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In attacking Montessori's conception of freedom as excessively individualistic, Dewey
and Dewey qualified their own view of liberty in education:
Help from others is not to be feared as an encroachment upon liberty, but that kind
of help which restricts the use of children's own intelligence in forming ends and
using ingenuity, initiative and inventiveness in the selection and adaptation of
materials. The limitation of material to performing exercises calculated to train an
isolated sense - a situation that never presents itself in life - seems to the
American teacher a greater limitation of freedom than that which arises from the
need of cooperation with others in the performance of common activities. (p. 161)
The following year Dewey elaborated and developed this view into what would be his
most comprehensive statement on education-Democracy and Education (1916/1966).
As the United States was on the verge of entering the First World War, Dewey
became more politically active. When he declared his support for U. S. involvement on
the grounds that an Allied victory would clear the ground for democratic reform in
Europe, Randolph Bourne, one of his former students, chided Dewey for allowing his
clear-thinking pragmatism to be clouded by an American chauvinism that played into the
hands of capitalist elites who controlled governments. 16 By contrast, when Dewey turned
his attention to the Polish-American community, who were concerned about the status of
their homeland after the war, he remained truer to his ideals by siding with the democratic
socialists (Westbrook, 1991, pp. 197-227).
16 Dewey?s argument for using military force to establish the conditions for democracy
seem eerily similar to the one used by supporters of the American invasion of Iraq.
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From 1919 to 1921, John and Alice Dewey journeyed through Japan and China as
part of an extended sabbatical. He was often invited to speak, and one series of lectures
given at the Imperial University of Tokyo was published in 1920 as Reconstruction in
Philosophy. Dewey (1920/1948) wanted to modernize philosophy, to rebuild it from
scratch as a human science following the pattern of natural science. As he had done with
education, he aimed to liberate philosophy from the dualism that so often opposed theory
to practice:
Reason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the pattern of science, and
used in the creation of social arts; it has something to do. It liberates man from
the bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened into custom. It
projects a better future and assists man in its realization. And its operation is
always subject to test in experience. The plans which are formed, the principles
which man projects as guides of reconstructive action, are not dogmas. They are
hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and
expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it
requires. (p. 96)
Soon after returning from Asia, Dewey was enlisted to join a group that wished to outlaw
war. Part of this inv'olvement pulled him into a war of words with critics such as the
influential journalist Walter Lippman, a "democratic realist," who argued that modern
society was too complex for the type of participatory democracy that Dewey idealistically
espoused. Although Dewey agreed with Lippman's description of the problem, he did
not agree with his solution. Unlike Lippman, who saw a limited role for participatory
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democracy in a modern industrial state ruled by rotating elites assisted by experts, Dewey
would not let go of his ideal even though he did not give clear instructions on how to
attain it: to strengthen and stabilize local communities so that frequent face-to-face
interactions would naturally develop into a participatory democracy (Westbrook, 1991,
pp. 260-318).
During the "Roaring Twenties," Dewey wrote prolifically on a variety of subjects
such as social psychology (Human Nature and Conduct, 1922) and political philosophy
(The Public and Its Problems, 1927/1954). Experience and Nature (1929a) was an
elaborate attempt to lay the metaphysical groundwork for his own reconstructed
philosophy. Here Dewey laid out the core of his pragmatism and instrumentalism by
transforming the orthodox language of traditional philosophy: The ontological
distinctions of subject and object were recast into the functional distinctions of organism
and environment within a holistic reality called nature. Experience, which occurred in the
transaction between organism and environment, was ontologically prior to knowledge.
Thinking was a conscious activity which took place after the organism experienced a
disruptien in the transaction. Knowledge was gained after the organism had found a way
to eliminate the disruption, with the result that subsequent experience was reconstructed
and enriched by this knowledge.
During the 1920s, his fame as an educational theorist kept growing, and three
countries invited him to study their school systems-Turkey, Mexico, and the Soviet
Union. Although he admired Russian society and its educational system, he grew
increasingly critical of Stalinist oppression and of Marxist dialectical materialism, which
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he regarded as another form of philosophical absolutism. After the Mexico trip in 1926,
Alice Dewey's health began to deteriorate; she died the following year. His children
supported Dewey through this loss and assisted him with domestic matters for the next
two decades (Rockefeller, 1991, pp. 360-361).
Dewey retired from Columbia in 1930, yet he remained active in public life and
wrote prodigiously. He worked in such organizations as the League for Independent
Political Action and the People's Lobby in the 1930s to challenge a two-party system that
was too closely tied to big business and too far removed from the common person. In
1937, at the age of 77, he chaired a commission that investigated Soviet charges of
treason and murder against Leon Trotsky in Mexico. According to Westbrook (1991),
"Dewey proved to be an alert, patient, and thorough chairman whose energy and devotion
to the task at hand impressed observers as well as Trotsky himself' (p. 481). The works
he published during this decade explored the religious, educational, and aesthetic
dimensions of experience (Dewey, 1934/1960, 1938/1963, 1934/1979).
During the 1940s, he wrote over 50 essays and book reviews. In 1946, John
Dewey married Roberta Grant (who was more than 40 years younger), and together they
adopted two young children. On June 1, 1952, less than 6 years into his second marriage,
he died. Westbrook (1991) provides a fitting epitaph: "Although he was slowed in his
last months by a broken hip - suffered while playing with his children - he remained
intellectually engaged to the very end of his life" (p. 537).
What Is Wisdom?
Here we have a life that spanned close to a century! Born before the American
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Civil War, John Dewey lived long enough to see the beginning of the Cold War. If
wisdom comes with age, then Dewey certainly deserves our attention. In an essay
delivered on his behalf by one of his former students (Sidney Hook) to an international
gathering of philosophers in Amsterdam in 1948, Dewey (1948/1989c) implored his
colleagues to consider
a re-tum to the view of philosophy put forward of old by Socrates. It constitutes
search for the wisdom that shall be a guide of life. It marks a return to the original
view of philosophy as a moral undertaking in the sense in which the moral and the
deeply and widely human are identical. (p. 365)
However, unlike the ancient Greek philosophers and their medieval successors who
searched for wisdom as a guide to life by looking for eternal verities that were believed to
be the unchanging ground of existence, Dewey argued that one should search for wisdom
in the other direction: Keeping a steady gaze fixed on the changing flux of everyday life,
one should look for possibilities suggested by present experience that could point towards
means available for constructing a better way of life.
If we grant Dewey the assumption that wisdom cannot be found in some
unchanging form beyond the reach of experience, how would one find it within
experience, and how would one recognize it if it was found? In other words, did Dewey
have a clear idea of what he was looking for? Did he have a concept of wisdom? Dewey
never wrote a treatise or essay on wisdom per see All we have are a few statements
scattered among the 37 volumes of his collected works.
Let us consider some of them in chronological order. The first clear statement
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appears in "Philosophy and Democracy," an essay published in 1918. In it Dewey had
connected wisdom with moral values at least 30 years before the Amsterdam conference
noted above:
By wisdom we mean not systematic and proved knowledge of fact and truth, but a
conviction of moral values, a sense for the better kind of life to be led. Wisdom is
a moral term, and like every kind of moral term refers not to the constitution of
things already in existence, not even if that constitution be magnified into eternity
and absoluteness. As a moral term it refers to a choice about something to be
done, a preference for living this sort of life rather than that. It refers not to
accomplished reality but to a desired future which our desires, when translated
into articulate conviction, may bring about into existence. (Dewey, 1918/1982, p.
44)
In the above statement, Dewey sharply distinguished his search for wisdom from the
older metaphysical quest: the wisdom he was looking for was time bound and forward
looking; it was directed to changing present conditions for a better future, which for
Dewey meant creating a more democratic way of life. A decade later, he qualified the
essentially future orientation of wisdom by noting its necessary connection to situations in
the present: "For wisdom as to ends depends upon acquaintance with conditions and
means, and unless the acquaintance is adequate and fair, wisdom becomes a sublimated
folly of self-deception" (Dewey, 1929a, p. 46).
Later on in the same volume, Dewey (1929a) pointed out that wisdom's
dependence upon knowledge of environmental conditions is not an academic exercise
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performed in the comfortable confines of a classroom far removed from an actual
situation where such conditions are felt and experienced:
Barely to note and register that contingency is a trait of natural events has nothing
to do with wisdom. To note, however, contingency in connection with a concrete
situation of life is that fear of the Lord which is at least the beginning of wisdom.
The detection and definition of nature's end is in itself barren. But the undergoing
that actually goes on in the light of this discovery brings one close to supreme
issues: life and death. (pp. 334 -335)
The above passage also demonstrates a rhetorical device that Dewey often used to bring
home a point with his readers. His audience would have been very familiar with Biblical
allusions,17 but Dewey frequently employed them in ways which would shock orthodox
Christians who read him carefully. For Christians or Jews, the experience of contingent
conditions was a wake-up call to the fragility of life. It led believers to fearfully
acknowledge their dependence on a supernatural God, and this would impel them to
reconsider their way of living-the beginning of wisdom. Dewey saw contingency playing
a similar role in his view of wisdom, a view, however, which did not allow within its
scope anything "above" or "beyond" nature. In Dewey's reading of history, prescientific
cultures should not be blamed for their reliance on dogma and cult to bring consolation in
the midst of natural contingencies. They did not know what they were doing. But we
should know better: We have access to the proven methods of modem science which can
17 Dewey is alluding to Psalm 111, verse 10: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom."
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help us secure a better future within the precarious present. There is no supernatural god
to save us from the hard labor associated with reform.
A few years later, in a substantially revised textbook on ethics which he
coauthored with James Tufts, Dewey looked more carefully at how our desires for the
future could be intelligently regulated by wisdom:
Our discussion has centered on the goods which approve themselves to the
thoughtful, or morally "wise," person in their relations to the satisfactions which
suggest themselves because of immediate and intense desire, impulse, and
appetite. The office of reflection we have seen to be the formation of a judgment
of value in which particular satisfactions are placed as integral parts of conduct as
a consistent harmonious whole. If values did not get in one another's way, if, that
is, the realization of one desire were not incompatible with that of another, there
would be no need of reflection. We should grasp and enjoy each thing as it comes
along. Wisdom, or as it is called on the ordinary plane, prudence, sound
judgment, is the ability to foresee consequences in such a way that we form ends
which grow into one another and reenforce one another. Moral folly is the
surrender of the greater good for the lesser; it is snatching at one satisfaction in a
way which prevents us from having others and which gets us subsequently into
trouble and dissatisfaction. (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, pp. 210-211)
We will return to Dewey's concept of wisdom as the ability to foresee consequences and
form reenforcing ends after we complete this very brief survey of his explicit statements.
Responding to one of his critics, Dewey (1949/1989d) pointed out the c9nnection
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between wisdom and knowledge in a way that succinctly summed up his position:
wisdom being not knowledge but knowledge-plus; knowledge turned into account
in the instruction and guidance it may convey in piloting life through the storms
and shoals that beset life-experience as well as into such havens of consummatory
experience as enrich our human life from time to time. (p. 383)
From the few explicit statements reviewed above, Dewey's view of wisdom can
be summarized as follows: Wisdom is a guide for living, a conviction of moral values, a
sense for a better life. As such, wisdom aims to change present conditions in order to
achieve a better future. This guide for living involves possessing knowledge that can be
applied, and it works only as a guide insofar as it is applied. As a sense for a better life,
wisdom is "the ability to foresee consequences in such a way that we form ends which
grow into one another and reenforce one another" (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, p. 210).
Wisdom could be viewed from various angles-as a guide, a conviction, a sense, an
ability, a combination of thinking and acting-but each angle did not quite capture the
whole of wisdom. Put another way, wisdom integrated the cognitive, affective, and
sensorimotor dimensions of life when viewed as a whole.
What sane person would not desire that? Who would not want to resolve the
inner contradictions that so often make it difficult to live in a unified, coherent fashion?
However, wisdom was not a commodity that was easily purchased or a technique that was
discovered in the armchair of comfortable contemplation: It could be found only in the
changing circumstances of everyday life where danger and risk could not be avoided.
Fear accompanied anyone who searched for it there. Wisdom was found in the
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experience of living.
How Is Wisdom Connected to Experience?
As a philosopher who tried to reclaim the vocation first spelled out by the ancient
Greeks, Dewey found himself in a shrinking minority. His colleagues in the academic
profession were (and to a great extent still are) engaged less in philosophy and more in
what Alexander (2003) calls "philepistemy"- the love of knowledge:
The modern practice of philosophy, like the university itself, appropriated a quasi-
scientific model in which rigorous technical analysis of discrete problems isolated
and concentrated upon for their own sake is believed to lead to the increase in
"knowledge" . . .. it is paramount to recognize that any endeavor to think in a
Deweyan mode is to engage in the practice of philosophy as the love of wisdom.
(pp. 129-130)
For Dewey, the search for wisdom involved reflecting on the practice of living first of
all. 18 Even when evaluating a theory's inner coherence, the underlying purpose was to see
how effectively that theory could inform and enrich lived experience through practical
action.
Obviously, examining the few fragments we have culled from Dewey's writings
which explicitly mention wisdom are not enough to go on. Few questions are answered.
Many more are raised. What does it mean to look for wisdom within experience? How is
this moral quest intrinsically connected to what science has shown us about nature? We
18 Schon's (1983) reflective practitioner would feel at home in the wider and more
inclusive expanses of Dewey's thought.
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need to go further into his underlying theory with the confidence that the few explicit
fragments reviewed above are merely the tips of an iceberg.
To flesh out Dewey's approach to answering these questions, we need to begin
with Dewey's starting point-the transaction between a human being and her surrounding
environment. This implies a psychological approach at first-the transaction is best
understood from the experience of an individual but without ignoring her connections to
other humans who are part of the surrounding environment-eonnections that will be
explored in due course. Therefore, we will begin with his introduction to social
psychology (Human Nature and Conduct, 1922), where the notion of habit plays a pivotal
role in understanding how transactions with the environment are established, maintained,
and reconstructed. Since wisdom is a moral activity, we will go on to examine his ethical
theory coauthored with James Tufts (Ethics, 1932/1989), and finally, since wisdom must
take into account the conditions of existence, we will conclude with a brief look at how
he conceived the nature of reality-his metaphysical theory (Experience and Nature,
1929a).
Wisdom and Habit
Dewey (1922) begins Human Nature and Conduct with the grand anti-Kantian
assumption which he shared with Hegel-namely, that the moral realm and the natural
realm could not and should not be viewed as ontologically distinct. Nevertheless, he is
asking the reader to adopt this stance a priori, implicitly promising that if you stick with
him and follow his train of thought, a more balanced approach to wisdom will emerge:
Until the integrity of morals with human nature and of both with the environment
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is recognized, we shall be deprived of the aid of past experience to cope with the
most acute and deep problems of life .... The intelligent acknowledgment of the
continuity of nature, man, and society will alone secure a growth of morals which
will be serious without being fanatical, aspiring without sentimentality, adapted to
reality without conventionality, sensible without taking the form of calculation of
profits, idealistic without being romantic. (pp. 12-13)
The continuity of nature with humans was secured through a transaction with the
environment that Dewey called "habit." A human was "a creature of habit, not of reason,
nor yet of instinct" (p. 125). A habit was more than an overt, routine activity or series of
repeated actions: It was a predisposition to act in a certain way that included a "special
sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and
aversions" (p. 42). A habit was acquired through the mediation of other humans: A child
began life outside the womb as a bundle of ceaseless energy during its waking hours. A
helpless infant was a dynamic series of impulsive events that gradually acquired co-
ordination and control of its own activity through interchanges with caring adults who
gave meaning to physical discharges: "You're hungry, aren't you? Here, come to
mommy. There, doesn't that taste good?" Habits were acquired through social
mediation, and required an ongoing, supportive social environment to develop into wiser
dispositions.
Dewey maintained that humans must be understood as active beings who respond
to stimuli only after or during a specific act in which the stimulus is established. The
stimulus is constructed in a habit-a predisposition-as a result of prior activity: In a
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habitual transaction with the environment, one happens upon something that is
transformed by habit into a stimulus for subsequent responses. For example, my taste for
Coca-Cola was developed after my first experience drinking a Coke, and every cola since
that time does not taste exactly the same because I carry a deposit from that first
experience in combination with a transaction in which the related terms-organism and
environment-have also undergone change. The stimulus associated with viewing or
thinking about that particular drink was established in my habit after the first encounter.
To cite a more extreme example: The first high of a heroin addict can never be repeated,
yet through it a potent stimulus is constructed, and the first iron link of a powerful drug
habit is forged.
In contrast with habits (such as those associated with drugs) that produce
immediate satisfactions, the development of a habitual transaction in which satisfactions
are not immediately received-such as a training regimen to improve cardiovascular
conditioning-requires persistent effort and attention. Once achieved, it becomes a
mechanism which seems to take on a life of its own and requires little thought - until a
disruption is experienced. Whether felt as a minor annoyance or a major affliction, a
disruption is an occasion whereby the rudiments of wisdom may develop. Dewey (1922)
delineates the continuity that a human organism has in transaction with an environment:
Normally, the environment remains sufficiently in harmony with the body of
organized activities [habits] to sustain most of them in active function. But a
novel factor in the surroundings releases some impulse which tends to initiate a
different and incompatible activity, to bring about a redistribution of the elements
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of organized activity. (p. 179)
The novel factor acts as a stimulus to release the impulse because the organism's habits
include a sensitivity to certain classes of stimuli as is illustrated in the following
semifictional example.
It is 1534. Let us imagine the European Jacques Cartier and the aboriginal chief
Donnacona walking through a forested region along the banks of a great river which
Cartier had named in honor of Saint Lawrence. Donnacona stops and motions to Cartier
to do the same. Donnacona has noticed that the birds are very quiet-a stillness that may
signify the presence of other aboriginals, perhaps his hated enemy the Iroquois. Unlike
Cartier who would have walked noisily and unwittingly into an ambush, Donnacona has
cultivated a sensitivity necessary to survive in this environment-a predisposition acquired
through the habits and customs of his own people.
Donnacona motions to his warriors behind him. They understand and are ready
when the Iroquois attack. Cartier has his sword out in time to stop an onrushing Iroquois.
Realizing that they have lost the advantage of surprise, the enemy raiding party quickly
retreats, with Donnacona's warriors in pursuit. Cartier looks at the fallen Iroquois dying
in front of him. If he had been slower in drawing his sword. . .. He is indebted to
Donnacona. There is a lot more to these "savages" then he thought.
Now at these moments of a shifting in activity conscious feeling and thought arise
and are accentuated. The disturbed adjustment of organism is reflected in a
temporary strife which concludes in a coming to terms of the old habit and the
new impulse. (Dewey, 1922, p. 179)
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In other words, the organism experiences cognitive dissonance until-as Piaget might
describe it-the organism accommodates itself to the new information by constructing a
new schema (a new habit) that incorporates the old one. Dewey's description more
explicitly places thinking, feeling, impulse, and action as functional (not ontologically
distinct) elements holistically and interdependently connected within an experience:
In this period of redistribution impulse furnishes the focus about which
reorganization swirls. Our attention in short is always directed forward to bring to
notice something which is immanent but which as yet escapes us. Impulse defines
the peering, the search, the inquiry. (p. 180)
Dewey avoids using language which may compromise his "integrationist" position. The
older psychology would bring in a faculty called "reason"-an ability to think rationally
which is essentially foreign to our "lower" nature. Dewey locates the ability to think and
to re-search within this impulse which the older psychology would label as part of
"desire"-an,"irrational" faculty which opposes itself to reason. Dewey places the
opposition among competing desires, one or some of which are reflective and oriented to
inquiry:
During this search, old habit supplies content, filling, definite, recognizable,
subject-matter. It begins with vague presentiment of what we are going towards.
As organized habits are definitely employed and focused, the confused situation
takes on form, it is "cleared up"-the essential function of intelligence. (p. 180)
The old, disrupted habit is not cast aside-it is broken up and redistributed into a new
organized activity which reestablishes a harmony among competing desires at the same
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time as it reconnects the organism with the environment in a way that is stronger and
richer.
How does this happen? It occurs through deliberation which is "a dramatic
rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action" (Dewey, 1922,
p. 190):
Deliberation means precisely that activity is disintegrated, and that its various
elements hold one another up. [They get in each other's way.] While none has
force enough to become the center of a re-directed activity, or to dominate a
course of action, each has enough power to check others from exercising mastery.
Activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection; activity is turned from
execution into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal. (p. 191)
Notice how Dewey keeps activity at the centre of an organism. Reflection or thinking is
activity turned inwards. In Piagetan language, concrete operational thinking (a child tries
out various courses of action in the environment by manipulating various objects)
becomes formal operational thinking (a child tries out various courses of action in his
mind).
Dewey's brilliant analysis challenges Kantian-conditioned habits of thinking that
run in sealed-off channels. It is difficult for the Western mind to shake off ontological
dualisms-theory/practice, thinking/feeling, reason/desire-and thereby understand
Dewey's position. A person with a Kantian mind-set is tempted either to accuse him of
reducing morality and rationality to mindless biological mechanisms, or to disparage his
thinking as being too vague, as not making clear enough distinctions that make sense to a
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rationalist who is more comfortable with analysis than synthesis, with thinking than with
feeling, with theory than with practice. Such a person might be afraid to make the
transition from ontological designations (the mind exists in itself) to functional ones (the
"mind" is shorthand for describing how biological impulses are organized in habits),
because she would hate to give in to her "lower" nature and lose the ability to think
clearly and to act morally, i.e., to choose disinterestedly, without regard for preference.
To return to the Dewey's analysis: After imaginatively rehearsing various courses
of action, one is chosen. It is not an arbitrary selection made by a detached observer.
This "chosen" one somehow arranges the other options around it like iron filings fitting
into the force field of a magnet. The impeded impulse has found a way through the
obstacle caused by a disruption:
Choice is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of habits
and impulses, finds a way fully open .... Choice is not the emergence of
preference out of indifference [the Kantian moral position]. It is the emergence of
a unified preference out of competing preferences. (Dewey, 1922, pp. 192-193)
Here Dewey reworks Plato. The Platonic virtue of temperance-the right ordering of
desire-is here intrinsically connected with "reasonableness." Instead of a Platonic
tripartite soul (the rational part with the virtue of wisdom, the spirited part with the virtue
of courage, and the desiring or appetitive part with the virtue of temperance), Dewey
allows the various desires to mingle (the Latin root of temper) in the act of deliberation.
The beginning of wisdom originates in a temperance that naturally emerges from "below"
rather than being imposed from "above:"
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Reasonableness is in fact a quality of an effective relationship among desires
rather than a thing opposed to desire. It signifies the order, perspective,
proportion which is achieved, during deliberation, out of a diversity of earlier
incompatible preferences. (p. 194)
As Dewey conceives it, reasonableness or rationality (reasonableness with a mathematical
accent) is a pattern of ratios in proportionate relationships among desires, a pattern which
effectively and efficiently meets the requirements of acting wisely within a specific
situation. It is a pattern that fits this situation. It is good in the ancient sense: It fits what
is needed in this particular case. Deweyan wisdom is situational ethics in the best sense:
Each situation is unique; therefore a pattern applied in one situation cannot apply as well
in a new situation. However, the pattern of a previous situation can be employed as an
hypothesis to guide deliberation in a new situation without applying it as a rule or recipe.
Dewey distinguished between principles and rules: Principles were inductive tools for
analyzing specific situations in the same way that hypotheses gave focus and direction to
scientific experiments. Rules were more like the deductive axioms formulated by
Aristotelian science which assumed a static universe: "A principle evolves in connection
with the course of experience, being a generalized statement of what sort of consequences
and values tend to be realized in certain kinds of situations; a rule is taken as something
ready-made and fixed" (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, p. 276). Experienced teachers know
that they can never present the same lesson twice in exactly the same.way. Often what
worked well with one group of students is relatively ineffective with another.
Once the choice is made, imaginative rehearsal (inner activity) is transformed into
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practical action (outer activity). Such rationality has integrity because the desires are held
together in a harmonious whole. It is a "wholesome" passion. Without the pattern of
reasonableness, desires would compete with each other or get in each other's way, or-as
is seen in a person who is intemperate-one desire will master the others in a way which is
not "wholesome." But paradoxically, the pattern emerges out of confusion and
deliberation. Things have to work themselves out-it takes patience to wait for the pattern
to emerge, to not force the issue by imposing a pattern which does not do justice to all of
the desires. Rationality and temperance are one in Dewey's psychology.
But then Dewey (1922) makes a startling assertion: "This implies, of course, the
presence of a comprehensive object, one which coordinates, organizes and functions each
factor of the situation which give rise to conflict, suspense and deliberation" (p. 195).
What is this comprehensive object which effects the organization of altered habits? Is
Dewey slipping in a Platonic form here that somehow exists apart from the competing
desires? No, the object in question is not an eternal idea existing in a realm beyond
nature. It is an ~'end-in-view"-aconsequence of a particular course of action foreseen in
imaginative deliberation or dramatic rehearsal. The end-in-view emerges within the
intraorganic activity of deliberation, guiding deliberation until the end-in-view furnishes
"an adequate stimulus to overt action" (p. 223). "In a strict sense an end-in-view is a
means in present action; present action is not a means to a remote end" (p. 226). The
end-in-view is a "means to unification and liberation of present conflicting, confused
habits and impulses" (p. 229).
Dewey took the taken-for-granted views on the fixed relationship of means to
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ends and threw them back into the swirling flux of present activity, where they had really
existed all along. Ends did not exist outside of activity to terminate action (to end it);
they functioned as pivots inside action. An end was a foreseen consequence of action, not
a goal that had to be reached by any means. Dewey eschewed the maxim, the end
justifies the means: It did not have a legitimate status in his moral theory because ends
were dependent on means-not the other way around. Proper moral deliberation involved
asking, "If I do this, what will be the result?" not "If I choose this goal, what is the best
way to get there?" Dewey (1922) elaborates further:
Moral theorists constantly assume that the continuous course of events can be
arrested at the point of a particular object; that men can plunge with their own
desires into the unceasing flow of change, and seize upon some object as their end
irrespective of everything else. The use of intelligence to discover the object that
will best operate as a releasing and unifying stimulus in the existing situation is
discounted .... overlooking means is only a device for failing to note those ends,
or consequences, which, if they were noted would be seen to be so evil that action
would be estoppe_d. (p. 228)
Wisdom-intelligent deliberation-involves seizing upon a promising object in imaginative
rehearsal and then considering how such an object or course of action is connected to
everything else within the situation.
Holding back the immediate impulse to act prematurely takes force. For a child,
this force originates in the environment-either immediately through the felt consequences
of its own overt actions (such as the piercing pain of a burning candle) or mediately
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through the restraining actions of others. In the first case, it is assumed that the child is
learning the consequences of its own behavior within a social milieu which protects the
child from potentially fatal results (such as falling through an open window of a sixth-
floor apartment). In the second case, the restraining actions are initially perceived by the
indignant child as consequences. ("I better not do that or I'll get into trouble.") However,
it is generally believed that if the restraint imposed by others is accompanied with reasons
that make sense to the child and is consistently applied by caring adults who themselves
model such restraint in their own behavior (Wolterstorff, 1980), then the child will more
likely develop the habit of thinking before acting-a wise habit which transforms or
sublimates enough energy needed for restraining and mediating impulse. From this
perspective, wisdom in Dewey's psychology can be conceived as a metahabit-a habit of
habits-which holds other habits together in the integrity of the self.
Wisdom and the Moral Selfin Society
If the fore~een consequences of a particular action look promising in comparison
to the consequences of alternative actions which come to mind, then a stimulus to action
emerges. This stimulus does two things at once: It unifies the habits and impulses at the
same time as it redirects overt actions. How then does Dewey understand the relationship
between a self-this bundle of habits-and the stimulus which unifies and liberates the
habits, desires, and impulses of which the self is composed? In other words, what is it
that connects the self with a particular object? To answer this question we need to
consider Dewey's ethical or moral theory.
In Deweyan moral theory, one must recognize the "essential unity ofthe selfand
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its acts" (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, p. 288). The self cannot be understood apart from
its actions. When action ceases, a living body becomes a dead corpse: The self
disappears. Inasmuch as the self does exist in any empirical sense, it exists in action. To
understand the connection between a self and a particular object, we must look at the self
acting with an object. When activity is directed towards an object, the direction is called
interest: "An interest is, in short, the dominant direction of activity, and in this activity
desire is united with an object to be furthered in a decisive choice" (p. 290).
What is the relationship between a self, a specific object, and the interest which
connects them? In one sense, the self depends on an object to furnish the interest.
Without an object, the interest has no content and does not exist; one must be interested
in something. In another sen~e, the make-up of the self determines whether an object has
interest. One legislator can be bribed, while another is immune to bribery. The object in
each case is the same, but the moral make-up of one legislator is such that the object has a
hold over him or her, whereas the moral make-up of the other is such that the object has
much less power to persuade. The power of an object to act as a pivot for action depends
on the extent to which the self is invested in the object which "as a moving force includes
the selfwithin it" (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, pp. 291-292).19
So, what is a wise person-a truly moral self-in Dewey's eyes? A wise person is
someone who recognizes that a self exists in action and that the directions of activity-the
interests which are cultivated-ehange the very make-up of the self:
19 This echoes the ancient wisdom of Jesus: "For where your treasure is, there your heart
will be also" (Barker, 2002, p. 1478).
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We prefer spontaneously, we choose deliberately, knowingly. Now every such
choice sustains a double relation to the self. It reveals the existing self and it
forms the future self .... Superficially, the deliberation which terminates in
choice is concerned with weighing the values of particular ends. Below the
surface, it is a process of discovering what sort of being a person most wants to
become. (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, pp. 286-287)
But what is of crucial importance in Dewey's theory-something that has not yet
been emphasized in our discussion-is the social factor. There is no such thing as an
individual self existing in isolation from other selves (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, p.
300). Even hermits are in debt to the caregivers who provided for them in their formative
years and with whom they developed the habits necessary for staying alive.
Growth in wisdom is experienced in deliberation when social connections are
taken into account, for a wise person understands that his or her self is realized through
actions which respect, honor, and desire those connections:
The kind of self which is formed through action which is faithful to relations with
others will be a fuller and broader self than one which is cultivated in isolation
from or in opposition to the purposes and needs of others .... But to make self-
realization a conscious aim might and probably would prevent full attention to
those very relationships which bring about the wider development of self. (Dewey
& Tufts, 1932/1989,p.302)
Self-realization or growth of the self is a very desirable outcome, but like happiness it is
one of those outcomes or consequences of actions which Dewey warns should not be
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conscious ends-in-view. The direct pursuit of happiness or self-realization is a vain
endeavor when the conditions which make them possible are ignored; as outcomes they
emerge when other activities and interests are consciously pursued.
What are these interests? In other words, what is the connection between the
interests which compose the self and the social factor which when taken into account
nourishes the development of that same self?
The final happiness of an individual resides in the supremacy of certain interests
in the make-up of character; namely, alert, sincere, enduring interests in the
objects in which all can share .... the very problem of morals is to form an
original body of impulsive tendencies into a voluntary self in which desires and
affections centre in the values which are common; in which interest focuses in
objects that contribute to the enrichment of the lives of all. (Dewey & Tufts,
1932/1989,pp.302-303)
Dewey (1929a) believed that "shared experience is the greatest of human goods" (p. 167).
In Biblical language this meant loving your neighbor as yourself: "Various phases of
participation by one in other's joy, sorrows, sentiments and purposes, are distinguished by
the scope and the depth of the objects that are held in common, from a momentary caress
to continued insight and loyalty" (p.167).
This is the democratic ideal that inspired Dewey's search for wisdom. He did not
furnish a blueprint for what a democratic society would look like: That would have
betrayed his own philosophy. The concrete details and the broad contours of such a
society had to be constructed by people in the daily flux of their own situations.
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However, he firmly believed that a flourishing and humane society would come into
being in the extent to which each member developed the wise habits of character
described above. The building of such a society would never cease: Agreements for how
to live together would always be subject to renegotiation because the conditions of
existence were not static. The values which guided living for one generation could not
be passed on in toto to another for, as Dewey and Tufts (1932/1989b) maintained,
"reflective morality demands observation of particular situations rather than fixed
adherence to a priori principles" (p. 329). Rather than a blueprint for democracy, they
advocated
the method of democracy, of a positive toleration which amounts to sympathetic
regard for the intelligence and personality of others, even if they hold views
opposed to ours, and of scientific inquiry into facts and testing of ideas. (p. 329)
The cultivation of wise habits that included the methods of democracy and of scientific
inquiry was how Dewey defined the problem of education. But before we consider how
to educate for wisdom in the Deweyan sense, we need to examine the metaphysics on
which he based his philosophy-his search for wisdom.
Wisdom and Metaphysics
We have shown what Dewey meant by wisdom as a moral quest and how it was
connected to his notion of habit and character. We have accepted Dewey's anti-Kantian
assumption that the moral and natural realms are continuous in order to see how his view
of wisdom is connected to his psychology and his ethical theory. But the assumption
itself has not been examined directly. In order to answer more adequately the questions
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posed at the beginning-What does it mean to look for wisdom within experience? How is
this moral quest intrinsically connected to what science has shown us about nature?-we
need to examine the metaphysics on which his anti-Kantian assumption is based.
Implied in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), and in Ethics (Dewey & Tufts,
1932/1989b), Dewey's metaphysics is explicitly laid out in Experience and Nature
(1929a).
Metaphysics or ontology concerns itself with the question of reality. What is real?
What is the nature of reality? In asking these questions, Dewey used "existence" or
"nature" to stand in for reality: What are the generic traits of existence? What is the
nature of nature? As Dewey (1929a) reminds us, the answers to these questions
undergird any quest for wisdom:
The more sure one is that the world which encompasses human life is of such and
such a character (no matter what his definition), the more one is committed to try
to direct the conduct of life, that of others as well as of himself, upon the basis of
the character assigned to the world. (p. 334)
Nevertheless, "the character assigned to the world" will be tested in action as a person
tries to live wisely (i.e., in harmony with nature). If the actions fail to achieve a good life,
then wisdom will involve examining to what extent a person's metaphysical conceptions
were faulty:
And if-he finds that he cannot succeed, that the attempt lands him in confusion,
inconsistency and darkness, plunging others into discord and shutting them out
from participation, rudimentary precepts instruct him to surrender his assurance as
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a delusion; and to revise his notions of the nature of nature till he makes them
more adequate to the concrete facts in which nature is embodied. Man needs the
earth in order to walk, the sea to swim or sail, the air to fly. Of necessity he acts
within the world, and in order to be, he must in some measure adapt himself as
one part of nature to other parts. (p. 334)
Here is where Dewey's metaphysics and anthropology begin together: A human being is a
part of nature. To understand the nature of reality, he advocates a philosophic
method-empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism-which keeps that assertion
before us. This method holds together experience and nature by positing two modes of
experience-primary or raw experience (what one undergoes or does with little reflection)
and secondary or refined experience (what one undergoes or does with more sustained
and conscious reflection). Since thought is abstracted-literally drawn from-eoncrete
experience, it is dependent on natural, biological mechanisms organized in transaction
with an environment. A person's sensory organs establish her connection to the natural
world, and as such, can be trusted to furnish the primary data of raw experience that allow
her to think about the general traits of existence: "The very existence of science is
evidence that experience is such an occurrence that it penetrates into nature and expands
without limit through it" (Dewey, 1929a, p. 4).
In Dewey' s natur~lism, a mind which can think about nature has natural origins
and emerges through an evolutionary development (Darwin is key here). Mind and
matter are "different characters of natural events, in which matter expresses their
sequential order, and mind the order of their meanings in their logical connections and
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dependencies" (Dewey, 1929a, p. 64). The tendency to believe that mind exists apart
from matter has its origins in what Dewey calls the philosophic fallacy: A functional
distinction (which naturally arises when analyzing experience) is transformed into an
ontological one. For example, many of the problems which beset the teaching and
learning of mathematics might be more easily resolved if a conscious effort were made to
avoid treating numbers as if they existed in some esoteric realm. A number was a
concrete adjective long before it ever became an abstract noun. The abstraction performs
a function which allows us to do more with concrete things. The use of "manipulatives"
in the primary grades is one attempt to keep numbers grounded in concrete reality.-
Dewey (1929a) believed that:
The only way to avoid a sharp separation between the mind which is the centre of
the processes of experiencing and the natural world which is experienced is to
acknowledge that all modes of experiencing are ways in which some genuine
traits of nature come to manifest realization. (p. 24)
Therefore, if all modes of experiencing can be trusted to show genuine traits of nature and
if experience actually presents esthetic and moral traits, then these traits may also
be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something that belongs to
nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physical science.
(p.5)
Dewey divides the generic traits of existence into two major classes-the stable and the
precarious-that when held together in thought have bearing on the moral quest for
wisdom:
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We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mixture of sufficiencies,
tight completeness, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and
control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, processes going on
to consequences as yet indeterminate....(p. 43)
The various natural occurrences, entangled as they are in various combinations of
predictable and unpredictable consequences for experience, are "evidence that wisdom,
and hence that love of wisdom which is philosophy, is concerned with choice and
administration of their proportional union" (p. 65). This statement is hard to grasp unless
we understand how the Hegelian deposit operates in Dewey's metaphysics. In his study
of Hegel, Charles Taylor (1975) makes no mention of Dewey, yet one would be hard
pressed to find a clearer articulation of Dewey's naturalism than the following drawn
from a passage in which Taylor describes the "expressivist" roots of Hegel's philosophy:
If I am not satisfied with an image of myself as a mind confronting internal and
external nature, but must think of myself as life in which nature speaks through
thought and will, if therefore I as a subject am one with my body, then I have to
take account of the fact.that my body is an interchange with the greater nature
outside. Nature knows no fixed boundaries at the limits of the body, and hence I
as subject must be in interchange with this greater nature. (pp. 24-25)
Even though he eschewed the absolute idealism of Hegel which viewed humans as finite
vehicles of infinite Spirit, Dewey (1929a) did see humans as that part of nature which is
conscious of itself and as such was responsible for guiding and directing the development
of nature:
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A true wisdom, devoted to [an opening and enlarging of the ways of nature in
humanity] discovers in thoughtful observation and experiment the method of
administering the unfinished processes of existence so that frail goods shall be
substantiated, secure goods be extended, and the precarious promises of good that
haunt experienced things be more liberally fulfilled. (p. 66)
How Does One Educate for a Love of Wisdom?
For Dewey, philosophy and education were of one piece. Philosophy was "the
theory of education in its most general phases" (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 331). Dewey
equated education with growth: It meant learning through and from experience in such a
way that growth in one direction promoted growth in general. A school was an
educational institution only insofar as it created "desire for continued growth" and
supplied "means for making the desire effective in fact" (p. 53). Love of wisdom is
naturally educative: It is devoted to opening up and enlarging avenues of experience
because it desires to forecast as many consequences of an action as it is possible to
foresee. Developing the metahabit of wisdom meant growing in the ability to predict
consequences along a broader and deeper network of physical and social connections and
to choose a course of action which advanced interests held in common.
Over the last 150 years, the establishment of common schools with compulsory
attendance for children has encouraged the misperception that education and schooling
are necessarily synonymous. Like many reformers before and after him, Dewey
(1899,1902/1990) was concerned that schools tended to ignore the educative tendencies
of living experience:
72
In critical moments we all realize that the only discipline that stands by us, the
only training that becomes intuition, is that got through life itself. That we learn
from experience, and the books and the sayings of others only as they are related
to experience, are not mere phrases. But the school has been so set apart, so
isolated from the ordinary conditions and motives of life, that the place where
children are sent for discipline is the one place in the world where it is most
difficult to get experience - the mother of all discipline worth the name. (p. 17)
Schools were failing to educate because they did not take advantage of a child's natural
"impulses and tendencies to make, to do, to create, to produce, whether in the form of
utility or of art" (Dewey, p. 26).
Pointing to his own experimental school at the University of Chicago, Dewey
(1899, 1902/1990) wanted
to make each one of our schools an embryonic community life, active with types
of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society and permeated throughout
with the spirit of art, history, and science. When the school introduces and trains
each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating
him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective
self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society
which is worthy, lovely and harmonious. (p. 29)
Dewey saw schools as potential pivots for creating a more democratic society because if
children could participate in the greatest of human goods-shared experience continually
reconstructed by intelligent deliberation-in their own classrooms, then they would be
73
furnished with a shared stimulus-an inspiring ideal-to improve society now and in the
future.
Although Dewey wrote much about education that remains fresh and invigorating
to this day, he would not prescribe a hands-on method like Montessori or use symbolic
gifts like Froebel. Although this made his educational philosophy more difficult to brand
and set apart from other progressive educators, he would not compromise his respect for
the heterogeneity of experience. For example, The School and Society (1899,1902/1990)
leaves the reader wanting to know more concrete details about Dewey's laboratory
school: How does a curriculum built around occupations actually work? Instead, the
reader is forced to think through the principles he advocates and to apply them to his or
her own school. This was (and is) a difficult task requiring patient attention from
teachers who can easily and erroneously read a child-centered approach into his ideas.
What were these principles, and how did they connect with Dewey's love of
wisdom? His major works on education exhibit a unity and a progressive development
around his notion of experience. The School and Society (1899/1990) connects the
educative role of experience with the curriculum of an experimental school. Democracy
and Education (1916/1966) fleshes out his ideas in a much more systematic and logical
way. Covering a broad range of topics all connected to education, Dewey takes the reader
along a coherent course that is rich with memorable sayings that resonate with anyone
who has spent time in schools. The following samples whet the appetite: "To be the
recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience" (p. 5); "We
never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment" (p. 18); "Few grown-
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up persons retain all of the flexible and sensitive ability of children to vibrate
sympathetically with the attitudes and doings of those about them" (p. 43); "Wisdom has
never lost its association with the proper direction of life. Only in education, never in the
life of farmer, sailor, merchant, physician, or laboratory experimenter, does knowledge
mean primarily a store of information aloof from doing" (p. 185).
However, the key to understanding how to educate for love of experiential
wisdom is most succinctly formulated by Dewey in Experience and Education
(1938/1963). Coming out after he had analyzed the psychology of habit (Human Nature
and Conduct, 1922), had revised his moral theory (Ethics, Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989),
had studied the metaphysics of experience (Experience and Nature, 1929a), and had
examined experience from an aesthetic perspective (Art As Experience, 1934/1979), this
little volume clarifies and distills his previous ideas on education while at the same time
makes more explicit "the organic connection between education and personal experience"
(Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 25).
Continuity in Experience
According to Dewey (1938/1963), there are two criteria that can be distinguished
in thought but always operate together in experience: continuity and interaction. Out of
these two criteria a number of principles follow which can aid an educator who wishes to
cultivate a love of wisdom. Continuity is another term for the way habit functions in the
reconstruction of experience: Every experience "enacted and undergone modifies the one
who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not,. the
quality of subsequent experiences" (p. 35). Using wisdom ba.sed on a greater maturity of
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experience than that possessed by students, the educator must intentionally select "the
kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences"
(p.28). How can such an experience be identified? An educative experience "arouses
curiosity, strengthens initiative, and sets up desires and purposes that are sufficiently
intense to carry a person over dead places in the future" (p. 38).
Interaction in Experience
To guide the educator in selecting activities that are potentially educative, he or
she must attend to two things which interact in any experience: first, the attitudes,
dispositions, and habitual tendencies of the student (the subjective side) and second, the
conditions in the environment which are potentially conducive to growth (the objective
side). The art of education involves allowing the subjective and objective sides of an
experience to interact in such a way that students are engaged in solving a problem which
engages their interest and challenges them to reconstruct their habits. If a teacher ignores
the subjective side-as was often the case in "traditional"education where students were
considered blank slates-she will be imposing a curriculum that may make no sense to
many students: Education becomes regurgitation. If the teacher ignores her
responsibility in regulating the objective side (since education only occurs indirectly
through the environment), the students' native impulses may be indulged rather than
reconstructed: Education becomes "free" expression. In this regard, Dewey (1938/1963)
was firmly opposed to a child-centered education:
Every theory which assumes that importance can be attached to these objective
factors only at the expense of imposing external control and of limiting the
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freedom of individuals rests finally upon the notion that experience is truly
experience only when objective conditions are subordinated to what goes on
within the individuals having the experience. (p. 41)
A child-centered approach often equates freedom with the unimpeded expression of
impulses and hence opposes freedom to control. A person who is at the mercy of her
uncontrolled impulses is actually "under the control of accidental circumstances" (p. 64).
Freedom really means self-control, which can begin only if an impulse is impeded so that
intelligent deliberation may ensue. Freedom is "power to frame purposes, to judge
wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them;
power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation" (p. 64).
Educatingfor a Love ofWisdom
In our examination of Dewey's notion of habit (above), we saw how experiential
wisdom begins with self-control-a right ordering of desires achieved through deliberation
about possible consequences of action. It is a temperance from which the virtue of
wisdom emerges:
Natural impulse and desires constitute in any case the starting point. But there is
no intellectual growth without some reconstruction, some remaking, of impulses
and desires in the form in which they first show themselves. This remaking
involves inhibition of impulse in its first estate.· The alternative to externally
imposed inhibition is inhibition through an individual's own reflection and
judgment .... thinking is stoppage of the immediate manifestation of impulse
until that impulse has been brought into connection with other possible tendencies
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to action so that a more comprehensive and coherent plan of action is formed.
(Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 64)
An individual student's self-control is not created ex nihilo: it is developed and
strengthened by an objective control "which is effected by the whole situation in which
individuals are involved, in which they share and of which they are co-operative or
interacting parts" (p. 53).
The "whole situation" includes primarily two elements which interact to furnish
control: first, the parameters which define a task and furnish an interest (solving a
problem, conducting an experiment, analyzing a reading, composing a poem, researching
an event, dribbling a soccer ball, drawing a map, building a stool, preparing a meal,
tending a garden, etc.) and second, the parameters which define social interaction. Here
Dewey brings in the democratic factor which is so crucial to his educational theory. The
educator is like a referee who enforces the rules of the game to which all agree. Like a
good referee who knows when to step in to call a foul and when to let them play, an
educator acts on behalf of the whole group to ensure a truly educative experience for all.
It calls for educators who have a sympathetic regard for their students; who
challenge them through activities which engage their thinking; who know how to use
available resources in the immediate environment; who allow their own desires to be
constantly reconstructed in experience; and who are willing to reflect in and on
experience and to intelligently consider and reconsider various courses of action. In
short, they are enthusiastic lovers of wisdom who practise what they preach. In the next
chapter, we follow the footsteps of one such enthusiastic lover of wisdom, Simone Weil.
CHAPTER THREE: SIMONE WElL AND THE LOVE OF WISDOM
In this chapter, we will follow the same sequence as in the previous one. A
selection of Simone Weil' s writings will be analyzed to examine her answers to the
following questions: What is wisdom? How is wisdom connected to experience? How
does one educate for a love of wisdom? Before embarking on this task, Weil's life will
be reviewed briefly. I draw on four sources for this biographical sketch: Cabaud (1964),
Fiori (1981/1989), McLellan (1990), and Petrement (1973/1976). As noted in the
previous chapter in regard to Dewey, the purpose of this short biography is to provide the
reader with a context within which to better understand and assess her ideas, not to
"psychologize" them, and certainly not to provide ammunition for ad hominem attacks.
Biographical Sketch
Simone Weil was born in Paris, France on 3 February 1909. Her father was a
well-to-do physician who served as a medical officer in the First World War. Her mother
came from a prosperous family with musical talent. -Simone was the younger of two
children born to the Weils: her brother, Andre, was her closest companion growing up
and taught Simone how to read. The Weils were secularized Jews who encouraged their
children to think for themselves.
The First World War interrupted Simone's early schooling-her family followed
Dr. Weil from posting to posting in much the same way that Dewey's family followed his
father around during the Civil War. By 1920 the Weils had settled down again in Paris,
and Simone began attending school more regularly. In 1925 she entered Lycee Henri IV20
20 The type of education she received here would be roughly equivalent to what a North
American student would receive in pursuing a Bachelor of Arts. Later on, Weil taught in
a number of lycees, somewhat like high schools that prepare students for university.
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and studied philosophy for 3 years with a teacher who would exert a powerful influence
on her intellectual development: Emile-Auguste Chartier, who was more often called by
his pen name, Alain.
Scorning outlines, summaries, and systems, Alain often conducted his classes by
responding to a reading chosen by a student. He believed that a thinker was best judged
by the way he or she tackled specific problems (Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 30). Reading
involved thinking along with great writers without taking notes: to read and reread until
the writer was understood (Fiori, 1981/1989, pp. 33-34). Clear thinking and good writing
were interdependent. Each student was encouraged to write for 2 hours a day in beautiful
handwriting without making corrections. While in his class, Weil took pains to improve
her handwriting (she was not naturally dextrous) and strove to maintain a neat script to
the very end of her life. If word processors had been available, it is probably safe to
assume that Alain would have rejected typed assignments. If a student wanted to make
revisions, she had only two choices: either leave what had been written or begin allover
again (Cabaud, 1964, p. 27). The impact of this teaching is evident in the manuscripts
that Weilleft behind.21
Alain particularly admired Plato, Descartes, and Kant. According to a former
21 The way she qualified her arguments demonstrates Alain's instruction for writing.
Modifications and clarifications often followed dubious assertions, as if she were
clarifying her conceptions "on the fly" as one does in extemporaneous speech. In the
following example, the second statement corrects the impression created by the first:
It is the part played by joy in our studies that makes of them a preparation for the
spiritual life, for desire towards God is the only power capable of raising the soul.
Or rather, it is God alone who comes down and possesses the soul, but desire
alone draws God down. (Weil, 1950/1959, p. 71)
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student, "one of his most energetic denials was that of the idea of progress in philosophy.
He thought that Plato not only had been left behind but was far ahead of us" (Petrement,
1973/1976, p. 33). Alain's philosophical stance greatly affected Weil, who began her
intellectual journey with Descartes and ended with Plato.
While attending Lycee Henri IV, Weil developed an interest in pacifism and
working-class education. Along with many of Alain's students, she taught courses on
weekends to railway workers and became increasingly active in trade union politics.
Although she never joined the Communist party, her attraction to Marxism grew naturally
out of a long-standing desire to identify with common laborers-especially with those
whom she felt were being exploited and oppressed.22 She admired people such as Leon
Letellier,23 the father of one of her classmates, who had combined intellectual pursuits
with manual labor. In the summer of 1927, she made copies of his writings while
working on his farm in Normandy (Fiori, 1981/1989, p. 49).
Between 1928 and 1931, she attended the Ecole Normale Superieure-an elite
school that prepared students for teaching positions in the upper lycees and universities.24
22 For example, the summer before entering Lycee Henri IV, 15-year-old Simone had
befriended some of the employees of the hotel in which her family was staying. To the
dismay of the other guests, she encouraged them to form a union (Petrement, 1973/1976,
pp.23-24).
23 Born in the same year as John Dewey, Leon Letellier (1859-1926) was attracted to the
ocean. At the age of 18, he joined a crew that fished the Grand Banks off
Newfoundland. He later traveled the world as a seaman on ocean liners. At age 30, he
entered university as a mature student and, soon after graduating, he settled down to farm
in his native Normandy (Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 46).
24 In the entrance examinations for this elite school, two women had the highest scores:
Simone Weil placed first, and Simone de Beauvoir placed second.
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Writing a short dissertation was one of the requirements for graduation. In the first part
of her dissertation, "Science and Perception in Descartes," (Weil, 1987, pp. 31-88), Weil
raised scholarly objections to the conventional view that this founder of modern science
created a coherent system which elevated abstract reasoning to such a degree that its
connection to concrete experience was obscured. In fact, Weil's assessment leads one to
believe that Descartes would have appreciated Dewey's laboratory school:
Cartesian science is far more packed with matter than is ordinarily thought .... It
is so bound to the imagination, so joined to the human body, so close to the most
common labors, that one may be initiated into it by studying the easiest and
simplest crafts. (Weil, 1987, p. 51)
In the second part of the dissertation, Weil took her own Cartesianjoumey of doubt
"without believing in anything except one's own thought insofar as it is clear and distinct,
and without trusting the authority of anyone, even Descartes, in the least" (p. 54). Her
conclusion sheds a different light on Descartes's famous maxim by connecting thinking
and existing to working:
The pilot who holds the tiller in a storm, the peasant who swings his scythe,
knows himself and knows the world in the way meant by the statement "I think,
therefore I am" and the ideas that follow from it. Workers know everything;
however, when their work is done, they do not know that they had all wisdom in
their possession. (p. 85)
Weil rarely (if ever) consulted her supervisor. He disagreed with her reading of Descartes
and gave her the lowest possible passing mark (McLellan, 1990, p. 29). Undaunted, Weil
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spent most of the 1930-1931 school year preparing for the final examinations. This year
also marked the onset of painful headaches which would plague her for the rest of her
life. Nevertheless, she passed her examinations and became eligible for a teaching post.
Simone Weil believed that wisdom could be found in hands-on work, and she
considered testing this hypothesis by joining the industrial workforce. However, since
unemployment among factory workers was rising (the depression was in full swing), she
accepted a position to teach philosophy at a girl's lycee in Le Puy, a town in southern
France. In addition, she maintained contact with trade unions and taught courses in
French and political economy on the weekends to miners in St. Etienne, a 3-hour train
ride from her apartment in Le PUYe She saw working-class education as one of the
conditions necessary for a true revolution. As she wrote in an article published in a trade-
union newspaper in 1931:
The important thing is to distinguish, among attempts at working-class culture,
those that are conducted in such a way as to strengthen the ascendancy of the
intellectuals over the workers, and those conducted in such a way as to free the
workers from this domination. (Weil cited in Petrement, 1973/1976, pp. 87-88)
She scandalized the residents of Le Puy by associating with unemployed workers and
supporting them in seeking help from the municipal authorities. In addition, it seemed
that her teaching had failed: only 7 of the 14 pupils she taught in Le Puy took the
baccalaureat examinations, and of these only 2 passed. Earlier in the year, one school
inspector had predicted this, even though he had been impressed by what her students
were learning when he observed a class (Cabaud, 1964, p. 57). Nevertheless, her students
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loved her: She put her time and resources at their disposal by offering extra courses free-
of-charge in Latin and on the history of mathematics. A young worker from St. Etienne
whom she had tutored in elementary geometry gushed: "With you as a teacher I was never
bored for a second" (cited in Petrement, pp. 98-99, 124).
Weil spent one month in the summer of 1932 visiting Germany with a view
towards understanding the political situation there, in particular the state of the German
working class. Upon returning to France, she wrote a series of 10 articles on Germany for
L 'Ecole emancipee, a publication of the teachers' trade union (Weil, 1987, pp. 97-147).
She was disappointed by the weakness of the German Communist party, and she partly
blamed this on a leadership that took its orders from the Soviet Union. As she began to
reassess Marxist theory,25 her views were attacked. When she attempted to speak at
rallies, she was shouted down; she was forcibly prevented from distributing pamphlets.
Her worker friends protected her from physical assault.
For the next two academic years, she taught at two different lycees-Auxerre in
1932/1933 (where her teaching was not as well received) and Roanne in 1933/1934. She
continued her involvement in trade unions, joining them in their marches and rallies,
writing articles in various left-wing journals, and teaching courses to workers on
25 Some of her political writings of this time are collected in Oppression and Liberty
(Weil, 1955/1958). Using a Marxist framework while at the same time criticizing it, she
argued that the machinery of oppression always accompanied the evolution of a society
when it reached a certain level of economic development. The analogy she used to
describe Europe of the 1930s could have been used by Homer-Dixon (2000) in his more
recent analysis of our world: "On the whole, our present situation more or less resembles
that of a party of absolutely ignorant travellers who find themselves in a motor-car
launched at full speed and driverless across broken country" (Weil, 1955/1958, p. 121).
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weekends in St. Etienne. In December of 1933, she met the exiled Leon Trotsky in Paris
and had a long argument with him that revolved around the issue of whether the Soviet
Union was a workers' state in transition (Trotsky's position) or whether it was another
form of ineluctable oppression (Weil's position).26
Having long had the desire to better understand the conditions under which
industrial workers lived, Weil took a leave from teaching to work in a Paris factory.
Between December of 1934 and April of 1935, she worked as a power-press operator for
a company that built electrical machinery. It seems that she quit after being injured on the
work site. A few days later, she got a job operating a stamping press in another firm. She
was fired after a month-probably because she couldn't produce fast enough. She spent
the month of May looking for work and finally found ajob with Renault. There she
operated a milling machine for 3 months. She quit for good in late August of 1935 only
after she had met her goal: acquiring the ability to work in a factory without descending
into a state of indifference.27 Soon after, mentally fatigued and physically exhausted, she
accompanied her parents on a vacation to Portugal for the remainder of that summer. It
was in a Portuguese fishing village, while viewing a candlelight procession of women
26 According to her friend and biographer, Simone Petrement (1973/1976, p. 188), Weil
always remained calm and composed during a discussion. The shouts that others heard
from an adjoining room were most likely from Trotsky, who asked her: "If that's how you
think, why did you put us up? Do you belong to the Salvation Army?"
27 As Weil (1936/1965a) wrote in a letter the following year:
I swore to myself that I would not give up until I had learned how to live a
worker's life without losing my sense of human dignity. And I kept my word.
But up to the last day I found it was necessary to renew the struggle every day to
keep that sense, because the conditions of life never ceased to undermine it and to
encourage a state of subhuman apathy. (p. 30)
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touring the fishing boats of their husbands, that Weil became aware of her attraction to
Christianity: "There the conviction was suddenly borne in upon me that Christianity is
pre-eminently the religion of slaves, that slaves cannot help belonging to it, and I among
others" (Weil, 1950/1959, p. 34).
In the fall of 1935, she resumed teaching philosophy at a girls' lycee, this time in
Bourges. The factory experience influenced her teaching: She began using literary works
more and more in her efforts to ground philosophy in concrete situations for her students,
speaking often about affliction and humiliation. In a shift that reminds one of Dewey,
McLellan (1990) reports that she concentrated ','more on psychology and ethics than on
metaphysics" (p. 110). The factory experience also oriented her extracurricular
activities: Weil began a dialogue with the manager of a nearby company that
manufactured stoves. Over the course of the winter and spring, she tried to convince the
manager to increase worker participation in workplace decision-making. She was
disappointed to find that even a well-meaning manager was not willing to take that sort of
risk (Weil, 1936/1965a).
In the summer of 1936, she joined a militia to fight on the Republican side of the
Spanish Civil War. After 2 months, she returned to France as a result of an accident in
which her leg was badly burned. She again requested leave from her teaching and took
the opportunity to visit Italy in the spring and summer of 1937. In the fall, she resumed
her teaching duties at a girls' lycee at Saint-Quentin. However, her headaches became so
intolerable that she had to quit in mid-year. She would never again have a paid teaching
position (Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 322).
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Drawn to Catholic liturgy (she especially loved Gregorian chant), she attended the
services at Solesmes in the week prior to Easter in 1938. By concentrating very hard on
the words and music, she was able to rise above the pain of her splitting headaches. A
fellow worshipper introduced her to the English "metaphysical" poetry of the 17th century.
She was so taken by one of George Herbert's poems (Love) that she memorized it,
reciting it with all of her attention whenever a headache became unbearable. During one
of these recitations, she had a mystical experience: "Christ himself came down and took
possession of me" (Weil, 1950/1959, p. 35). From this point on, her thinking and writing
became more explicitly religious while maintaining its focus on social and political
problems.
From the time she left teaching until the German invasion of France in 1940,
Simone Weil immersed herself in works of literature and history. According to
Petrement (1973/1976) her research was driven by a desire to seek "in past centuries for a
perspective, a firm and correct standard by which to judge present-day events" (p. 345).
For her, Hitler's Germany was a spiritual resurgence of ancient Rome.28 She also read the
Hebrew scriptures, the Egyptian Book ofthe Dead, and the Bhagavad-Gita. Following
the lead of her brother who had taught in India, she learned Sanskrit. She participated in
discussion groups and contributed articles to various journals.
With Paris on the verge of capitulating to German forces, she and her parents
28 She despised the Roman empire. In her view, it was infinitely far from the spiritual
beauty of ancient Greece. In an article published that year Weil (1940/1962a) pulled no
punches: "Everything that disgusts and also everything that shocks us in [Hitler's]
methods is what he has in common with Rome" (p. 119).
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travelled south through unoccupied France, eventually settling down in Marseilles.
Barred from teaching by the anti-Jewish laws of the Vichy regime, Weil spent much of
her time reading and writing. She became involved with an another journal (Cahiers du
Sud) for which she wrote a number of articles under an anagrammatic pseudonym (Emile
Novis). One article is a striking commentary on Homer's Iliad (Weil, 1940/1977c). She
sought out Catholics, questioning them incessantly about church doctrine and about
whether the church in good conscience could baptize a person who held heretical views.29
Through her contact with a Dominican priest who was helping various refugees find
work, she was taken on by a self-educated farmer in the late summer and autumn of 1941
to work in vineyards about 240 kilometres north of Marseilles. She had returned to the
ardors of physical labour, complementing factory with field.
Soon after returning to Marseilles, she became active in the Resistance (McLellan,
1990, p. 79) with the hope of eventually joining the Free French in England. Since it
seemed impossible to do so directly from Vichy France, she decided to try an indirect
route by accompanying her parents, who had managed to acquire visas for New York.
She hoped from there to make her way to London and join up with the Free French under
General Charles de Gaulle. They left Marseilles in May of 1942, were detained for over 2
weeks in a North African refugee camp, eventually crossed the Atlantic, and finally
arrived at New York in early July. During her 4-month stay in New York, she continued
29 During her 1942 sojourn in New York, she wrote a long letter to an American
clergyman in which she enumerated 35 objections to church teaching. For example, she
rejected a good portion of the Hebrew scriptures. In her view, the Egyptian Book ofthe
Dead was closer to the spirit of the gospels (Weil, 1951/1974a, p. 105).
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to read and write; in particular, she researched folklore in the public libraries. Every day
she attended Mass, and every Sunday she attended a Baptist church in Harlem (Cabaud,
1964, p. 276). She continued to debate various Catholics on theological matters. After
much letter writing and pleading, she managed to convince her compatriots in England to
employ her services.
Weil arrived in London in late November. Working for De Gaulle's government-
in-exile, she was assigned the task of reviewing proposals that outlined how France might
be governed after the war. She did much more than this: Beginning with a radical re-
assessment of human rights and responsibilities, she ended up writing a book-length
treatise which conceived of a society built around human needs: More than three-quarters
of the book is an extended discussion on the need for roots (Weil, 1949/1952b).
However, her ardent wish was to reenter France on some clandestine mission. The
authorities adamantly refused to send her.
Eating very little and often working through the night, she eventually collapsed
from exhaustion in April of 1943. She was admitted to a hospital with a diagnosis of
tuberculosis. She refused to eat enough to regain her strength and fight her illness.3o
Exasperated, her physician ordered her removed after 3 months: Her bed was needed for
more co-operative patients. She was transferred to a sanatorium on August 17. Although
there is some question as to whether she deliberately starved herself-she seemed unable
30 Simone Weil was never a big eater to say the least. When the war began, she vowed
never to eat more than what her compatriots in France were officially rationed. Would
she rather die than break a vow? If she was anorexic, it had nothing to do with our notion
of "body image."
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to tolerate solid food-there is no doubt that her physical deterioration was accelerated by
malnutrition. Simone Weil died on 24 August 1943 at the age of34. Most of her work
was published posthumously (Petrement, 1973/1976, pp. 535-539).
What Is Wisdom?
Fiori (1981/1989) described Simone Weil as a "philosopher, in its proper sense of
a 'lover of wisdom: , perhaps this is the only definition that we can hazard for a woman
we cannot define or categorize in her private or public life" (p. 314). Weil had
discovered "the key to a wisdom which can be applied to the daily life of every man on
both the individual and social plane" (p. 309). In this section we will examine Fiori's
claim by analyzing a selection of WeiI's writings. Like Dewey, Weil never wrote a
treatise on wisdom. As we analyze the few passages that allude to it, we will attempt to
bring to the surface an implicit conception of wisdom that undergirded her work.
As we saw above, Simone Weil (1987) wrote of wisdom in her dissertation on
Descartes for the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1929/1930:
Not only does Descartes regard every mind, as soon as it makes a serious effort to
think properly, as equal to the greatest genius, but he finds the human mind even
in the most ordinary thinking. There is, in his eyes, a common wisdom - a
wisdom that is to the mind what the eyes are to the body - much closer to
authentic philosophy than is the kind of thinking that study produces, "since we
see very often that those who have never worked hard at the study of letters judge
things close at hand much more soundly and clearly than those who have been in
constant attendance at schools." Thus Descartes' great precept for attaining
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wisdom is not to study excessively. (p. 53)
Here Descartes (as read by Weil) resonates with Sternberg (1998): Wisdom emerges from
practical thinking which in turn rests on tacit knowledge born in concrete
experience-knowing what to do in a particular situation without necessarily being able to
articulate it in words.
Her belief that wisdom was potentially accessible to every individual, regardless
of how well she might perform on an IQ test, probably had its origins in a crisis of despair
that Weil experienced at age 14. Comparing herself to her exceptionally gifted brother,31
she felt inferior and mediocre:
After months of inward darkness, I suddenly had the everlasting conviction that
no matter what human being, even though practically devoid of natural faculties,
can penetrate to the kingdom of truth reserved for genius, if only he longs for truth
and perpetually concentrates all his attention upon its attainment. (Weil,
1950/1959, pp. 30-31)
Here she employs the term "truth" instead of wisdom. These terms were closely
connected in her thought. This becomes clear when we examine a passage written in the
year she died. The conviction born in an adolescent crisis had become even stronger.
Was she using hyperbole?
A village idiot in the literal sense of the word, if he really loves truth, is infinitely
superior to Aristotle in his thought, even though he never utters anything but
31 Andre Weil (1906-1998) is considered one of the finest mathematicians of the 20th
century. In 1958 he joined the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, where he
remained until his death.
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inarticulate murmurs. He is infinitely closer to Plato than Aristotle ever was. He
has genius, while only the word talent applies to Aristotle. If a fairy offered to
change his destiny for one resembling Aristotle's, he would be wise to refuse
unhesitatingly. (Weil, 1950/1977b, p. 329)
As George Grant succinctly paraphrased it: "A village simpleton who truly loves his
neighbor is wiser than Aristotle."32 His summary softens her violent assault on
conventional wisdom by shifting the emphasis from "really loves truth" to "truly loves
one's neighbor." The second phrase is easier to accept in a postmodern age where the
notion of truth has little prestige. One can imagine the possibility of loving or respecting
a concrete individual, but what does it mean to love what seems to be a difficult-to-define
abstraction? Whose truth are we talking about? Your truth? My truth? The truth of dead
White European males? The truth of indigenous peoples? We will return to these
questions.
The passage above also emphasized the deep chasm that separated Plato from
Aristotle in Weil's (1951/1957) reading:
Plato's wisdom is not a philosophy, a research for God by means of human
reason. That research was carried out as well as it can be done by Aristotle. But
the wisdom of Plato is nothing other than the orientation of the soul towards
grace. (p. 85)
To sum up Weil's conception so far: Wisdom is the ability to make clear and
32 George Parkin Grant (1917-1988) was a Canadian political philosopher who trusted
Weil implicitly. This quotation is based on my recollection of a lecture given by Grant in
1978.
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sound judgments. It is available to every person regardless of their intellectual capacities.
It is better developed in specific, concrete activities-especially physical labor-than in the
more abstract activities associated with schooling. A love of truth is indispensable in
cultivating the ability to judge soundly, and further, growth in wisdom was somehow
associated with a certain "orientation of the soul."
How Is Wisdom Connected to Experience?
After her mystical experience in 1938, Weil increasingly oriented her thinking
towards holding together what she was convinced were two opposing truths: the
perfection of God (or the Good) and the misery of human beings. Although these
assertions when held together often led to the atheism of a Voltaire or a Gordon
Sinclair,33 Weil saw the experience of suffering as a door through which divine wisdom
could be perceived:
It is human misery and not pleasure which contains the secret of divine wisdom.
All pleasure-seeking is the search for an artificial paradise, an intoxication, or
enlargement. But it gives us nothing except the experience that is vain. Only the
contemplations of our limitations and our misery puts us on a higher plane. (Weil,
1947/1952a, p. 84)
How could she arrive at such a conclusion? To answer this question, we need to retrace
33 Gordon Sinclair (1900-1984) was a Canadian journalist and broadcaster. Much like
Christopher Hitchens today, he was not afraid to express his atheism. He appeared as a
regular panelist on the CBC television series Front Page Challenge. In one show,
discussion focused on a natural disaster reported in the headlines. As I recollect, he asked
a version of an old question: "How can a good God allow the suffering of innocent
human beings?"
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her thought as it coalesced around a belief which she had held before her mystical
experiences and which deepened after them: Wisdom could be found in physical labor.
In the second part of her student dissertation, "Science and Perception in
Descartes," Weil (1987) undertakes her own Cartesian journey of doubt which ends with
locating the key of wisdom with "the pilot who holds the tiller in a storm, the peasant
who swings his scythe" (p. 85). She begins with experience understood as the mixed
feeling of pleasure and pain:
For me the presence of the world is above all this mixed feeling. What the
swimmer calls water is for him above all a feeling made up of the pleasure that
comes from swimming and the pain induced by fatigue. (p. 55)
However, she cannot know the world through her feeling of it. In her feeling of the world,
how can she separate what she brings to the feeling from what the world makes present to
her?
If the swimmer thinks that the ambiguous feeling that makes the water present to.
him is the effect, or mark, or image of a coolness, a transparency, a resistance that
is not constituted by that very feeling, he is saying more than he knows. (p. 56)
Is knowledge possible then? If feeling is the only conduit through which she has contact
with the world, how can she separate illusion from reality? The very fact that she poses
these questions gives her the clue: She can question, she can doubt whether something is
real or not: "The power that I exercise over my own belief is not an illusion; it is through
this power that I know that I think .... I have power, therefore I am [Ie puis, done je
suis]" (p. 59). Weil goes behind Descartes' maxim (I think, therefore I am) to retrieve the
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power to act:
My own existence as I feel it is an illusion; but my existence as I know it is not a
feeling but my creation. To exist, to think, to know are only aspects of a single
reality: to be able to do something .... To know is to know what I can do; and I
know to the degree that I substitute "to act" and "to be acted upon" for "to enjoy,"
"to suffer," "to feel," and "to imagine." In this way I transform illusion into
certainty and chance into necessity. (p. 59)
Nevertheless, this power is very limited in scope:
Does my will have any power over my enjoyment, my desire, my belief, or my
anxiety if I want to get rid of them or change them? Not the slightest. All I can
do is refuse my assent to what I believe or desire. (p. 67)
Is she then a complete plaything of her passions, like a sailor tied to her rigging, who
helplessly watches her sailboat being tossed to and fro, refusing to give assent but
powerless to do anything about it? No. Even though her power ofjudgment may be the
only power she possesses, it gives her a handle on the world, a power that opens up a way
to change it:
However much the contents of my passions have a hold on me, to that extent they
also allow me a grasp; and thus the world, although it does not depend on me,
ceases to be something that exercises an inexplicable mastery over me. (p. 67)
Even though she cannot explain it, the power that refuses to give assent to her passions
also acts on the world at the same time: It is based on a mysterious bond that exists
between her and the world-"an ambiguous being that is a composite of myself and the
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world acting on each other" (p. 69). Weil defined imagination as "this knot of action and
reaction that attaches me to the world" (p. 70).
Wisdom in Work
The imagination can deceive her: What seems like a malevolent being menacing
her along the bend of a road turns out to be a harmless tree. But it can also furnish the
ideas-such as number and straight line motion-that do not dominate her imagination in
the same way, since they are made present to her only by an act of her own attention
(Weil, 1987, p. 72). Here Weil introduces one of the main themes of her thought, one
that she will develop in her later writings with much greater precision: the act of attention
which is somehow distinct from an act impelled by "passion" or emotion. The ideas
which the imagination can furnish through an act of attention (e.g., geometry) give her the
detachment whereby she can grasp the world,34 whereas all other ideas (e.g., emotions)-
which also arrive through the imagination-leave her attached to her passions and subject
to the world. She is a split being: "Can I not attain perfect wisdom, wisdom in action,
that would reunite the two parts of myself?" (p. 78). Yes, but not directly. She can unite
them indirectly through work: "The two kinds of imagination, which are found separately
in the emotions and in geometry, are united in the things I perceive. Perception is
geometry taking as it were possession of the passions themselves, by means of work" (p.
34 How can geometry provide the detachment whereby one can grasp the world? Weil
(1941/1968a) explains elsewhere: "All tools are instruments for ordering sensible
phenomena, for combining them in definite systems; and in handling them men always
think of the straight line, the angle, the circle, and the plane" (p. 39). Yet, "when thinking
geometrically we always think that the straight line is something pure, a work of the
mind, and outside the world of appearances" (p. 36).
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79).
How is work connected to perception? In the early evening, two men are walking
beside a pear orchard recently harvested. One has spent the day picking pears and is
making ready to go home. The other is a tourist who has never picked fruit. The laborer
perceives the orchard differently from the tourist because the former's perception has
been deepened and disciplined by a more-or-Iess strenuous physical contact endured over
a sustained period of time. Weil considered this to be a truer perception because it was
fashioned by a more genuine contact with reality.
Why is work the key to wisdom? Why is it not wise to pursue a life of leisure?
To accept Weil's (1955/1958) answer to these questions, one must assume (as Dewey
did) that it is not good to be dominated by unbridled passions or emotions. Her words
evoke Plato's description of the "despotic" soul (Comford, 1945, pp. 287-301):
An existence from which the very notion of work had pretty well disappeared
would be delivered over to the play of the passions and perhaps to madness; there
is no self-mastery without discipline, and there is no other source of discipline for
man than the effort demanded in overcoming obstacles. A nation of idlers might
well amuse itself by giving itself obstacles to overcome, exercise itself in the
sciences, in the arts, in games; but the efforts that are the result of pure whim do
not form for a man a means of controlling his own whims. (Weil, p. 84)
The curse of work is really a blessing in disguise, for it protects us from ourselves:
Even if man were to cease being subjected to material things and to his fellows by
needs and dangers, he would only be more completely.delivered into their hands
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by the emotions which would stir him continually to the depths of his soul, and
against which no regular occupation would any longer protect him. (p. 85)
If work performed this protective function, why did it so often feel like a curse? Was
there a virtue in passively accepting the often boring routine of a job? No. The question
for Weil was not how to eliminate work, but how to make work less oppressive and more
vital. In order for this to happen, work had to become more intelligent, that is, it had to
keep thinking connected to acting. To the greatest extent possible, each worker had to
have a share in thinking through the problems of production. In other words, when work
involved the ongoing challenge of thinking, it became an educational experience in
Dewey's sense:
The difficulties to be overcome would have to be so varied that it would never be
possible to apply ready-made rules; not of course that the part played by acquired
knowledge should be nil; but it is necessary that the worker should be obliged
always to bear in mind the guiding principle behind the work in hand, so as to be
able to apply it intelligently to ever new sets of circumstances. (p. 95)
Wisdom in factory work. In late 1934 Weil entered a Paris factory to experience
industrial work first-hand-not as a social scientist sponsored by a funding agency for
which she had to meet certain acceptable criteria, but as an anonymous, unskilled laborer
who tried to make sense of her experience by keeping a private journal (Weil, 1987, pp.
155-226). She did not expect to find anything close to her ideal of mindful work; but
what she actually did undergo was psychologically devastating, especially for someone
who found it difficult to produce the minimum rate in a job that was paid by the piece
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(e.g., stamping out washers or rivets). Along with calculations of how much she
produced on a daily basis, her journal is a detailed record of her work activities
accompanied with the odd diagram. Punctuated by moments that temporarily lifted her
spirits-the relative fun of riveting, the joke of a fellow worker, a sympathetic smile, a
short session in a happy workshop-her experience was physically exhausting, crushingly
painful (particularly during her headaches), and mentally numbing. Thinking was the
hardest thing to do. She was an appendage to a machine. Leaving work one day, she sat
down fatigued beside the Seine River and contemplated her wretched situation: "I wonder
if, in the event that 1were condemned to live this life, 1would be able to cross the Seine
every day without someday throwing myself in" (p. 204). Through this ordeal, she
realized that self-respect was largely a social construction and that a sense of self-worth
was almost completely dependent on one's circumstances. Nevertheless, she retained her
affection and respect for her fellow workers, in whom she "always found that generosity
of heart and aptitude for general ideas were directly proportional to each other" (p. 226).
Seven years later she published an article on this experience. Even though her
work experience was almost entirely negative, she was still hopeful that factory life could
be brought closer to her ideal of mindful work: "The factory ought to be a place where,
for all the inevitability of physical and spiritual travail, working people can taste joy and
nourish themselves on it" (Weil, 1942/1977a, p.66). The joy of work should furnish the
primary incentive, with the paycheck furnishing a secondary one. For this to happen,
workers must not only understand how their work contributes to the manufacture of the
end product, they should have a part to play in the planning of the work. This accords
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with the value she placed in mindful work prior to her factory experience:
It is not in relation to what it produces that manual labour must become the
highest value, but in relation to the man who performs it; it must not be made the
object of honours and rewards, but must constitute for each human being what he
is most essentially in need of if his life is to take on of itself a meaning and a
value in his own eyes. (Weil, 1955/1958, p. 104)
A society would experience wisdom to the degree in which it gave manual labor a
pivotal place. With the possible exception of "primitive" groups such as Amish
Mennonites, does recorded history offer us any examples of such societies? Even ancient
Greece, the civilization she most admired, did not appreciate the value of physical work,
to say the least. In the modem world, the value of labor is calculated in monetary units:
This debased view is so powerful that few union leaders have the ability or the desire to
transcend it:
Suppose the devil were bargaining for the soul of some poor wretch and someone,
moved by pity, should step in and say to the devil: "It is a shame for you to bid so
low; the commodity is worth at least twice as much." Such is the sinister farce
which has been played by the working-class movement, its trade unions, its
political parties, its leftist intellectuals. (Weil, 1950/1977b, p. 323)
Physical labor was equal in value to art and science:
To take a youth who has a vocation for this kind of work and employ him at a
conveyor belt or as a piece-work machinist is no less a crime that to put out the
eyes of the young Watteau and make him turn a grindstone. But the painter's
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vocation can be discerned and the other cannot. (Weil, 1950/1977b, p. 322)
In writing about how French industry could be reorganized after the war in The
Needfor Roots (Weil, 1949/1952b), she raised what she believed was the essential idea
around which factories should be restructured, that "of posing in technical terms
problems concerning the effect of machines upon the moral well-being of the workers"
(p. 58). In addition, she offered a number of specific proposals. First, apprenticeship
programs should be set up in such a way that apprentices could move about the country in
a "tour de France," imbibing regional traditions as they learned their trade. Second, the
workers needed to increase their freedom and responsibility: "A workman or group of
workmen could have a certain number of orders to fill within a given time, and be left
with a completely free hand in the actual layout of the work" (p. 60). Her final proposals
anticipated Schumacher's (1973) Small Is Beautiful: Large, centralized firms should be
broken up and dispersed throughout the countryside, and corporations which divided
ownership and management through stockholding should be abolished and declared
illegal (p. 77).
Wisdom in field work. Although Weil had tasted little joy in the factory, she
seemed to have feasted on it in the field. During harvest season in 1941, she worked 8-
hour days picking grapes in southern France. The physical exhaustion in the field was no
less than in the factory, but its psychological impact on her was qualitatively different.
Petrement (1973/1976) quotes from one of her letters of this period:
The tiredness is a tiredness that is healthy for the soul, which puts me into more
complete contact with nature, and in the depths of which one finds profound joys.
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... Sometimes I am crushed by fatigue, but I find in it a kind of purification.
Right at the bottom of my exhaustion I encounter joys that nothing else could give
me. (pp. 440, 441)
Weil's description resonates deeply with my own experience working on a fruit farm.
However, the purifying joys of physical labor were not what initially drew me to the farm
at the age of 9; it was the opportunity to drive a tractor. Even though I was paid little or
no money, I sensed that driving a tractor was not just a favor that my father (with the tacit
permission of the owners) extended to a bored kid: I had a contribution to make. During
harvest season, I drove the tractor in a stop-and-go fashion through orchards and
vineyards while my father and his coworker loaded up the trailer with baskets of Blue
Delicious plums or Concord grapes or bushels of Bartlett pears. I saved them the extra
effort of getting on and off the tractor during stops.
So began my first of 18 consecutive seasons of work on a fruit farm. I did not
want to return to school in September. Some days I would look out of the grade 5
classroom window and, with a lump in my throat, see my father loading up grapes at the
end of a vineyard. Each day at half past 3, I would tear out of the building and run the
quarter mile from school to farm, joining my father until suppertime. Each autumn
Saturday from 7 in the morning until 6 in the evening, I would pick fruit in the field or
help grade and pack it in the bam or- my favorite-haul trailers fully laden with fruit from
field to barn. When my father could no longer work because of debilitating arthritis, the
owners of the fruit farm invited me to work from May through August-the summer break
for university students.
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It was during the first full summer of farm work that I experienced the joys of
arduous labor. Using a long-handled shovel, I had to cut down weeds missed by a tractor-
drawn disc-harrow. This meant going around the trunk of every tree through
approximately 100 acres of pear, plum, cherry, and peach orchards. When blisters began
to form on my palms, I felt envy for a more senior coworker who sat on a tractor all day.
How was I going to make it through 2 exhausting weeks of la-hour days working by
myself?
As my blisters changed into callouses and my muscles firmed up, the ceaseless
rhythm of my swinging shovel brought me to a state in which I paid attention to ordinary
things. The changing position of the sun, the rustling of leaves, the sweet scent of grape
blossom, the variations in temperature, the perspiration rolling off my forehead, the pain
in my back-these were all savored and endured as I thought along with Weil: "Only
those possess nature and the land who have been penetrated by it through the daily
suffering of their limbs broken by fatigue" (cited in Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 444). I was
alive! The idea of sitting on a tractor began to lose its hold on me. The stench of diesel
exhaust and the steady roar of the engine seemed more and more repugnant. My
perception had changed.
For Weil (1952-1955/1956), "joy is the fullness of the sentiment of the real" (p.
222). It was the "feeling of reality" (p. 266). Aside from working outside in fresh air
among growing things, what made the field more conducive than the factory for finding
joy in work? First, a farm worker could more easily understand how his or her labor fit
within the general scheme of things-a scheme in which planting, cultivating, and
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harvesting followed a regular seasonal pattern. As a result, the orders given by a field
boss or vineyard owner would often seem less capricious than those given by a factory
foreman. Second, the farmhand would bump up against the physical demands of
work-making contact with conditions imposed from without-in a qualitatively different
way than a factory worker. In Weil's view, the obstacles or contradictions experienced
through work put one into contact with reality, the manifest appearance of which
constituted beauty (p. 387). Was it because of a closer proximity to nature less modified
by human artifice that the farmhand could experience these impositions in a way that
more easily opened up a possibility that beauty could be perceived in the order of the
world?
The following example drawn from my own life may serve to illustrate this
qualitative difference. I spent only one day working in a factory. This occurred as a
result of a request made by an industrial supervisor with whom I was acquainted. He
knew I was available on rainy days when there was no inside work to be done on the
farm. His company specialized in moving heavy equipment, and on this particular day, I
joined a crew that had to move a large press inside a factory which manufactured metal
cans for soft drinks. The noise of the metal presses was deafening, and every worker
wore ear protection. Machine operators spent their whole day executing a series of
repetitive motions. Most of my day was spent standing around waiting for a foreman to
give instructions. This created within me an anxious boredom-I had nothing to do, but I
had to be ready to follow orders at any moment. The exhaustion I felt at the end of the
day had more to do with strained nerves and ringing ears than with physical work. The
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hefty paycheck was not enough of a stimulus to lure me away from the farm.
Wisdom and the Order ofthe Universe
Physical work-a series of directed actions-brought one up against something that
resisted one's efforts. The struggle with concrete obstacles-which Weil called necessity,
"that which imposes conditions" (Weil, 1952-1955/1956, p. 217)-could teach a person
about patterns and regularities which existed in the world quite apart from any patterns
that one could imagine or impose upon it. Gouinlock (2004) expresses it succinctly: "The
fisherman, hunter, farmer, and builder are instructed and called to account by the
unsentimental course of events" (p. 94).
Paradoxically, it is through the use of tools-those extensions of our bodies-that
we are able to master our bodies in work, a mastery built through habit, and thereby we
develop a perception of necessary relations, a perception which lies at the heart of
science. Caught in a violent storm at sea, a seasoned sailor realizes that
The mind has to get away from desire and fear and apply itself solely to
establishing an exact relationship between the movements imparted by the
instruments and the objective aimed at .... The body, rendered as it were fluid
through habit, to use Hegel's beautiful expression, simply causes the movements
conceived in the mind to pass into the instruments. The attention is directed
exclusively to the combinations formed by the movements of inert matter, and the
idea of necessity appears in its purity, without any admixture of magic. (Weil,
1955/1958,pp.90-91)
The attention paid to these patterns and regularities-the order of the world-could, in turn,
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reveal a wisdom that also seemed to exist apart from one's own conceptions:
We have everyday before us the example of a universe in which an infinite
number of independent mechanical actions concur so as to produce an order that,
in the midst of variations, remains fixed. Furthermore, we love the beauty of the
world, because we sense behind it the presence of something akin to a wisdom we
should like to possess to slake our thirst for the good. (Weil, 1949/1952b, p. 10)
Hence, for the Christian Platonist Weil, a scholar's true aim was the union of her "own
mind with the mysterious wisdom eternally inscribed in the universe" (p. 262).
In the last section of The Need/or Roots, Weil (1949/1952b) defended and
elaborated this view of wisdom as she challenged Hitler's bold assertion that brute force
was sovereign in the universe-an assertion implied by modern science. If force is
supreme, then might is right, and it is absurd to believe that human beings can build a
society on principles that are somehow not subject to the application of force:
It is inconceivable that everything in the universe should be entirely subjected to
the rule of force and that Man should be able to e~cape the effects of this, seeing
that he is made of flesh and blood and that his mind wanders here and there at the
mercy of sensory impressions. There is only one possible choice to be made.
Either we must perceive at work in the universe, alongside force, a principle of a
different kind, or else we must recognize force as being the unique and sovereign
ruler over human relations also. (p. 241)
Weil was firmly convinced that there was another principle at work and that blind,
indeterminate force was subject to and limited by an eternal and supernatural wisdom.
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Again, since she was advocating a position that runs counter to Dewey's naturalism, her
argument needs to be quoted at length. In reading it, one can see that her bold assertions
are the product of reflecting on her experiences working in the factory and the field:
The whole succession of events here below, made up, as they are, of variations in
balance mutually compensated - births and destructions, waxings and wanings -
render one keenly alive to the invisible presence of a plexus of limits without
substance and yet harder than any diamond. That is why things are beautiful in
their vicissitudes, although they allow one to perceive a pitiless necessity .... But
the thought which really enraptured the ancients was this: what makes the blind
forces of matter obedient is not another, stronger force; it is love. They believed
that matter was obedient to eternal Wisdom by virtue of the love which causes it
to consent to this obedience. Plato, in his Timaeus, says that divine Providence
dominates necessity by exercising a wise form of persuasion over it. (p. 290)
What type of providence is this? It is certainly not one that comports easily with a
conception held by many believers, that is, that God somehow intervenes selectively by
disturbing the order of the world so as to protect some and leave others at the mercy of
natural disasters. Weil attacked this conception root and branch. She often cited the
gospel of Matthew in this regard: "He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and
sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous."35
35 Matthew 5: 45 (Barker, 2002, p. 1477). The Hebrew scriptures contain a similar
passage but without an explicit reference to God. See Ecclesiastes 9: 11: "The race is not
to the swift or the battle to the strong, nor does food come to the wise or wealth to the
brilliant or favor to the learned; but time and chance happen to them all" (Barker, p.
1016).
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Loving Wisdom
Has Weil made an unwarranted leap in her logic? How could pitiless necessity
perfectly obey a love exercised without force? To follow her logic, we are invited to
follow her experimental method - a method which seems to have more in common with
Buddhist meditation than with either modern science or contemporary Christianity:
The operation of the intellect in scientific study makes sovereign necessity over
matter appear to the mind as a network of relations which are immaterial and
without force. Necessity can only be perfectly conceived so long as such relations
appear absolutely immaterial. They are then only present to the understanding as
a result of a pure and lofty concentration emanating from a part of the mind not
subjected to force.... So long as man submits to having his soul taken up with his
own thought, his personal thoughts, he remains entirely subjected, even in his
most secret thoughts, to the compulsion exercised by needs and to the mechanical
play of forces. If he thinks otherwise, he is mistaken. But everything changes as
soon as, by virtue of a positive act of concentration, he empties his soul so as to
allow the conceptions of eternal Wisdom to enter into it. He then carries within
himself the very conception to which force is subjected. (pp. 290-291)
This method is very difficult and requires a persevering faith that can withstand
disappointment. How can I determine whether my thoughts are subjected to force or not?
I must be relentlessly honest with myself, questioning motives constantly but without
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sliding down the slippery slope ofintrospection.36 This can best be achieved through two
types of discipline: the discipline of dialectics in which ideas are tested in discussion with
others, and the discipline of work in which actions are tested by the effects they have in
an environment.
How can I produce "a pure and lofty concentration" unswayed by the pressure of
needs? I must refuse primary allegiance either to the satisfaction or to the renunciation of
my needs. I must strive to fulfill obligations without seeking or ignoring the good
opinion of others. Through all this, I must wait patiently for wisdom to appear while
rejecting all conceptions which fall short. It is like the young chess master who, not
seeing that he is in a winning position, nevertheless remembers his teacher's advice:
"Don't move until you see it" (Rudin, Horberg, & Zaillian, 1993).
Throughout Weil's writings, we find deposits of wisdom produced by the type of
concentrated attention which she had practised and developed from early adolescence.
The Cartesian journey of doubt undertaken in her minidissertation is probably her first
sustained written attempt. Through the discipline of work-both physical and
intellectual-she refined and developed this method until she hit a wall. This obstacle was
the "affliction"37 she experienced in factory work which, combined with her splitting
headaches, made it almost impossible for her to concentrate. It was soon after this that
36 In the first lecture presented at the Roanne lycee in 1933, Weil (1959/1978) advised her
students to avoid introspection because the object of study (oneself) always vanished (pp.
27-29).
37 Affliction is the closest English equivalent to the French malheur, which Weil used to
mean physical suffering combined with social degradation and a sense of inevitable
doom.
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she became aware of a "conception of eternal Wisdom" which transformed her
perception: What she had formerly regarded as the blind mechanism of necessity and
chance was still contemplated as such, with none of the bitterness removed; except now it
was bathed in a light that revealed a perfect and beautiful obedience to a transcendent and
sovereign Good. Caught in this net of necessary relations, human beings had freedom in
only one sense: whether to consent to this obedience or not. However, from the
perspective of experience, this consent was decisive:
Where everything else is equal, a man does not perform the same actions if he
gives his consent to obedience as ifhe does not; just as a plant, where everything
else is equal, does not grow in the same way if it is in the light as if it is in the
dark. The plant does not have any control or choice in the matter of its own
growth. As for us, we are like plants which have the one choice of being in or out
of the light. (Weil, 1950/1959, p. 88)
Loving wisdom-as-truth. For Weil, a lover of wisdom had to be a lover of truth.
In fact, it would be hard to distinguish these terms in her writings. As noted above, they
could be used interchangeably. Here we return to questions that we set aside above. Weil
would probably welcome the fact that truth enjoys little prestige in our postmodern era,
for prestige was, in her view, a corrupting influence. Truth for her was not an abstraction
dependent on the quality of the mind that conceived it. Truth was contact with
reality-reality in its fullness which existed quite apart from anyone's ability to speculate
on it. She was a realist within the tradition of Plato: "To desire truth is to desire contact
with a piece of reality" (Weil, 1949/1952b, p. 253).
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Reality was not something one could possess; one could only be penetrated by it.
Therefore, to ask "whose truth?" was to ask the wrong question. But, any culture could
contain a piece of truth (in whatever language or idiom this was phrased) to the extent to
which it was open to such penetration. Weil believed that the truth in Christianity was
more or less present in all religions. In her notebooks, Weil (1956) drew parallels with
the folklore and myths of a variety of religions and cultures including Hinduism, Taoism,
Buddhism, ancient Greece, and ancient Egypt. However, she did not advocate
syncretism. In her view, changing one's religion was "as dangerous a thing as a change
of language is for a writer. It may tum out a success, but it can also have disastrous
consequences" (Weil, 1951/1974a, p. 117). Neither did she advocate an uncritical
acceptance of one's own religion; in fact, one must be willing to leave a religion if it is
discovered to be false, even if this means becoming an atheist. For Weil (1947/1952a),
atheism could be a type of purification: "Among those men in whom the supernatural part
has not been awakened, the atheists are right and the believers wrong" (p. 104). Her ideas
on religion and truth must be kept in mind as we turn to her position on the purpose of
education.
How Does One Educate for Love of Wisdom-As-Truth?
Weil understood both poles of the teaching-learning dialectic. If one of her
biographers is to be believed, then she was the ideal educator: "Since teaching meant for
her a communication of wisdom ... she found herself unable to resist' any soul's need
for instruction. ' ... her pedagogical gifts were such that she could have adapted any
subject to any kind of mind" (Cabaud, 1964, p. 260). On the other hand, if one reads the
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reports written by school officials, the reviews are mixed. At Auxerre, where she was
least appreciated, one inspector wrote: "Certainly a distinguished mind but as a teacher
she has no pedagogic sense" (cited in Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 169). Nevertheless, on
the whole, she was loved by her students (Petrement, p. 205).38
Except for a short article on teaching mathematics and a longer essay on
developing attention in school studies, Weilleft us nothing but a few fragmentary
comments on education scattered throughout her writings. We will conclude this chapter
by considering both selections.
During her first year of teaching (1931-1932), Weil (1932/1968b) wrote an article
in which she reported on a "personal experiment in teaching" (p. ·71). Sensing that her
philosophy students at Le Puy were interested in the history of mathematics and that the
required curriculum left no space for an extended discussion, she offered an optional
course that each student decided to attend (Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 98). The course
outlined major mathematical ideas in chronological fashion, starting with the
measurement of lengths and the development of theorems in ancient Greece and ending
with the development of calculus in the 17th century. She interpreted this history as
various attempts to solve the contradiction between continuous space and discrete
number. In her judgment, the experiment was very successful, since everyone, even the
38As lecturers both Dewey and Weil created bad first impressions. He spoke slowly with
many pauses and seemed to ignore the class; she spoke without emotion and rarely looked
at her students. Nevertheless, persevering students, initially catching only glimpses of
what lay beneath the austerity of their styles, eventually encountered the rich substance of
their thoughts. Both were at their best in small seminar-type classes. See Westbrook
(1991, pp. 378 - 379) and Petrement (1973/1977, pp. 169,170,181).
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weakest math students, comprehended it enthusiastically: "They understood that
mathematics is a product of human thought and not a collection of dogmas" (p. 73).
She concluded the article with suggestions on how to teach science in a way that
combined thinking with acting. Although she does not explicitly state it, it is safe to
assume that these suggestions are meant to be implemented with high school students or
adult workers who took similar courses. First, each branch of science should be taught
with an historical perspective in mind. Second, as far as possible, such study should
involve the reading of primary sources in combination with the reproduction of original
experiments. Finally, each student should develop a "productive technical skill"
combined with an historical study that related the development of this skill to the
development of science and technology in general (p. 74). As Weil (1987) had concluded
in her dissertation on Descartes, science was best understood if a student, "following the
same order he would follow if he were methodically making discoveries himself, may be
said less to receive instruction than to teach himself' (p. 86). Like Dewey, Weil was
critical of the prevailing methods of teaching science and wanted to make it more vital,
more connected to the growing ability of a student to make sense of the world. As Dewey
(1910/1985a) pointed out, laboratory exercises performed as illustrations of ideas
presented in lectures or textbooks introduce students to the rituals of science, but they do
not necessarily construct a scientific habit of mind, a habit that was built on the platform
of common sense (pp. 75 - 77).
Ten years later, Weil (1950/1959, pp. 66-76) wrote an essay on the purpose of
schooling for Father Perrin, the Dominican priest who had helped her find work in the
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vineyards north of Marseilles and with whom she had discussed Catholic doctrine at great
length in a spirit of friendship. In the spring of 1942, Father Perrin was assigned a
position which put him in contact with Catholic students, and the former high school
teacher wanted to give him her thoughts on how school studies could be put to the "right
use."
The reader must bear in mind the audience to which this essay is addressed-a
Catholic priest who would have had occasion to teach and counsel Catholic students. In
light of the previous discussion, one could almost imagine her transposing this essay for a
Buddhist elementary school teacher or a Hindu professor. A reader who has never prayed
or who has rejected the religion in whose idiom Weil wrote might feel alienated or
offended by this essay. Perhaps the following explanation could remove this difficulty.
Up until the late summer of 1941, Weil had assiduously avoided prayer in all its
visible forms. Always alert to the possibility of self-deception, she feared the power of
suggestion that lurked behind this religious practice. However, she could no longer avoid
it after falling into a trap of her own making: Weil had volunteered to teach her farmer-
employer Greek. During one of the sessions, she and her student agreed to memorize the
Greek text of the Lord's Prayer. Since keeping a promise was a sacred duty to her, she
felt obliged to do it. Weil (1950/1959) made herself recite it with absolute attention:
"The infinite sweetness of this Greek text so took hold of me that for several days I could
not stop myself from saying it over all the time" (p. 39). Looking back at her first
mystical experience, she now concluded that the attentive recitation of Herbert's poem,
Love, had the virtue of a prayer even though she did not know it at the time (p. 35).
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Prayer was virtually identical to the method of sustained attention that she had
practiced for years. It was not auto-suggestion. In auto-suggestion one developed the
"power of positive thinking" which, in turn, produced a hopeful confidence and formed
the basis of acting in ways that more or less produced successful outcomes. After I had a
particularly dismal school year, a friend told me the following September to look at the
mirror each morning and say to myself: "I can do it. I can do it." It worked! Although
this was very similar to the psychological benefits that many people report having as a
result of praying regularly, prayer in Weil's view was essentially different. Auto-
suggestion was based on positive self-talk with a view to a desired outcome. Prayer-as-
attention was based on listening to another without regard for any visible success.
In "Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of
God" Weil (1950/1959, pp. 66-76) argues implicitly that teachers who educate for love of
wisdom-as-truth must help their students cultivate the faculty39 of attention-to develop
their ability to concentrate in a "pure and lofty" manner. Her first sentence enucleates the
essay which follows: "The key to a Christian conception of studies is the realization that
prayer consists of attention" (p. 66). For many Christians, prayer was (and is) seen as a
prelude and postlude to work. Devout Christians pray for a blessing before work is begun
and thank God for success after it is complete. Prayer is directed to God so that work
becomes effective. For Protestants with a pragmatic bent, Weil's thesis is startling
39 Weil's use of this term brings to mind the faculty psychology of the 19th century which
undergirded the traditional view of education and which had been discredited by the
emerging science of psychology in the 20th century. In my reading of WeiI, she tends to
use this term in a more generic sense as a synonym for power, ability, or capacity.
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because she emphasizes the reverse relationship. Work should be conducted in such a
way that our prayers become effective:
When we set out to do a piece of work, it is necessary to wish to do it correctly,
because such a wish is indispensable if there is to be true effort. Underlying this
immediate objective, however, our deep purpose should aim solely at increasing
the power of attention with a view to prayer. (p. 69)
How could school studies be used to develop the power of attention? It meant tackling a
math problem or a language assignment with all the effort that one could muster to find a
solution or compose a poem without any regard for good grades as such. Even if such
sustained effort of attention failed to produce a visible result, it would sooner or later
have its effect in prayer. In addition, it might improve another ability in no way related to
the original assignment. The seemingly vain attempt to solve a mathematical problem
could one day enable the student "to grasp the beauty of a line of Racine more vividly on
account of it" (Weil, 1959, pp. 67-68).40
In this sense, slow learners had a distinct advantage: They were forced to struggle
longer and harder than their more gifted classmates. By Weil's calculation, the "slower"
ones who disciplined themselves in this manner would one day experience the fruit of
their work in exact proportion to the genuine effort expended. Weil points to the example
of the Cure d'Ars (1786-1859), who found academic study extremely difficult and failed
in his first attempt to pass the examinations necessary for entering seminary.
Nevertheless, his ability to teach catechism and to counsel individuals became so well
40 Jean Baptiste Racine (1639 - 1699) was a French playwright.
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known that up to 20,000 people a year came to see this parish priest in the final decade of
his life (Otten, 2003). In Weil's estimation, the long and painful years he spent trying "to
learn Latin bore fruit in the marvellous discernment which enabled him to see the very
soul of his penitents behind their words and even their silences" (Weil, 1950/1959, pp.
68-69).
Students who truly paid attention would not only reap benefits in prayer or in
another field of study-they would be better equipped to help those in affliction because
they could give these sufferers the right kind of attention:
It is a recognition that the sufferer exists, not only as a unit in a collection, or a
specimen from the social category labelled "unfortunate," but as a man, exactly
like us, who was one day stamped with a special mark by affliction. For this
reason it is enough, but it is indispensable, to know how to look at him in a certain
way. This way of looking is first of all attentive. The soul empties itself of all its
own contents in order to receive into itself the being it is looking at, just as he is,
in all his truth. Only he who is capable of attention can do this. (p. 75)
Weil distinguished attention from the type of muscular effort or expenditure of
nervous energy that merely tires us. If one was tired, paying attention was very difficult.
Twenty minutes of sustained study was often much more effective than 3 hours of staring
at books without a break. Attention was also distinct from will power which, though
essential in manual work, had no -place in study per se: "The intelligence can only be led
by desire. For there to be desire, there must be pleasure and joy in the work" (Weil,
1950/1959, p. 71). Will power could perhaps clear away obstacles that blocked the
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growth of desire, but will power could not manufacture joy. Once the ground was
cleared, all one could do was to pay attention with patient endurance: "Above all our
thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its naked
truth the object which is to penetrate it" (p. 72). How could one do this in school work?
There is a way of giving our attention to the data of a problem in geometry
without trying to find the solution, or to the words of a Latin or Greek text without
trying to arrive at the meaning, a way of waiting, when we are writing, for the
right word to come of itself at the end of our pen, while we merely reject all
inadequate words. (p. 73)
Weil (1950/1959) wrote of two conditions that needed to be observed if we were
to put school studies to the right use: First, as we have seen, each school task should be
approached with the implicit aim of increasing the power of attention. Second, we need to
pay careful attention to each assignment in which we have done poorly, "seeing how
unpleasing and second-rate it is, without seeking any excuse or overlooking any mistake
or any of our tutor's corrections, trying to get down to the origin of each fault" (p. 69).
Although not stated in her essay, it goes without saying that teachers who wished
to educate students in this manner were themselves committed to developing the power of
attention in their own lives and work. Teachers who looked at their own mistakes with a
steady gaze were more likely to improve their pedagogical techniques. They would
welcome being corrected by peers and students alike, thereby creating a classroom
climate that cultivated a love of truth along with reducing the fear of making mistakes.
To give a struggling student one's full attention was to give them the gift of
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encouragement-even if one could not (at that moment) provide a concrete suggestion.
They would live by Grant's maxim: "For those of you who wish to become teachers,
always remember that there is at least one student in the class who is more intelligent than
you are." 41
In the next chapter, we bring the two lovers of wisdom together. The thought of
John Dewey and Simone Weil will be compared in the hope that a clearer and more
robust conception of wisdom will come into focus.
41 This is based on my recollection of a lecture given by George Grant in 1978.
CHAPTER FOUR: LOVING WISDOM WITH DEWEY AND WElL
As far as we know, John Dewey and Simone Weil were unaware of each other.
On Dewey's part this is perfectly understandable: Weil was a young French woman who
lived in relative obscurity; Dewey died before Weil's writings would have been available
in English. When meeting Dewey in North America, did Trotsky ever mention his
argument with that infuriating young woman who sheltered him in Paris? Although a
reference to William James can be found in her notebooks,42 Weil never mentioned
Dewey by name. It is tempting to imagine a chance meeting between Dewey and Weil
during her 4-month sojourn in New York City. If the 33-year-old had been interested in
American pragmatism, she might have tracked down the 83-year-old in the autumn of
1942. Nevertheless, apart from her keen desire to leave America for London as soon as
she could, her main intellectual pursuits involved reading up on ancient folklore and
finding Catholic priests who were willing to answer her reservations about receiving
baptism.
In this chapter the views of John Dewey and Simone Weil on wisdom are
compared. The comparison is structured around three questions: How is wisdom
connected to experience from a psychological perspective? How is wisdom connected to
the social dimension of experience? How is wisdom connected to nature? In the next
chapter, the comparison of their views will form the basis of a discussion on how to
educate for love of wisdom.
42 Weil (1950/1970) defined freedom-"when the thought of an action precedes the action"
(p. 26)-in response to James's (1884) thesis that an action (I am running) preceded an
emotion (I am afraid). To have the presence of mind to be aware of one's fear dissipated
a knee-jerk panic reaction and allowed some freedom from, and mastery of, the emotion
of fear.
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How Is Wisdom Connected to Experience from a Psychological Perspective?
As noted in Chapter Two, it would be fair to say that Dewey considered wisdom
to be a moral activity that constructed a moral self. It had its roots in the habitual
transactions that humans forged with their environments. The moral self was a bundle of
habits that were continually reconstructed as the self adapted to changing environments or
responded to problematic transactions. Wisdom was the cord which held the bundle of
habits together. Wisdom was a metahabit: a habit of habits. The habit of deliberation
developed at the core of wise activity. It meant thinking before doing by rehearsing
various courses of action in the mind before deciding on one. It meant learning from
mistakes, learning from experience, and reconstructing habits. A teacher with wisdom
derived from experience could visualize a classroom activity well enough to anticipate
student responses to instructional directions. She could enter a classroom of new students
and know how to read the situation, alert to signs of attention or inattention, careful not to
jump to conclusions, but also willing to take appropriate action if the situation required
it. To act wisely was to think before, during, and after acting-it was the habit of
reflective practice, a habit which expressed her moral self-as-a-teacher and, at the same
time, modified this same self as it was embodied through action.
Transactions with events in environments were central to Dewey's conception of
the moral self, and of these transactions, the ones connected to other selves-the social
dimension of experience-held the most value for "shared experience is the greatest of
human goods" (Dewey, 1929a, p. 167). For the development of a moral self, the
metahabit of wisdom continually took others into account so that a shared experience-the
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democratic way of life-would enrich the lives of each one.
For Weil, it also would be fair to say that the roots of wisdom lay in transactions
with an environment. It was difficult, if not impossible, to conceive a self separate from
the transactions which defined it. The surrounding conditions were the backdrop that
brought a self into relief, and without the environmental backdrop which sustained it, the
self would disappear. The transactions were a composite of a self with its
environment-each acting on the other (Weil, 1987, p. 69). Nevertheless, this composite
self was divided, craving to be unified, to be whole, to have integrity:
I am always a dual being, on the one hand a passive being who is subject to the
world, and on the other an active being who has a grasp on it; ... Can I not attain
perfect wisdom, wisdom in action, that would reunite the two parts of myself? (p.
78)
Like Dewey, Weil saw wisdom developing through action. One's actions not only
revealed the degree to which one possessed wisdom as a force that unified the self-that
tied the habits together-these actions created that very self. Weil (1987) was emphatic
about it: "My existence as I know it is not a feeling but my creation" (p. 59). Activity
which exhibited a grasp on the world might look passive to someone looking from the
outside, just as passivity which exhibited the world's grasp on the self might appear as
activity to the same observer. The colloquial term "acting out" denotes such a passive
state where anarchic desires are given "free" reign. As Dewey (1938/1963) made clear,
such a person's conduct is
dictated by immediate whim and caprice; that is, at the mercy of impulses into
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whose formation intelligent judgment has not entered. A person whose conduct is
controlled in this way has at most only the illusion of freedom. Actually he is
directed by forces over which he has no command. (pp. 64-65)
Effective action was tempered by thinking which Dewey (1922) would translate as
"deliberation" or "dramatic rehearsal" or "activity following intra-organic channels" (p.
191). Deliberation is a wonderful word to describe how conflicting impulses lost their
freedom to go unchecked: They were not liberated but de-liberated. Here, scientific
thinking-what Weil (1987) called "directing one's reason well"(p.47)-transformed crude
impulse into refined action. The result would be what Weil called indirect action or work
and what Dewey called intelligent action.
Indirect action (work) was the key to changing one's self for the better; trying to
control one's impulses directly was a recipe for failure-like a dog chasing its own tail.
Work consisted of directing one's attention outward, grappling with the surrounding
conditions of existence which more or less resisted one's efforts at control. Out of this
struggle, the necessary discipline could be furnished to master oneself. Dewey could not
agree more:
We cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it
indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of
the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfillment of desires.
(Dewey, 1922,p.20)
In this way, the wisdom of the Socratic dictum became concrete: To know oneself was to
reveal and to refashion oneself through work.
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So far in our comparison, we could say that Dewey's and Weil's views on wisdom
dovetail very well. Both of them undertake a psychological journey in their quest for
wisdom, and both stay with their starting point-the transaction between a self and the
environment. However, a slight tension can be detected in the way they conduct their
inquiry. Written in the third person, Human Nature and Conduct (Dewey, 1922) is a
more conventional scholarly approach: The investigator appears as a detached observer
taking notes on what is happening in the psyche. "Science and Perception in Descartes"
(Weil, 1987, pp. 31-88) is divided in two sections: The first part is a third-person
commentary on Descartes; the second part, Weil's own Cartesian journey of doubt, is
appropriately-given the nature of her task-written in the first person. Perhaps her
supervisor thought, "What impudence! This young woman thinks she can parallel the
journey of the great Descartes!" If so, it is no wonder she received a low mark: Her thesis
did not fit the rubric of acceptable scholarship, which usually involved analyzing and
elucidating a modest portion of a great thinker's work. If Dewey had been her supervisor,
would he have been more receptive to her dissertation? Would not Dewey have
applauded the following statement, which seemed so close to his view of science and his
theory of education? Among the conclusions to her thesis, Weil wrote:
And so outside of effective action, when the body, in which past perceptions are
inscribed, is relieved from the necessity of exploration, human thought is given
over to the passions, to the kind of imagination that conjures up gods, to more or
less reasonable-sounding arguments received from others. That is why mankind
needs science, provided that instead of imposing its proofs it is taught in the way
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that Descartes called analytic, that is, in such a way that each student, following
the same order he would follow if he were methodically making discoveries
himself, may be said less to receive instruction than to teach himself. (pp. 85-86)
Weil not only believed that she was being faithful to the spirit of Descartes by
undertaking her own journey of self-instruction, but that Descartes had demanded such a
journey from any reader who wished to understand him:
Cartesian thought is not something that one can comment on from the outside;
every commentator must become, at least for a time, a Cartesian. But how does
one become a Cartesian? To be a Cartesian is to doubt everything, and then to
examine everything in order; without believing in anything except one's own
thought insofar as it is clear and distinct, and without trusting the authority of
anyone, even Descartes, in the least. (Weil, 1987, p. 54)
Where is the tension between Dewey and Weil? None of the foregoing is meant to imply
that Weil's first-person journey is superior to Dewey's third-person approach. The reader
is attracted to Weil's impetuosity-her boldness to plunge in with little regard for what her
supervisor might think. She is drawn vicariously into the water with the swimmer who
feels that mixture of pleasure and pain (Weil, 1987, pp. 55-56). The determined reader
has to work harder to experience the same with Dewey, and perhaps the increased effort
demanded of the reader provides a greater reward.43 Nevertheless, in Weil's account one
sees more vividly a person struggling with her thinking in a way that makes Dewey
43 Not everyone would agree. For Egan (2002), untangling Deweyan syntax is not worth
the effort. He considers Dewey to be a mere plagiarist of Herbert Spencer.
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appear relatively calm. Perhaps this simply reflects the difference in their
ages-eomparing the impetuosity of a 20-something with the serenity of a 60-something.
Or perhaps Dewey, like his pragmatist predecessor, C. S. Peirce, would question the
wisdom of undertaking the Cartesian journey of doubt and might wonder if it is truly
possible to doubt everything except "one's own thought insofar as it is clear and distinct."
Outside of testing ideas in practical experience, why should one trust or assume that one's
thinking is clear? 44
Wisdom and the Disappearing Self
To return to the question: What bearing has the above excursus on discovering an
important tension between Dewey and Weil? Dewey's third-person stance puts him in
the position of observing the psyche from the outside. Look again at the way he describes
deliberation:
Deliberation means precisely that activity is disintegrated, and that its various
elements hold one another up. While none has force enough to become the center
of a re-directed activity, or to dominate a course of action, each has enough power
to check others from exercising mastery. Activity does not cease in order to give
44 "We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices ... we
actually have .... A person may ... find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but
in this case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the
Cartesian maxim" (Peirce cited in Dipert, 1999, ~ 11). Since we begin our lives believing
the ideas given to us by our parents, caregivers, teachers, and other authorities, there is no
practical reason to doubt an idea until it is found to be false or problematic in an actual,
specific situation in which the idea is put to a test. Weil's Cartesian journey of doubt can
be interpreted as a series of thought experiments or tests performed through reflecting on
her own accumulated experience, but unlike Descartes, she sees no need to base the
clarity of her thoughts on the existence of God.
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way to reflection; activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels,
resulting in dramatic rehearsal. (Dewey, 1922, p. 191)
The "self' seems to have disappeared. It has no ontological status apart from the pattern
of biologically derived impulses holding themselves in check and eventually reorganizing
themselves into a new pattern or reconstructed habit where the previously incompatible
desires achieve a new harmony. As we saw in Chapter Two, the beginning of wisdom
appears in a new and better ordering of desires: Temperance is the root of reasonableness,
rationality means that the relations among competing desires have been tempered, each
relation defined by a new ratio that when combined with other ratios achieve a new
harmony which is expressed in effective action. The "self' comes back into view.
Although Dewey lays out in detail how habits are re-constructed through enduring
interests, one cannot help feeling that there is something magical and mysterious about
how the self reappears after deliberation as a morally stronger bundle of habits.
By contrast, Weil examines her own thinking from the inside and cannot allow her
"self' to disappear because she is more explicitly both spectator and participant. Her
"self' is a dual being which seeks unity through self-mastery (Dewey's tempered
mingling of desires). From Weil's perspective, this unity is effected through a painful
struggle where the active part-the being which can effect a grasp on the world through
work-seeks to diminish the weight of the passive part insofar as it is subject to the world.
Implied (but never stated) is Weil's identification of her "true self' with the active part.
There is a sense in which Dewey both agrees and disagrees with her. Yes, the
"self' is created in action, but one must be careful that in conceiving the self this way one
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does not fall into the trap of hypostatization-reifying a concept into a real existent.
Reminded of his own youthful struggles with absolute idealism, Dewey might look kindly
at this intense young woman and gently remonstrate her for falling into the "philosophic
fallacy" where functional distinctions are mistakenly awarded ontological status. For
Dewey, the "self' is shorthand for denoting a more or less ordered system of processes
and impulses. As a naturalist, Dewey sees no separate existence of a "self' or a "soul"
apart from the biological and chemical activities which define it, just as a beautiful
snowflake does not exist apart from the water molecules which, together with certain
environmental conditions, determine the snowflake's unique pattern. Surprisingly, WeiI
(1950/1977c) agrees with him. The soul or its modern counterpart-the person-has no
existence independent of the biological and social mechanisms which make it what it is:
an organized yet dynamic series of events. Yet, she maintains, there is something
"sacred" within each human being-a desire for good-and it has nothing to do with
personality or personhood:
At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the
tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all
experience of crimes committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil
will be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in every human being. (p.
315)
Dewey made a strong case for avoiding the pitfalls of hypostatization when doing
scientific or theoretical work. But what about everyday practical living-something that
both Dewey and Weil prized? Do we not need to cultivate what Laing (1973) called
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"ontological security" to live with some measure of sanity? Does not one need to develop
confidence that one is real and that one can relate to others who are experienced as real
through acts that demonstrate a faith in oneself? If this is simply a noble lie or a "useful"
reification, it loses its functional power as soon as one regards it as such in the warp and
woof of daily life. Dewey would acknowledge this, but he would add that we can believe
in our real existence naturally defined without necessarily believing in a soul or a self
existing apart from the dynamic series and organized patterns of events that we call a
living body. Can a soul exist apart from a body? Can form be separated from matter?
Here we have another footnote to the longstanding debate between two giants of Greek
philosophy, with Weil taking Plato's side and Dewey reiterating the Aristotelian position.
Wisdom and the Thinking Self
Weil demonstrates a variation of ontological security throughout her Cartesian
journey. She doubts everything at the outset except one thing-her own thought "insofar
as it is clear and distinct" (Weil, 1987, p. 54). One is tempted to say that the one part of
her self whose reality she will not doubt is her ability to think clearly. But she does not
say that, and here she departs from Laing (1973) and modern self-actualization theorists:
She trusts only clear thoughts. And this is consistent with the way she lived: she would
rather have been challenged on the truth of her thoughts than have been complimented on
her intellectual ability to formulate those thoughts. The important issue was not whether
the thoughts belonged to her as a form of intellectual property, but whether the thoughts
were true. For her, clarity was the initial- though not necessarily the final-eriterion of
truth. Clarity impelled her to examine the truth of an idea in the crucible of experience.
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To use Deweyan language: "Truth as a positive, achieved thing simply means that use has
tested and has approved what was an intellectual, and so problematic affair, and thereby
has given it an assured status in further effort" (Dewey, 1911/1985b, p. 46). Successful
deliberation cleared up a problematic situation, but the clarity, elegance, and coherence of
the hypothetical solution was not enough to satisfy a pragmatic conception of truth: The
act of thinking was not complete until it was tested in practice (Dewey, 1910/1985a, pp.
234-241). In this regard, Weil was zealously Deweyan: Is Marxism a path of liberation
for oppressed workers? She involved herself with trade unions to find out. Will
educating workers help them achieve steps towards liberation? In her spare time from her
day job as a high school teacher, she instructed railway workers to examine this notion.
Why were the Communist unions unable to challenge Nazism? She visited Germany to
see for herself. Was the Soviet Union simply another form of oppression for the working
class? She tested her hypothesis in a long argument with one of the Russian Bolsheviks,
Leon Trotsky. Convinced that the Republican militia were fighting for Spain's "famished
peasants against landed proprietors and their clerical supporters" (Weil, 1938/1977d, p.
75), she joined up and soon discovered how the justice of one's cause can quickly be
obscured in war by cowardice, cruelty, and wanton disregard for the value of human life:
"People get carried away by a sort of intoxication which is irresistible without a fortitude
of soul which I am bound to consider exceptional since I have met with it nowhere" (p.
77). Is manual labour a path to wisdom? She worked in a factory and in a vineyard to
experience this for herself.
Her whole intellectual journey-from before her 1930 student dissertation through
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to her death 13 years later-is based on a trust of clear and distinct thoughts that are tested,
purified, modified, or discarded in the fire of one's own experience. By 1942, despite her
unshakeable faith in the reality of a realm transcending nature-a confidence born of her
mystical experiences which she articulated in a Christian idiom-she refused to
compromise her intellectual scruples by accepting baptism in the Catholic church. In
fact, far from being threatened by religious superstition, her early confidence in clear
thinking was somehow connected to her developing view of supernatural truth. Weil
(1950/1959) believed "that one can never wrestle enough with God if one does so out of
pure regard for the truth" (p. 36).
Thinking clearly-the active part of the self-operated through a conduit to the
environment, what Dewey called the transaction and what Weil (1987) called the
imagination, "this knot of action and reaction that attaches me to the world" (p. 70). On
closer examination, two types of thoughts can be distinguished in the imagination: (a)
those which impose themselves and are fused with impulse, feeling, or emotion - a pang
of hunger, a painful injury, a friend's rebuke; and (b) those which do not impose
themselves but require work to make themselves apparent and clear-knowing how to
swing an axe with grace and power, knowing how to write a line of poetry, understanding
a theorem in geometry.45 Weil (1930/1987) concluded:
If I try to discover how much trust should be put in the thought harbored by the
45 Except for the example drawn from mathematics, the illustrations presented here for
both types of thoughts are mine, not Weil's. The three examples of thoughts that require
work correspond to categories of learning outcomes drawn from Posner and Rudnitsky
(2001): respectively, they are psychomotor..perceptual skills, cognitive skills, and
cognitive understandings.
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imagination, I find that the clear ideas alone do not represent the encroachment of
the world on me, since they are made present to me only by an act of my own
attention. (p. 72)
Developing the ability to pay attention increasingly became her preferred method of
discerning clear ideas-whether such thought was provoked by the imposition of a
problem or whether the thing attended to was contemplated as an object of beauty. For
Dewey (1929a), thinking and knowing were, strictly speaking, associated more with
problem-solving and productive action than they were with contemplation (pp. 269-270,
289-290). Chapter Five will examine these differences in greater detail.
Weil rejected the view that thinking could be explained as a natural product
issuing forth from a progressively sophisticated pattern of material forces. Following
Plato's teaching in conjunction with the scientific conception of entropy, Weil
(1943/1962b) maintained that "the imperfect cannot give rise to the perfect or the less
good to the better" (p. 44).46 Is Dewey's magnificent naturalistic description of
46 Weil might reason analogically as follows: A perfect triangle exists nowhere, yet we
refer to it in our minds when we attempt to draw one. If we used a less than perfect
triangle as our referent, our drawing would be even less perfect. She translates this to the
realm of human morality as follows: "It is only the thought of perfection that produces
any good-and this good is imperfect. If one aims at imperfect good, one does evil"
(Weil, 1950/1970, p. 342). But where does this thought of perfection originate?
Weil distinguished between plural goods embodied in existence and the Good
beyond being. Following Plato, she believed that existent goods derived their "goodness"
from transcendent Good. Plural goods existed on the same plane as, and were opposed
to, plural evils. The Good transcended the good/evil opposition. It had no opposite
(Weil, 1956, pp. 592-593). It was her contention that if one oriented one's attention and
desire to the Good beyond being, then and only then, existent goods would be
strengthened and non-existent goods would come into being. If one oriented one's
attention and desire wholly to existent goods, then these goods would degrade and evil
would increase. To use Deweyan language, this hypothesis required a proper test, but
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deliberation and habit a variation of materialism? We will consider this question in more
detail below. Regardless, Weil (1955/1958) believed that the connection between
thought and action would remain an unfathomable mystery despite advances in
neuroscience or physiological psychology: "The extreme complexity of vital phenomena
can perhaps be progressively unraveled, at any rate to a certain extent; but the immediate
relationship linking our thoughts to our movements will always remain wrapped in
impenetrable obscurity" (p. 89). It is difficult to understand how she can be so sure.
Dewey might counter that her bold assertion is based on a false, ontological dichotomy
between thinking and acting. If one asserts, as he did, that thinking is acting turned
inwards, then the problem disappears. The relationship between thinking and acting is
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.
To sum up the comparison so far: Dewey and Weil substantially agree on what
wisdom is from a psychological point of view. They locate its genesis in the transaction
between a self and its environment. Wisdom begins to take root when activity is diverted
from immediate outward expression through inward deliberation towards mediated,
indirect action or work. For both, the test of experience is essential in verifying or
modifying ideas and developing wisdom. However, a fissure seems to appear in their
respective positions when we examine their views of the moral self. From her first-
person perspective, Weil experiences a binary tension within the transaction where the
self and its environment are linked in a wrestling match: Her active self seeks to increase
what would constitute a proper test outside of employing Weil' s method of paying
attention? These ideas are rooted in Plato's Symposium (See Chapter 6).
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its grasp on the environment, while her passive self allows the environment to encroach.
Impelled by a desire to achieve mastery of herself-the active part overcoming the passive
part-Weil discovers that clear thoughts (the only thing she trusts at the outset) are secured
through the active work of attention. From his third-person perspective, Dewey describes
a plurality of tensions among competing desires which hold each other up in deliberation
as old habits are disrupted. Thinking is employed to find a way to unite the desires
around enduring interests in order to forge a better transaction with the environment (i.e.,
a new habit is constructed out of the remnants of the old one). The widening fissure can
be postulated as follows: Dewey loves experiential wisdom inasmuch as it creates a self
that grows progressively stronger and richer from a moral point of view. Weilloves
experiential wisdom inasmuch as it reveals clear thoughts that act as stepping stones on
the way to truth. To Dewey, Weil is dangerously close to committing the philosophic
fallacy, a form of self-delusion that seeks to vouchsafe the hard-won insights of
experience by inventing a realm called "transcendent." Is she not holding on to
"either/or" thinking-that ancient dualism that kept mind and matter ontologically
separate? To Weil, Dewey may be guilty of "lowering the sights" of philosophy by
aiming at personal growth and social usefulness at the expense of a commitment to truth.
How Is Wisdom Connected to the Social Dimension of Experience?
Both Dewey and Weil would agree that humans are unavoidably social beings and
that the wisdom of moral deliberation entails taking into account connections that bind a
self to others. Dewey finds meaning through making connections, and the more
connections that are ascertained in deliberation, the more meaningful a chosen activity
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becomes, no matter how mundane that activity may seem at first glance. Dewey & Tufts
(1932/1989) uncover how an ideal functions in the love of wisdom, and they use Weil's
favorite Christian poet to drive the point home:
The genuine ideal ... is the sense that each of these special situations brings with
it its own inexhaustible meaning, that its value reaches far beyond its direct local
existence. Its nature is perhaps best expressed in the verses of George Herbert:
"Who sweeps a room as for Thy Laws 1Makes that and th'action fine." (p. 273)
For Dewey, the social dimension (whether an association of values that live within an
individual or an actual society of individuals) is the criterion that distinguishes fleeting
pleasure from enduring happiness: "Harmony and readiness to expand into union with
other values is a mark of happiness. Isolation and liability to conflict and interference are
marks of those states which are exhausted in being pleasurable" (p. 199).
First, let us examine how the social dimension functions within an individual as
an association of values in Dewey's psychology. Those who assume that an American
pragmatist and a French Platonist are diametrically opposed might be surprised to see
how much Dewey's moral self resembles Plato's just man.47 In his Ethics, Dewey
(Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989b) shows how the four cardinal virtues (courage, justice,
47 In an autobiographical essay published the same year as the revision of Ethics, Dewey
made an startling admission: His favourite philosophical reading was Plato! Perhaps his
well-known attacks on this Greek thinker were more directed at what he called the
"artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative commentators who treat him as the
original university professor" than at the Plato he admired, "whose highest flight of
metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical tum" (Dewey, 1932/1989b, p.
ISS). It seems that when Garrison (1997) targets Plato in the name of Dewey, he is
attacking the artificial one.
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temperance, and wisdom) are not really separate virtues; they are simply different features
that cohere seamlessly in one moral self. Notice how he begins the following passage
with what is less an attack on the classical conceptions of virtue than it is a criticism of
empiricist notions such as those held by Benjamin Franklin, whose list of virtues lacked a
unifying framework: 48
The mere idea of a catalogue of different virtues commits us to the notion that
virtues may be kept apart, pigeon-holed in water-tight compartments. In fact
virtuous traits interpenetrate one another; this unity is involved in the very idea of
integrity of character. At one time persistence and endurance in the face of
obstacles is the most prominent feature; then the attitude is the excellence called
courage. At another time, the trait of ~mpartialityand equity is uppermost, and we
call it justice. At other times, the necessity for subordinating immediate
satisfaction of a strong appetite or desire to a comprehensive good is the
conspicuous feature. Then the disposition is denominated temperance, self-
control. When the prominent phase is the need for thoughtfulness, for consecutive
and persistent attention, in order that these other qualities may function, the
interest receives the name of moral wisdom, insight, conscientiousness. In each
case, the difference is one of emphasis only. (pp. 257-258)
48 In his autobiography, Franklin (1909) listed 13 virtues that he wished to develop in
himself: "My intention being to acquire the habitude of all these virtues, I judg'd it would
be well not to distract my attention by attempting the whole at once, but to fix it on one of
them at a time." (Continuation, Part III). From Dewey's perspective, this approach is
misdirected: One cannot cultivate virtues directly, since they are always the byproduct of
effective action undertaken by a whole self.
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However, Dewey did differ from Plato here in at least one important respect: Plato's
conception ofjustice was more comprehensive. It was not simply the impartial phase or
the equitable feature of moral character; it was identical to it. When wisdom, courage,
and temperance interpenetrated and supported one another, when each part of the soul
fulfilled its proper function according to the dictates of wisdom, then Plato used the term
"justice" to describe the virtuous soul or moral self in its unity, harmony, coherence,
wholeness, and integrity (Comford, 1945, pp. 139-143).
Second, let us examine how the social dimension functions as an association of
individuals in Dewey's social psychology. Dewey reverses Plato's Republic in
constructing his democratic ideal. The Republic sets up an imaginary society as a
heuristic device to show how justice is achieved by analogy in the individual soul.
Dewey (1922) begins Human Nature and Conduct with the individual psyche by
describing how a tempered wisdom is achieved through the comingling of conflicting
desires in deliberation. Dewey implicitly projects what is going on in the psyche onto the
screen of the wider society: The well-tempered community could be achieved through a
democratic form of life in which separate-yet-connected individuals with differing goals
and temperaments seek ways to achieve a "working" unity through intelligent
collaboration.
What was Dewey's democratic ideal, and how was it connected to wisdom? In
The Public and Its Problems, Dewey (1927/1954) distinguished democracy as a social
idea from democracy as a particular form of representative government. The specific
forms of political democracy such as constitutional monarchy (United Kingdom, Canada)
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or a republican system of checks and balances (United States) owed their existence not to
democratic ideas per se (however influential these ideas might have been) but to changing
material and social conditions effected by technology. No doubt influenced by Marx in
this regard, Dewey anticipated the trenchant analyses of Ellul (1954/1970) and Heidegger
(1954/1977) by 2 decades: "The transition from family and dynastic government
supported by the loyalties of tradition to popular government was the outcome primarily
of technological discoveries and inventions working a change in the customs of which
men had been bound together" (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 144). On the other hand, Dewey's
democratic ideal-like any ideal-had a nonhistorical quality which seemed to transcend
time and place. He was well aware of this and harbored no illusions: An ideal was based
on something which truly existed "carried to its final limit, viewed as completed,
perfected. Since things do not attain such fulfillment but are in actuality distracted and
interfered with, democracy in this sense is not a fact and never will be" (p. 148). Yet,
despite the arguments of those who embraced a more "realistic" version of modern
democracy,49 Dewey refused to let go of participatory democracy as an end-in-view for
creating a more genuine and wiser community-a public that could find itself, a society
that could intelligently deliberate and foresee the consequences of its conjoint activities:
From the standpoint of the individual, [the democratic idea] consists in having a
49 One of these democratic realists, Walter Lippman, challenged Dewey's idealism.
Lippman convincingly argued that the electorate did not have the competence to
participate meaningfully in the increasingly complex world of political democracy.
Accordingly, experts in civil service bureaucracies who advised elected politicians had
taken over the function formerly served by ordinary citizens in the town-hall meetings of
a bygone age. See Westbrook (1991, pp. 294-300).
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responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activity of the
groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values
which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands
liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with interests
and goods which are common. Since every individual is a member of many
groups, this specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact
flexibly and fully in connection with other groups. (p. 147)
Dewey's democratic idea was the metahabit of wisdom socially transposed: It bound
individuals and groups together without strangling them. More than being simply the
social corollary of the moral self, the unavoidable web of social connections were
necessary to the very construction of that moral self:
A good citizen finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and
enriched by his participation in family life, industry, scientific and artistic
associations. This is a free give-and-take; fullness of integrated personality is
therefore possible of achievement, since the pulls and responses of different
groups reinforce one another and their values accord. (p. 148)
The individual was not only circumscribed by the groups to which she belonged, she was
to a great degree defined by them. Each group had a share in making the self what it was.
Both Dewey and Weil believed that wise deliberation kept the social dimension
constantly in view. Weil followed Marx in emphasizing that society was the
fundamental human fact. Although she debunked the Marxist formula that "social
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existence determines consciousness,"50 she appreciated his attempt to analyze the
relationships of force in reference to human society in the manner of a physicist who
analyzed these relationships in reference to inert matter. She took Marx's position and
reframed it in a way that kept the relationships of social forces intact while maintaining
that humans understood as individuals were relatively free:
Men are not the impotent playthings of fate; they are eminently active beings; but
their activity is at each moment limited by the structure of the society which they
form among themselves, and only modifies that structure in its turn by a ricochet,
once it has modified the relations between them and nature. The social structure
can never be modified except indirectly. (Weil, 1955/1958, p. 149)
The structure of society, like the structure of the moral self, could only be transformed
indirectly through work, which from a social perspective meant conjoint activity
channeled through the means of production. Amish Mennonites understand this: To
conserve their social structure which is constructed around the value of manual labour,
they resist technological change. Whoever owned the means of production was not the
decisive issue. Altering the means of production was the key to real social change, even
though the issue of ownership was inextricably linked to it. If this is true, then education
50 Dewey (1929a), who asserted that mind was "a function of social interactions" (p. xvii),
would probably agree with her refutation of Marx: "Seeing that what is 'social' can have
an existence only in human minds, 'social existence' is itself already consciousness; it
cannot in addition determine a consciousness which would in any case remain to be
defined. To posit in this way a 'social existence' as a special determining factor divorced
from our consciousness, hidden no one knows where, is to make a hypostasis of it; and it
constitutes, furthermore, a beautiful example of Marx's tendency towards dualism"
(Weil, 1955/1958, pp. 133-134).
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could effect Dewey's hoped-for social transformation only if it was aimed at equipping
students with the ability and the desire to comprehend technology (Le., clearly
understanding how humans interact with human and nonhuman nature through productive
work and intelligently changing that interaction based on a knowledge of foreseeable
consequences). No wonder that Dewey's laboratory school had occupations at the core
of its curriculum. The ever-expanding patterns of relationships that working individuals
formed around the means of production, patterns that became increasingly complex
through specialization and division of labour, crystallized into powerful social
mechanisms that could be as blind and as dangerous as any force of nature. Ironically,
unruly nature, seemingly domesticated through collective human action, reappeared
within the social structure with all the oppressive power of an arbitrary deity.51 How
could it be mastered? Weil (1955/1958) answered:
To gain mastery over it means to subject it to the human mind, that is to the
individual. In the subordination of society to the individual lies the definition of
true democracy and that of socialism as well. (p. 20) ... The only hope of
socialism resides in those who have already brought about in themselves, as far as
is possible in the society of today, that union between manual and intellectual
labour which characterizes the society we are aiming at. (p. 23)
What type of society was she aiming at? Did Weil have a democratic ideal comparable to
51 See Crozier (1964) for a brilliant analysis of how modern bureaucratic structures
imprison and warp human intention and behaviour. However much it may appear as
perfectly rational in an organizational flow chart, the phenomenon of bureaucracy often
belies the intentions of those who "run" it and is often experienced as a pitiless and
indifferent machine by those who inhabit it.
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Dewey's? Yes. In Oppression and Liberty, Weil (1955/1958) described the pragmatic
function of an ideal in terms that echo Dewey:
Perfect liberty is what we must try to represent clearly to ourselves, not in the
hope of attaining it, but in the hope of attaining a less imperfect liberty than is our
present condition; for the better can be conceived only by reference to the perfect.
One can only steer towards an ideal. The ideal is just as unattainable as the
dream, but differs from the dream in that it concerns reality; it enables one, as a
mathematical limit, to grade situations, whether real or realizable, in an order of
values from least to greatest. (p. 84)
Like Dewey, she began with the individual:
True liberty is not defined by a relationship between desire and its satisfaction, but
by a relationship between thought and action; the absolutely free man would be he
whose every action proceeded from a preliminary judgment concerning the end
which he set himself and the sequence of means suitable for attaining this end. (p.
85)
Although his phrasing was comparatively less strident and included an awareness of
contingency, Dewey (1929b) had exactly the same conception of freedom:
Freedom is an actuality when the recognition of relations, the stable element, is
combined with the uncertain element, in the knowledge which makes foresight
possible and secures intentional preparation for the probable consequences. We
are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about. (pp. 249-250)
However, instead of using the social dimension as the criterion for defining happiness in
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the individual as Dewey seemed to do, Weil (1955/1958) used the individual as the
criterion for defining the "least evil society." A truly democratic society served the needs
of the individual:
To sum up, the least evil society is that in which the general run of men are most
often obliged to think while acting, have the most opportunities for exercising
control over collective life as a whole, and enjoy the greatest amount of
independence. (p. 103)
Weil was much more wary of the social dimension than Dewey. This was part of the
reason she never joined the Communist party or the Catholic church: "As soon as a party
finds itself cemented not only by the coordination of activities, but also by unity of
doctrine, it becomes impossible for a good militant to think otherwise than in the manner
of a slave" (pp. 30 -31). Like Dewey, she saw how a community of relatively free
individuals could be become unthinking cogs in a collective machine. Nevertheless, her
notion of freedom was not the romantic ideal of rugged individualism so often celebrated
in American westerns. All that an individual owned-even her sense of worth, her self-
esteem-was derived from the social element. Weil's experience as an anonymous factory
worker removed all doubt on that score. Yet, there was one thing that an individual could
do which a collectivity never could. An individual could think. Weil (1950/1977b)
described it in stark terms: "A collectivity is much stronger than a single man; but every
collectivity depends for its existence upon operations, of which simple addition is the
elementary example, which can only be performed by a mind in a state of solitude" (p.
320). By solitude, she did not mean physical isolation from others, although this may be
143
necessary from time to time. She was merely pointing out that when thinking clearly and
effectively, a person had to focus on an issue or problem without being intimidated by the
presence of others or what others might think. Since calculating machines have taken
over many of these "simple operations" and computers are able to process information in
speed and quantity in ways that literally boggle the best of human minds, one wonders
whether a collectivity has the potential to be exponentially more powerful than even Weil
could imagine. This raises a number of related questions: Could a society exist without
depending on human minds performing operations in solitude? In theory, is there
anything about human reasoning that could not be duplicated by a machine? And if such
a dimension of reasoning could be shown to exist, would it be considered essential for
maintaining or improving a social order? Or, alternatively, would it be considered a
threat to that order? If not, would there be any use or purpose for a uniquely human form
of thinking?
Weil's (1955/1958) criterion for measuring freedom and democracy in a society
was the extent to which the patterns of relationships among individuals could be
understood by each thinking individual:
Thus, if we wish to form, in a purely theoretical way, the conception of a society
in which collective life would be subject to men as individuals instead of
subjecting them to itself, we must visualize a form of material existence wherein
only efforts exclusively directed by a clear intelligence would take place, which
would imply that each worker himself had to control, without referring to any
external rule, not only the adaptation of his efforts to the piece of work to be
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produced, but also their coordination with the efforts of all other members of the
collectivity. (pp. 98-99)
Is this not a clear statement of the democratic ideal which Dewey prized? If one thinks
that Weil valued autonomous individualism over and above Deweyan shared experience,
the following elaboration dispels that notion unreservedly:
Such a society alone would be a society of men free, equal and brothers. Men
would, it is true, be bound by collective ties, but exclusively in their capacity as
men; they would never be treated by each other as things. Each would see in
every work-fellow another self occupying another post, and would love him in the
way the Gospel maxim enjoins. Thus we should possess, over and above liberty,
a still more precious good: for if nothing is more odious than the humiliation and
degradation of man by man, nothing is so beautiful or so sweet as friendship. (pp.
99-100)
For Weil (1950/1959), the social dimension could be embraced as an unqualified
good only within the narrow domain and rare event of pure friendship, which she strictly
defined as a "supernatural harmony, a union of opposites" (p. 154). The opposites which
composed this union were necessity and liberty. Friendship was experienced by a pair of
individuals when each one pursued her own good in a relationship with the other (a desire
for attachment experienced as need or necessity), while simultaneously wishing that the
good of the other be increased (a desire for detachment experienced as liberty). Liberty in
friendship was born out of a double-edged respect: Each person cherished the faculty of
free consent-both in the other and in oneself at the same time. Friendship was freely
145
given and received. It could not be forced. Philia, the love involved in friendship, was
described by Weil (1952-1955/1956) in a way which challenges those who believe that a
shared experience simply means having a "good" time together:
Love in the case of someone who is happy is to wish to share the suffering of the
beloved who is unhappy. Love in the case of someone who is unhappy is to be
filled with joy by the mere knowledge that the beloved is happy, without sharing
in this happiness or even desiring to do so. (p. 270)
Granted that friendship so conceived was extremely rare and beautiful, why describe the
harmony as a supernatural one? In the following passage, Weil (1950/1959) used an
analogy drawn from the first book of the Bible:
Friendship is a miracle by which a person consents to view from a certain
distance, and without coming any nearer, the very being who is necessary to him
as food. It requires the strength of soul that Eve did not have; and yet she had no
need of the fruit. If she had been hungry at the moment when she looked at the
fruit, and if in spite of that she had remained looking at it indefinitely without
taking one step towards it, she would have performed a miracle analogous to that
of perfect friendship. (p. 157)
Weil considered friendship to be the highest form of human association. Even a good
marriage had to have friendship at its core if it was to remain good. Weil was very
careful with the idea-so often expressed in wedding ceremonies-that the two shall
become one. Naturally speaking, this unity was improbable if not impossible without the
one seeking to please the other or the one seeking to dominate the other-an unbalanced
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union born of necessity but destructive of liberty. True friends accepted themselves freely
and equally as distinct creatures in a unity that transcended the natural mechanisms
which-unless enlightened by supernatural love-bound people to each other in unhealthy
ways: "It is impossible for two human beings to be one while scrupulously respecting the
distance which separates them, unless God is present in each of them" (1950/1959, p.
160).52
For Weil, the wisdom which bound humans together in the detached attachment
of friendship was a supernatural grace. Outside of this grace-which could be experienced
by individuals who were not necessarily conscious of its supernatural source (perhaps she
might see Dewey in this light)-the social dimension would devolve into an ersatz wisdom
binding individuals in ways that strangled their ability to think clearly and act freely.
Unless tempered by supernatural grace, all social organizations-ehurches and religious
orders included-had this oppressive tendency. This is why in her proposals for
rebuilding postwar France, Weil (1949/1952b) argued for a society in which individuals
could find space to breathe, where they could periodically collect their thoughts in
solitude and open themselves up to the supernatural grace which was constantly and
secretly present but which was more often than not refused entry by the social element
which naturally colonized their imagination.
In The Need/or Roots, Weil's (1949/1952b) blueprint for a democratic society
was built on a startling assumption that challenged the principles of the French
52 This is an example of how Weil fused her Platonism with her Christianity. She
believed that human friendship reflected the divine friendship found among the three
persons of the Trinity.
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Revolution: Rights were a social phenomenon and existed only when obligations were
exercised by humans toward each other. Hence, obligations were prior to rights:
A right is not effectual by itself, but only in relation to the obligation to which it
corresponds, the effective exercise of a right springing not from the individual
who possesses it, but from other men who consider themselves as being under a
certain obligation toward him. (p. 3)
For the Christian Platonist Weil, keeping an obligation was a duty whose roots lay in a
supernatural realm beyond the immediate and changing context of a specific situation.
However, when an obligation was exercised and made its appearance as a right, it had to
take into account particular social conditions. In the following illustration, I draw an
analogy from something that Weil, following the ancient Greeks, considered precious and
is hinted at by Dewey in his study of deliberation: the mathematical idea of ratio and
proportion. Rights in different situations and contexts can appear analogous to different
ratios that are nevertheless equivalent: 2 to 4, 3 to 6, 4 to 8, and so on. When the
obligation, 1 to 2, needs to be constructed as a right in a particular situation where the
prevailing conditions provide 32 as the first term, then the conditions more amenable to
modification must be manipulated in such a way that 64 as the second term may appear.
There is a sense in which Dewey (1929b) echoed this idea: If certain ideals or values were
to be secured in social life, one had to understand how the conditions of existence
supported or hindered their existence. By modifying these conditions through the
experimental methods of modern science, Dewey was very hopeful that the moral traits
found in nature could be as firmly established in the social sphere as mechanical,
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electrical, and atomic forces had been harnessed in the physical sphere. Of course, in
Dewey's metaphysics, these moral traits had no root in a supernatural realm-they were
completely natural. And obligations were conditional; any sense of "owing" or "duty"
was predicated on what one judged to be a worthwhile value. By the same token, these
judgments were never final: They were hypotheses that guided inquiry into the objective
conditions that could or could not support the existence of the chosen value. By being
tested in action, hypotheses were open to ongoing modification. If any obligation had
unconditional status in Dewey's system, it was the one owed to using and constantly
improving the methods of experimental science.
If the supernatural is a human construction as Nietzsche (and Dewey) proclaimed,
how could the idea of equality as a foundation for human rights and democracy survive,
since nature produced beings unequal in strength and intelligence? Ironically, Nietzsche
could not help inventing his own version of the supernatural on which to pin his
hopes-the Ubermensch. Even heroic atheism had to have larger than life heroes. For
Weil, the fact that humans could not help constructing ersatz forms of the supernatural
(idols) was an indirect proof for its reality. Real hunger expresses a need for real food. 53
Idols, however, could not deliver the justice, equality, and liberty which humans craved.
Quite the contrary, they enslaved and oppressed them.
Ersatz forms of the supernatural were social constructions that derived their power
53 Strictly speaking, the existence of hunger does not necessarily prove the existence of
food, even though it may provide grounds for hoping in the existence of food. Weil said
she would never let go of her desire for absolute good, even if it could be proved that
there was no such thing. Like a Penelope waiting for her Odysseus, she would rather
remain unsatisfied than betray her desire and aim it toward relative goods.
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from energy derived from collective ties. Hitler understood this. Organized religion
more or less succumbed to it. This is why Weil was so wary of the social element and
why she took great pains to construct an ideal society that was based on the needs of
individuals rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, the social element was an unavoidable
necessity for human beings. Hence, Weil (1949/1952b, p. 7) argued, "we owe our respect
to a collectivity, of whatever kind - country, family, or any other - not for itself, but
because it is food for a certain number of human souls."
Obligations towards human beings were derived from their needs. What were
they? Of course, physical needs came first-food, clothing, and shelter-and provided Weil
with a model for establishing rights based on eternal obligations:
To no matter whom the question may be put in general terms, nobody is of the
opinion that any man is innocent if, possessing food himself in abundance and
finding someone on his doorstep three parts dead from hunger, he brushes past
without giving him anything. (Weil, 1949/1952b, p. 6)
Physical needs would be more difficult to ascertain in a consumer culture that blurred the
distinction between needs and luxuries. Nevertheless, the effort to do so would
invariably invoke a premier need for the human psyche-order-which Weil defined as "a
texture of social relationships such that no one is compelled to violate imperative
obligations in order to carry out other ones" (p. 10).54 The subsequent descriptions of
54 A person who identifies herself oli. the right-to-life side of the abortion debate might
argue that our present society is failing to provide this need of order in that the obligation
to respect human life is violated by the obligation to respect human choice. A prochoice
advocate might argue the reverse: No one is being compelled to terminate a pregnancy,
but at least a woman's right to choose is not violated as it had been prior to Roe v. Wade.
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more specific needs give the reader a clearer picture of what such a social order entailed.
Most of these needs were arranged in antithetical pairs and seemed to require a
miraculous harmony analogous to the one found between necessity and liberty in
friendship. Each term of a pair could be balanced in alternating sequence55 just as
breathing in followed breathing out: liberty/obedience, equality/hierarchy,
honor/punishment, security/risk, private property/collective property. In addition, she
discussed the need for responsibility, freedom of opinion, truth, and the one which
furnished the book's title: the need for roots.
Over 80% of her treatise described the modern malaise of uprootedness along
with a prescription for its cure. According to Weil (1949/1952b), a human being has
roots "by virtue of his real, active, and natural participation in the life of the community,
which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain
particular expectations for the future" (p. 43). How one understood the relation of past
treasures to future expectations was a life-and-death matter for Weil. In order to build a
future, one could use only materials provided by the past:
The future brings us nothing, gives us nothing; it is we who in order to build it
However, the latter position raises a very pertinent question: If one member of the human
species may decide that another member of the human species can be terminated without
regard to any criterion except the choice of the former, then what is it about human beings
that they should have any rights at all? The fact that the former may have legal status as a
person and the latter may not only moves the question to another level. See Grant (1974)
for an extended discussion on this question.
55 Weil (1949/1952b) rejected Aristotle's golden mean, which to her satisfied "neither the
one nor the other of two contrary needs. It is a caricature of the genuinely balanced state
in which contrary needs are each fully satisfied in turn" (p. 12).
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have to give it everything, our very life. But to be able to give, one has to possess;
and we possess no other life, no other living sap, then the treasures stored up
from the past and digested, assimilated, and created afresh by us. Of all the
human soul's needs, none is more vital than this one of the past. (p. 51)
By cutting off its living connections to the premodern past, Weil argued, France had
become a shallow-rooted tree easily toppled by the German invasion of 1940. By
contrast, Weil admired England, which had nurtured a living tradition and "which in the
face of the first wave of German terror behaved far and away the best" (p. 49).56
Dewey (1927/1954) also saw a need for roots, which he called attachments that
"are nourished in constant relationships. Acceleration of mobility disturbs them at their
root. And without abiding attachments associations are too shifting and shaken to permit
a public readily to locate and identify itself' (pp. 140 -141). Modern technological
science wedded to various forms of dynamic capitalism (the Soviet Union was a form of
state capitalism) uprooted and continues to uproot individuals from the communities in
which they had been nourished by a living tradition. As a result, in the space of a few
generations, these traditional communities were disappearing. Dewey also recognized
that these face-to-face communities had to be remade, for they were the only hope that a
public had of finding itself, of creating the material and social conditions for a democratic
way of life:
56 Weil's admiration needs to be qualified by recognizing that certain conditions favoured
England-such as the relative strength of the British air force and navy, which discouraged
the Germans from following up aerial bombardment with an amphibious landing on
English shores. Nevertheless, her admiration was based on her experience living among
these plucky Anglo-Saxons.
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In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-
to-face intercourse. This is why the family and the neighborhood, with all their
deficiencies, have always been the chief agencies of nurture, the means by which
dispositions are stably formed and ideas acquired which laid hold on the roots of
character. (p. 211)
Outside of educational reform, Dewey was not sure how the conditions necessary for
community could be reestablished, and he seemed more equivocal than Weil in opposing
the industrial juggernaut that relentlessly uprooted the genuine communities that
remained. However, Weil saw in France an opportunity to create these conditions
because French industry had been devastated by war. By contrast, war had accelerated
the development of the military-industrial complex in North America, strengthening the
ties that bound Canada to the United States while simultaneously uprooting the local
communities in both.57
Weil believed that the material and social conditions necessary for a more
democratic form of life could be created in France immediately after the war, and she
implored her compatriots in London to adopt her ideas before the war ended. If they did,
the future leaders of France would be in a position to implement them before the window
of opportunity opened by the immediate aftermath of war would be closed by the
reestablishment of prewar habits that would be activated by an enduring interest in
corporate capitalism-an interest shared by their American liberators who were more than
57 Grant's (1965/1970) lament for Canada mourns the loss of a nation that was being
displaced by continental capitalism.
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willing to offer aid in this regard.
What was the nature of this opportunity? The war had forced intellectuals-a tag
she despised-to work in the fields and factories of Germany and, to a lesser extent, in
France. Weil's (1949/1952b) tone was urgent:
This extremely valuable experience runs the risk of being wasted, due to the
irresistible temptation to forget humiliation and misfortune as soon as one has left
them behind. Now, straightaway, those among such prisoners who have returned
should be approached and asked to keep up their contacts with the workers, which
had been begun by force, think over themselves what this recent experience has
meant, with the idea of effecting a rapprochement between culture and the people,
thereby giving culture a new direction. (p. 72)
In other words, the new direction for culture involved uniting the intellectual and physical
dimensions of labour in everyone as far as possible.
Nevertheless, such an endeavour would remain nothing more than wishful
thinking unless certain material prerequisites were met. The most important and the most
radical of these requirements involved destroying the sacred cows of corporate
capitalism: breaking up large factories and abolishing incorporated joint-stock companies.
This did not mean that Weil was opposed to private ownership of business-far from it.
She upheld property-both private and collective-as a vital need for the soul:
All men have an invincible inclination to appropriate in their own minds anything
which over a long, uninterrupted period they have used for their work, pleasure, or
the necessities of life .... But where the feeling of appropriation doesn't coincide
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with any legally recognized proprietorship, men are continually exposed to
extremely painful spiritual wrenches. (Weil, 1949/1952b, pp.34-35)
The need for property was met in real and prolonged contact with land and materials.
The farm I worked on was mine, even though as a hired hand I had no legal title to it.
When the farm was sold, the trees and vineyards razed, and the land scoured into an
industrial park, something extremely valuable had been taken from me. I still mourn its
loss.
Property was a meaningless abstraction in a factory or a farm owned by a joint-
stock company because the workers and managers held no legal title to it and the
stockholders had no real contact with it. The need for property could be satisfied only in
smaller businesses and farms where legal title and real contact could be combined in
shared ownership and where intellectual and physical labour existed in close proximity.
In this regard, she anticipated Schumacher (1973), who had shown how a small
manufacturing plant owned jointly by those who worked therein could form a viable and
vital economic community. No doubt she would join those who today applaud the efforts
ofYunus (2007), who respects and trusts the dignity of the working poor by lending
money to those who lack legal title to collateral property. Would not Dewey (1934/1979)
also welcome these practical proposals in the light of his criticism of industrial
development which had severed the arts into the useful and the fine (p. 27) and where
"prestige goes to those who use their minds without participation of the body and who act
vicariously through the control of the bodies and labor of others" (p. 21)7
To sum up the comparison regarding wisdom and the social dimension of
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experience: Dewey and Weil agreed that wisdom involved taking into account how
humans could best live together in community. Both of them formulated a substantially
similar democratic ideal that functioned as an end-in-view for the type of society each
wanted to help build. Dewey used the criterion of openness to wider connections-the
possibility of further growth-in distinguishing a moral community from one which was
less moral. For example, a band of robbers was by definition limited in its potential for
wider connections with individuals and groups who were not involved in crime. Weil, on
the other hand, used the criterion of individual needs to distinguish a relatively free
society from a relatively oppressive one.
Both Dewey and Weil valued intelligent conjoint activity. Just as a moral selfwas
created indirectly through work, so a moral social structure developed indirectly via
conjoint activity through the means of production. However, Weil emphasized that
thinking could be done only by individuals, not by associations. Dewey and Weil agreed
that the substance of thought was largely a social construction, but Weil maintained that
only an individual with an unyielding commitment to truth would be able to think about
the relationships of force in society with any degree of clarity. Both of them wanted to
reconnect intellectual with physical labour, but Weil unequivocally placed physical work
at the spiritual core of her ideal society. In her view, all other human activities were
inferior to manual work in spiritual significance.
Both Dewey and Weil saw shared experience as an unqualified good. However,
Weil added an important qualification that demonstrated how wary she was of the social
dimension in contrast to Dewey: Shared experience was dependent on a supernatural
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harmony. Further, she believed that the only foundation for a democratic and free
society were rights effectively exercised through the recognition of obligations that were
rooted in a realm beyond nature.
How Is Wisdom Connected to Nature?
Dewey, of course, would wonder why Weil would need to posit a realm beyond
nature to establish a foundation for the type of morality that undergirded democracy.
Since moral traits appear in experience alongside amoral forces-or as Weil put it, human
beings crave for justice while being subjected to force-Dewey (1929a) deduced that
moral traits "may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something
that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physical
science" (p. 5). In all construction projects-whether material or intellectual-the building
blocks are provided by nature, and human beings, who are thoroughly part of nature,
endeavour to secure these blocks in full knowledge that there are no guarantees. There
are no certainties in the mixture of stability and contingency that humans experience in
their transactions with nature. Just as a tsunami can devastate the lives of millions, so a
tyrannical force can destroy a stable democracy. However, humans committed to
democratic ideals will resist this force, just as those humans who care for others in
misfortune will come to the aid of tsunami victims. The moral traits found in nature are
the only source for fashioning the foundational blocks of a democratic form of life. We
have no omnipotent, supernatural ally to help us build the good society-we are on our
own.
How open would Weil be to the possibility that what she calls "supernatural" may
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simply be what Dewey calls the moral traits found in nature? Could the argument be
resolved by an appeal to semantics? Could they possibly be using different words to
describe the same phenomenon? This appears to be the case when we examine Weil's
(1949/1952b) argument against a dualism which asserted that force was sovereign in the
natural world but that somehow human beings who are part of nature could have a
conception ofjustice that was not itself subject to force: "Either we must perceive at work
in the universe, alongside force, a principle of a different kind, or else we must recognize
force as being the unique and sovereign ruler over human relations also" (p. 241). Could
we not translate this into Deweyan language? Is not this "principle of a different kind"
the same conception as Dewey's "moral traits" which are as much a part of nature as the
mechanical forces studied by a physicist?
But how are they a part of nature? What is the relationship between the principle
ofjustice and the principle of blind force in their existence as part of nature? Dewey did
not pose this question directly. Nevertheless, did he implicitly assign a unity within
nature to these principles? It seemed to be an article of faith for him. If so, Dewey might
have been castigated by Weil (1955/1958) as a "simpleton" along with Voltaire and the
Encyclopedists who were atheists without being materialists. They wanted to have it both
ways:
But if one leaves the supernatural out of account, one is right to be a materialist.
This universe, minus the supernatural, is only matter. In describing it solely as
matter, one seizes upon a particle of truth. In describing it as a combination of
matter and of specifically moral forces belonging to this world, that are on a level
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with nature, one falsifies everything. (p. 177)
Before we conclude that Weil would brand Dewey as a simpleton on par with
Voltaire, we must examine Dewey's position in relation to idealism and materialism as
defined by Weil. Her unique and intriguing way of defining these old philosophical
positions was based on her reading of one obscure sentence in Plato's Republic (VI,
493a), namely that there is an infinite distance between the essence of the necessary and
the essence of the good. Much of her writing is directly or indirectly concerned with
contemplating the meaning of that sentence.58 Weil (1955/1958) argued that the principle
58Plato uses the analogy of a great beast and its keeper to describe society and the sophist,
the so-called teacher of wisdom. Weil' s wariness of the social dimension of experience is
rooted here. Weil (1950/1959) translates this passage from the Greek as follows:
Whatever pleases the animal he calls good, whatever annoys him he calls bad, and
he has no other criterion. Things that are necessary he calls good and beautiful,
for he is incapable of seeing or showing to others to what degree the essence of
the necessary is in reality different from the essence ofthe good. (p. 86)
One would need to be a Greek scholar to ascertain whether Weil's translation is more
faithful than a well-known translation (Cornford, 1945), where the terms "necessity" and
"good" do not appear in stark contrast within the same phrase. It explains why the
sentence she italicizes is so obscure:
He will fit all these terms to the fancies of the great beast and call what it enjoys
good and what vexes it bad. He has no other account to give of their meaning; for
him any action will be 'just' and 'right' that is done under necessity, since he is
too blind to tell how great is the real difference between what must be and what
ought to be. (pp. 200-201)
Gouinlock's (2004) beginning premise for his theory of wisdom is instructive here: "I
proceed on the assumption, which is essential to human survival and prosperity, that
morality comprises precisely those forms of behavior that are necessary for there to be a
functioning social order" (p. 13). Weil does not dispute the necessity of morality so
conceived, but as a Platonist, she maintains that "the good" is essentially different from
the ethical behavior that serves to maintain society. The Needfor Roots (1949/1952b)
can be read as her attempt to address the necessity of social order while maintaining a
focus on "the good" which transcended it. In the same way, the death of Socrates and the
death of Jesus can be read as simultaneous submissions to the necessity of social order
and to a love ofjustice which transcended social norms.
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of blind force (necessity) and the principle ofjustice (good) is experienced as an
irreconcilable contradiction within every human:
He is subject to necessity, and craves for the good. It is not his body alone that is
thus subject, but all his thoughts as well; and yet man's very being consists in
straining towards the good. That is why we believe that there is a unity between
necessity and the good. (p. 159)
Dewey's Hegelian deposit would revolt against calling this contradiction
irreconcilable-every thesis produced a corresponding antithesis which could be
synthesized in a more comprehensive unity-and he would undoubtedly affirm his belief
in the unity, or at least the potential unity, of the physical (necessity) and the moral (good)
traits of nature. Nevertheless, let us proceed. Weil (1955/1958) defined idealism as
follows:
Some believe that the thoughts of man concerning the good possess the highest
degree of force here below; these are known as idealists. They are doubly
mistaken, first in that these thoughts are without force, and secondly in that they
do not lay hold of the good. These thoughts are influenced by force; so that this
attitude is in the end a less energetic replica of the contrary attitude. (p. 159)
Let us examine whether Dewey commits the double error of idealism so defined. First,
was Dewey an idealist who believed that human thoughts concerning ideal ends ("the
good" in Weil's terms) had the greatest force here below? No, or at least, not necessarily.
Such thoughts could only be realized (i.e., have some measurable force) to the extent to
which they were tested in practice through the indirect action of work-where actual
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conditions were modified and manipulated in accordance with an end-in-view which was
believed to be good. In this process of manipulation, the ends-in-view or ideals were
reciprocally clarified and modified. For example, in implementing a lesson, a teacher
may have a vague idea regarding the purpose of a planned educational activity. As the
activity develops, the responses of the students along with unforeseen contingencies
prompt the teacher to modify the activity. In so doing, the educational purpose of the
activity becomes clearer, which in turn gives further direction to the activity.
There was nothing necessary about Dewey's idealism. There were no guarantees
that ideals would be realized. Precariousness was a generic trait of nature: It could
frustrate or vitiate the best of intentions. As shown above, ideals functioned in his
philosophy in much the same way as they did in Weil's thought. They were ideal limits
towards which we could direct our actions and thoughts, knowing full well that such
ideals could never be perfectly realized while at the same time believing that continual
efforts would bring us closer to the ideals. Mathematics provides us with a perfect
illustration: A hyperbolic curve approaches an asymptote-a line analogous to an ideal
limit-getting infinitely closer, but never reaching it. Weil's attack could more
appropriately be directed towards the idealism of Hegel, whose emphasis on necessity
was so absolute that contingency, though recognized as a minor irritant, carried little
weight in the grand scheme of things. Furthermore, Hegel would insist, the rational
necessity of absolute Spirit becoming progressively aware of itself in and through its
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embodiment as the tangible universe was, by implication, necessarily good.59 This was
no longer part of Dewey's Hegelian deposit, if indeed it ever had been.
Did Dewey commit the second error attributed by Weil to idealists? Did he
believe that human thoughts could "lay hold of the good"? Here the answer is not as
clear. Ifwe stay with the assumption that Weil's "good" was Dewey's "ideal," then an
ideal came to mind not through a revelation proceeding from some preexisting realm
outside of nature but as a result of acting with existent natural conditions, and as such,
was within the reach of our thought. However, it was not so much that a person would
lay hold of the ideal-and here wisdom made its appearance in uniting the moral self-but
that it would lay hold of a person in a manner that Dewey (1934/1960) described as
authentically religious: "the unity of loyalty and effort evoked by the fact that many ends
are one in the power of their ideal, or imaginative, quality to stir and hold us" (p. 43).60
59 My understanding of Hegel is based on Taylor's (1975) very clear and readable
exposition and commentary. I have found English translations of Hegel to be very
difficult to read-much more so than Plato or Aristotle.
60 I have probably not done justice to the crucial role that the imagination plays in
Dewey's naturalistic wisdom. The end-in-view that propels thinking and doing in
Dewey's pragmatism is always the result of an act of the imagination. To generate
possible solutions to a problem or to deliberate over possible consequences before
committing oneself to a course of action depends on the ability to imagine those solutions
or consequences: "Although imagination is often fantastic it is also an organ of nature; for
it is the appropriate phase of indeterminate events moving toward eventualities that are
now but possibilities" (Dewey, 1929a, p. 54). Imagining a better world is a prerequisite
for building one. Perhaps my reticence in emphasizing the imagination with both Dewey
and Weil was unconsciously shaped by Sternberg's suggestion that wisdom is primarily
grounded in practical thinking. No matter how important a role it played in helping
someone think outside of habitual modes of reasoning (what Sternberg would call
analytic thinking), creativity or imagination was always subject to the test of practice.
Weil was much more severe than Dewey in her assessment of the imagination,
and it reveals a huge rift in their metaphysical positions. For Dewey, reality was defined
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Let us now turn to materialism. For Weil (1955/1958), optimistic materialists61
believe that "force is of itself directed towards the good .... They are also doubly
mistaken; first force is a stranger to and indifferent to the good, and secondly it is not
always and everywhere the stronger" (pp. 159 - 160).
Was Dewey an optimistic materialist who believed that force is of itself directed
towards the good? Again, no. He expressed disdain towards those who esteemed force
by the spatial and temporal order of natural events-one event following another in an
endless chain of linked consequences. Since the imagination functioned to predict
consequences before they happened, it was tied to the future. For Weil, the spatial-
temporal order of natural events was held within a timeless eternity beyond nature which
could not be imagined. Nevertheless, like Plato, she believed that this supernatural order
had a greater reality than natural existence. However, since this timeless reality could not
be imagined, Weil was very critical of using imagination outside of its role in clearly
conceiving possibilities. If this timeless reality were real, then one had to be very careful
that thinking through possibilities did not devolve into desiring an imaginary future that
would attain absolute status, as it does in orthodox Marxism. An imaginary future was
not to be trusted because it could seduce desire away from an unimaginable reality: "The
imagination is always united with a desire, that is to say a value. Only desire without an
object is empty of imagination. There is the real presence of God in everything which
imagination does not veil" (Weil cited in Panichas, 1977, p. 360).
Furthermore, Weil might argue, the attempt to imagine a timeless eternity would
only make it seem more unreal. This is why Dewey's disparagement of Plato's theory of
timeless, unchanging forms makes so much sense: any attempt to imagine such an
absolute state often results in a fantasy that appears boring or ridiculous in comparison to
the dynamic of ever-changing events, events that are inextricably situated within a spatial
and temporal network of shifting relations.
61 "Optimistic materialist" is my term which I believe accurately denotes Weil's
characterization of an idolator or a materialist who has not sunk into a state of
indifference. If one were to extrapolate further, a pessimistic materialist would believe
that force was always supreme and always indifferent to any notion of good or ideal ends.
Such a person would be in danger of being overwhelmed by despair or hardened into a
state of indifference. From this perspective, Nietzsche can be viewed as a materialist who
refused to despair: he hoped for the time when more highly evolved humans would be
able to freely create values -literally, to construct "good" out of nothing, for he believed
that nature - whether human or non-human - had no moral traits.
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above ideal values (Dewey, 1934/1960, p. 44). Like Weil, Dewey recognized that natural
forces were indifferent to human ideals. Nature as experienced by humans was a mixture
of goods that were enjoyed and evils that were suffered. The generic traits of nature-the
stable and the precarious-eould be experienced as good or evil depending on the
circumstances. Although stability was usually prized as a good thing, there were times
when it was endured as monotony. In such cases, the sense of adventure surrounding the
unpredictable would provide welcome relief. Nevertheless, by achieving some control
over these forces through intelligent inquiry (science), human ideals had a better chance
of being realized. Even though force per se was not directed towards human ideals, it
could be turned in this direction through the efforts of humans who had not lost sight of
the ideals they prized.
In regard to the second error assigned by Weil to materialists-that force was
always victorious-Dewey does not seem to have committed it. First, he never lost hope
in the democratic ideal in the face of powerful commercial and industrial forces that
seemed to be destroying every condition on which a viable democracy would depend.
Surely no one could hold on to such a hope if they believed that force was always and
everywhere the stronger. Second, he had great respect for the precarious nature of
experience, and he would no doubt agree with the wisdom of Ecclesiastes: "The race is
not to the swift or the battle to the strong, nor does food come to the wise or wealth to the
brilliant or favor to the learned; but time and chance happen to them all" (Barker, 2002, p.
1016).
If Dewey was neither an idealist nor a materialist according to Weil's definition,
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was he an atheist? Throughout his later works, Dewey consistently attacked the notion
that there existed, beyond the reach of experience and nature, a transcendent realm where
perfect goodness, beauty, truth, and justice resided. Although he saw no point to
believing in a supernatural God-in fact, for him such a conception was harmful because it
drafted energy away from the work needed to modify existent conditions in direction of
ideal goods-he did not totally abandon the idea of God:
We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet
of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in
nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified
by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation
between ideal and actual to which I would give the name "God." (Dewey,
1934/1960,pp.50-51)
Dewey was adamant: The ideal and the actual were not unified in some preexisting
transcendent realm, nor were they unified through some automatic process. The act of
unifying them-of striving to bring actual conditions closer to the ideal-fell to the human
part of nature. Ifhumans did not regulate their conjoint activities in this way, if they did
not allow "God"-the active relation between the ideal and the actual-to dwell in and
among them, then the unification attempt would stall. This is very close to the
paradoxical injunction given 2,000 years ago to the new Christians at Philippi: "Continue
to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you to will
and to act according to his good purpose" (Barker, 2002, p. 1846).
Dewey's God is not the omnipotent Being who rules in sovereign majesty. Quite
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the contrary, this divinity is completely dependent on human consent and action.
However, even here, we must be careful not to hypostatize Dewey's very rudimentary
concept of God. Besides tentatively assigning this name to the active relation between
the ideal and the actual (an optional assignment at that), Dewey has no theology that can
be compared to Weil's-except for one major point: Inasmuch as it operates as an
impersonal grace in the world of human experience, Weil's God is likewise dependent on
human consent. Apart from that, there seems to be no common ground between Weil' s
supernatural grace and Dewey's natural piety.
If the above analysis is correct-that Dewey defies being labeled in Weil's terms as
an idealist or a materialist-then how would Dewey interpret her conclusion to this
section? Weil (1955/1958) writes:
They alone can escape these errors [of idealism and materialism] who have
recourse to the incomprehensible notion that there is a unity between necessity
and the good, in other words, between reality and the good, outside this world.
These last also believe that something of this unity communicates itself to those
who direct towards it their attention and their desire - a notion still more
incomprehensible, but verified experimentally. (p. 160)
If Kestenbaum's (2002) reading of Dewey has any merit, then Dewey might
respond: 62 "Yes, I have escaped the errors of idealism and materialism as you define
62 This imaginary response is based on Dewey's own words as highlighted by
Kestenbaum (2002, p. 230). The first paragraph draws on Human Nature and Conduct
(Dewey,1922, pp. 264, 259). The second paragraph borrows from Reconstruction in
Philosophy (Dewey, 1920/1948, p. 211), Experience and Nature (Dewey, 1929a, p. 292),
and "The Iliad: Poem of Might" (Weil, 1940/1977c).
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them, and I do hold on to the notion that blind force and moral traits are somehow unified
in an enveloping whole, the sense of which sustains me in the midst of our feeble
attempts to bring the actual closer to the ideal. However, Ms Weil, I take your phrase
'outside this world' to mean a place beyond what is immediately open to observation and
inspection. It may be beyond my senses, or 'supersensible' as Mr. Kestenbaum calls it-it
outruns the seen and the touched 63-but I cannot say that it is beyond nature or
'supernatural'; to do so would be to say more than I know and am willing to assert."
"Let me add, however," Dewey might continue, "that I know what you mean
when you talk about the grace experienced in true friendship. There is something
spontaneously miraculous and mystical in certain phases of shared life and experience
which bathes even the ugliest scenes of the modern world with a beautiful light which, as
Wordsworth puts it, 'never was on land or sea.' Great poetry also can shed this kind of
light, even on the bitterness of war, as your commentary on the Iliad points out.
However, that is about as far as I will go in the direction of what you confidently assert,
and I confidently reject, as the 'supernatural. '"
63 If one assumes that Dewey's notion of experience is empirically defined-that
experience is exclusively based on what comes to us through the five senses-then one
might conclude that Dewey is unwittingly driving a wedge between experience and
nature, that something can be beyond experience yet not beyond nature. This is not the
case, since his definition of experience is wide and deep enough to embrace the aesthetic,
the religious, and even the mystical (Dewey, 1934/1960, pp. 35-37).
Weil, on the other hand, puts the transcendent beyond nature but not beyo,nd
experience. By definition, the supernatural is not subject to the conditions of existence.
Therefore, it cannot exist in any conceivable way to minds that are subject to those
conditions. Even so, Weil was convinced that her experience of the supernatural was not
an imaginary one. Her conviction was partly based on the fact that prior to this first
"absolutely unexpected contact" (Weil, 1950/1959, p. 36) she had no interest in tackling
the problem of God or in reading the mystics.
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"Professor Dewey," Weil might reply, "you are probably right not to go any
further in that direction. The object of my search is not the supernatural, but this world.
The supernatural is the light. We must not presume to make an object of it, or else we
degrade it.64 I take your rejection to be a justifiable critique of its degraded forms.
Reading your arguments in A Common Faith can serve as a purification to those who
have formed illegitimate attachments to what they erroneously take to be the
supernatural."
Summary
For Dewey, wisdom was connected to nature through the moral striving of human
nature. It came into existence as humans modified actual conditions towards ideal ends,
which themselves were suggested by natural situations previously experienced. The
wisdom of human action took into account the generic traits of nature (stability and
contingency) to which it was always subject even as it sought to manipulate these traits in
creating a better life for all.
For Weil, wisdom was connected to nature in a double relation. Nature was
subject to a divine wisdom even as human wisdom was subject to nature. Human
modification of actual conditions was not a one-way street: Both human actions which
changed natural environments and human joys and sufferings given or inflicted by nature
were tempered and enlightened by a divine love-a wise persuasion-which was
communicated to those who ardently desired it and who were willing to wait patiently and
attentively for it.
64 The preceding three sentences are her exact words (Weil, 1952-1955/1956, p. 173).
168
In this chapter we have compared the views of John Dewey and Simone Weil on
wisdom. Our comparison was structured around three questions: How is wisdom
connected to experience from a psychological perspective? How is wisdom connected to
the social dimension of experience? How is wisdom connected to nature? We found
much agreement between Dewey and Weil, particularly in the way each of them located
the source of wisdom in work that combined thinking with acting-an endeavour that
could modify existent conditions, which in turn would rebound on an individual to
fashion a moral self and rebound on a society to create a genuine community. For both,
wisdom took into account connections that bound an individual to others. Although both
of them believed that intellectual and manual labour should be united in conjoint activity
and shared work experiences, Weil emphasized that physical work should form the
spiritual core of a society. Although both valued shared experience, Weil was more wary
of the social forces which shaped thought, since clear thinking could be achieved only by
individuals. Finally, Weil not only believed that nature was subject to a divine wisdom,
but that a democratic society would thrive only if it was watered by supernatural springs.
Dewey could not see how one could move outside nature or experience and believed that
any attempt to so would stunt the growth of wisdom. Wisdom could be nourished only
by natural rivers-even if some of those streams were given a divine designation.
In the next chapter we will continue our comparison of John Dewey and Simone
Weil as we examine how one can educate for, and be educated by, a love of wisdom.
CHAPTER FIVE: EDUCATING FOR A LOVE OF WISDOM
How does one educate for a love of wisdom? How can a comparison of John
Dewey and Simone Weil help educators who share or desire to share in this love? How
can it help them to communicate and cultivate this love with their students? This chapter
will attempt to answer these questions by looking at a first-hand account of the original
University of Chicago Laboratory School-The Dewey School (Mayhew & Edwards,
1936)-in conjunction with the second edition of How We Think: A Restatement ofthe
Relation ofReflective Thinking to the Educative Process (Dewey, 1933). The former
serves as a concrete illustration of how to educate for a Deweyan love of wisdom; the
latter, as its subtitle suggests, provides a coherent theoretical statement of what Dewey
meant by thinking and how to educate for it. The latter will also serve to bring into focus
Weil's views on thinking, especially since she gave so much value to clear thoughts and
the method for conceiving them-developing one's capacity for attention.
The Dewey School and How We Think are intrinsically connected. In How We
Think, Dewey (1933) provides specific pedagogical advice on the teaching of thinking
which is rooted in what he learned with the laboratory school. In my opinion, these two
books (when read together) not only provide the best illustration of what Dewey meant by
cultivating a love of wisdom with schoolchildren, but they also most clearly delineate
what amounts to the same thing-his educational philosophy. Dewey's more famous
treatises-Democracy and Education (1916/1966) and Experience and Education
(1938/1963)-are better understood after one has read The Dewey School (Mayhew &
Edwards, 1936) in which concrete practices are described by the very teachers who had
been "on the ground" with these children. In contrast, The School and Society
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(1899/1990) and The Child and the Curriculum (1902/1990) leave many specific
questions unanswered, even though of all Dewey's publications, they are most directly
tied to the Laboratory School. In a more recent review of that experiment, Laurel Tanner
(1997) asserts that the achievements of the Dewey school have yet to be truly appreciated
and assimilated in American schooling, and she whets the appetite of those readers who
want to know more. As Tanner notes, "it is indeed a paradox that Dewey, whose
emphasis was ever on human progress through shared experience, left so little of his own
experience in a form that would be truly useful to future generations of school improvers"
(p. 10). With Dewey's support, Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards
(1936) left us a document that fills in many of the blanks and connects most of dots.65
But where does this leave Weil? How can her relatively undeveloped educational
views be fairly compared to a fleshed-out educational theory informed by a bold
experiment in educational practice? We shall use Weil as a foil in our attempt to uncover
and critique Dewey's views on how to educate for a love of wisdom. She brings to the
table her own experience as an educator with working-class adults and as a teacher with
highschool adolescents. Like a fellow practitioner who can function as a critic in
appraising the work of a more celebrated artist, the former lycee professor of philosophy
will offer her insights on the Deweyan project as mediated through my understanding of
65 In my view, Dewey's mature philosophy as articulated in his later writings is very
coherent with his work in the laboratory school. .His naturalistic metaphysics (1929a) and
aesthetics (1934/1979) are strongly rooted in that experience. In his look back at the
theory behind the school from the vantage point of writing his later works, Dewey (1936)
did not repudiate or even substantially modify the ideas of education that he first
published in 1895.
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both of them. If the analysis presented in the previous chapter has any merit, then her
credentials are well founded: Weil's views on wisdom dovetail quite well with Dewey's,
and she is able to hold her own on the points where they diverge.66
After briefly reviewing the 8-year history of the Dewey school, we shall focus our
analysis by attempting to answer two main questions: (a) How does one educate for love
of wisdom, taking into account its connection to experience? (b) How does one educate
for love of wisdom, taking into account its connection to thinking?
History of the Dewey School
When John Dewey came to the University of Chicago in 1894 to head the
Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, he had a strong desire to test his developing
ideas on education. In a letter to his wife Alice that same year, he shared the outlines of a
laboratory school forming in his mind "where some actual and literal constructive activity
shall be the centre and source of the whole thing. " (Dewey cited in Westbrook, 1991, p.
96). With the support of President William Harper, Dewey convinced the university
authorities to adopt the following plan. The University School would operate under the
auspices of the newly created Department of Pedagogy, with Dewey acting both as chair
of the department and director of the school. Graduate students in this department would
be available to assist those who were hired to teach in the school. Finances came from
three sources: the university, which transferred money received as tuition paid by the
66 I refer the reader to the previous chapter where I analyze and compare their respective
positions. A reader with a strong naturalist bent may disagree with me, since she has not
proved the existence of a realm beyond nature. Be that as it may, I believe such a reader
might be willing to concede that Weil has laid out incisive and provocative arguments
that are worth considering.
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graduate students in the Department of Pedagogy; the parents of the schoolchildren, who
paid a relatively modest tuition directly to the school; and donations from community
supporters, who responded to fundraising efforts which covered the annual budget
shortfalls (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, p. 12). The pupils came mainly from middle-class
families, many of which included parents who taught at the university.
In the initial plan, Dewey (1895/1972) stated that the problem for all education
was "to co-ordinate the psychological and social factors" which meant that "the child be
capable of expressing himself, but in such a way as to realize social ends" (p. 224). The
school's curriculum was guided by the following hypothesis: Integrating the need for
expression with ends defined in association with others would best be achieved through
such basic occupations such as cooking, sewing, and carpentry. On the psychological
side, this decision was based on Dewey's understanding of human development and
learning. Thinking and feeling were not only inextricably connected to motor activity,
they originated there. The direction to motor activity was furnished by interest-the
activity had to appeal to the child as "worth while, as genuine work" (p. 228). Cooking,
sewing, and carpentry represented adult activities which young children observed at
home, and these occupations were often reenacted by them in dramatic play. These
constructive activities would form a bridge that connected the child's preschool
experiences to the adult's life as a productive participant in the wider society. On the
social side, these occupations connected the child to the most fundamental physical
problems: developing the means to procure food, clothing, and shelter. By engaging in
these activities in association with her peers, the child would both understand the material
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basis of her own society and strengthen the social bonds formed in conjoint activity.
The basics of traditional education-reading, writing, and arithmetic-would not be
imposed as separate subjects to be taught in isolation but be brought in gradually as
students saw the need and use for developing these skills in relation to their productive
work. For example, carpentry, cooking, and sewing all demanded the use of numbers in
measuring, and since the purpose of language was primarily social-"the child does not
realize an activity save as it feels that it is directed towards others and calls forth a
response from others" (Dewey, 1895/1972, p. 226)-written communication would
eventually develop out of oral exchanges. Drill exercises in writing and reading would be
employed only after a student appreciated how written communication could better serve
the purposes that she had formed in the process of constructive activity. The other
disciplines could be found in embryonic form within the activities, and Dewey listed
them in his plan for the benefit of the teacher, whose task it was to connect the child with
these disciplines inasmuch as they were connected to and grew out of productive work.
For example, when the child boiled an egg, the teacher could point out the states of matter
involved in heating water (physics) along with changes undergone by the egg (chemistry).
In woodworking, the structure of trees would be studied (botany). While spinning and
weaving her own woolen fibres, an older student would try to understand how the
development of steam-powered looms destroyed the cottage-based manufacturing of
earlier times (history).
As Mayhew and Edwards (1936) point out, learning-from-mistakes took place
almost immediately: "The first six months was a 'trial-and-error' period and was chiefly
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indicative of what not to do" (pp. 7-8). Sixteen students between the ages of 6 and 9 were
led by one teacher assisted by one graduate student (Dewey, 1897/1976, p. 325). What
went wrong? Dewey had assumed (as most of us still do today) that the all-round
elementary classroom teacher would be in the best position to oversee the integration of
subjects around occupations, especially at the primary level. Scientific inquiry was
arguably the most important discipline for Dewey, and it soon became clear that a child's
introduction to it through activity had to be guided by someone with a solid background
in that subject (Mayhew & Edwards, pp. 35-36; Tanner, 1997, pp. 98-99). It was morally
irresponsible to knowingly allow the weed of mis-education to take root at the beginning
and then hope that it would be pulled out later: It was not only wasteful for the school; it
was harmful to the child. If this were true of one discipline, then it was true of every
discipline. Children should be exposed to the best available ideas from the very
beginning. Dewey (1897/1976) reasoned that it was impossible for one teacher "to be
competent in all directions. Even if it were desirable it is a physical and mental
impossibility" (p. 334).67 Second, the more a teacher had mastered a subject and felt
67 As Tanner (1997, p. 99) laments, the myth of the generalist teacher has yet to be
challenged in North American schooling. The distaste for mathematics and the incidence
of math phobia among young people and adults must have some connection to the fact
that many young children are guided into this discipline by teachers who have not
specialized in it, or worse, have no taste for math themselves. Until I had read about
Dewey's about-face regarding the generalist teacher, I had never seriously questioned this
myth. I accept his reasoning with the following qualification: Sometimes a specialist so
takes her knowledge for granted that she cannot understand the difficulties her students
are experiencing in comprehending the subject matter. In some cases, a teacher who is
only a few steps ahead of her students in grasping material is in a better position to see
the difficulties, provided that she is enthusiastic about her own learning and seeks to
understand the discipline to the best of her ability.
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"thoroughly at home in it, using it unconsciously without the need of express thought"
(Dewey, 1933, p. 275), the more her conscious attention could be directed at how the
students themselves were dealing with the subject matter.
Despite the objections of many parents, the idea of the all-round teacher was
abandoned, and the school was reorganized the following October along departmental
lines-one full-time teacher in charge of science, cooking, and related "domestic arts," one
in literature and history, one in manual training and shop work, and a part-time teacher in
music (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, p. 8).68 To prevent specialists from creating what the
child would experience as separate compartments (as often happens in rotary teaching),
weekly meetings were held in which teachers listened to each other's reports and
collaboratively strove to maintain an integrated and holistic curriculum which was
developed and refashioned "on the go." As Wirth (1966) has noted, "It was an early form
of team-teaching" (p. 141).
During the first 2 years, the experimental nature of the school was more
pronounced: A number of approaches and materials were attempted-some kept and some
discarded-in developing a curriculum which had no precedent to follow. For example,
tracing the path of primitive peoples in solving the problems of food, clothing, and shelter
was deemed successful for children as young as 7. However, the development of Roman
civilization seemed too remote and abstract to properly engage the interests of 10-year-
68 The teacher who had been the all-round generalist became the specialist in charge of
literature and history in the new departmental organization. Her graduate assistant
became the teacher in charge of manual training and shop work. The new teacher of
science and domestic arts was Katherine Camp, who would later coauthor The Dewey
School (Dewey, 1897/1976, p. 325).
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olds (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, p. 49). Although there were opportunities for multiage
grouping in relation to certain activities, the teachers found that grouping the students
according to age seemed to work best. In 1898, a "subprimary" department was added
(ages 4 and 5). To avoid confusing the Dewey school with the public school's graded
system, the age groups were simply labeled as Group I (age 4), Group II (age 5), Group
III (age 6), and so on up to Group X (age 13) and Group XI (ages 14 and 15).
Certain features considered to be an essential part of schooling (even today) did
not exist here. Homework was initiated by students, not by teachers. Assessment of
student work was based on anecdotal evidence and was used to determine a student's
readiness to engage in a certain type of activity or was used to modify the curriculum.
Review of work at the end of a daily session took the place of testing, and neither grades
nor marks were used to measure student performance. As in life outside of school, ideas
were tested in action through construction and experimentation. Only the oldest group
(age 15) encountered the demands of scholastic testing as conventionally understood, but
this had nothing to do with the Dewey school per se; courses and tutors were offered to
help this group prepare for college entrance examinations. No doubt, Simone Weil would
approve of this; she was also reluctant to assign marks or grades to her students, much to
the chagrin of her administrators. However, unlike the Dewey schoolteachers who were
concerned that their graduates be prepared for the next level of schooling, she was not
particularly interested in preparing her students for the baccalaureate or bachot-the
French equivalent of college entrance examinations (Petrement, 1973/1976, pp. 170,
181).
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As enrollment increased, the school outgrew its facilities, moving three times in 5
years. By October 1898, it included a gymnasium; multiple rooms for manual training or
shop work, art and textiles, history and English; one large kitchen, two dining rooms,
two science laboratories, and enough outdoor space to plant a garden. In 1902, the school
had what would turn out to be its largest population, while maintaining a very low
student-teacher ratio (6 to 1): 140 students, 23 teachers, and 10 assistants (graduate
students). Less than 2 years later, the experiment ended with Dewey resigning and
leaving to take up a new position at Columbia in New York.
What had happened? In 1902, the University of Chicago planned to incorporate
the Chicago Institute, a teacher-training school run by a pioneer in progressive education,
Colonel Francis W. Parker. Along with it came an elementary school whose primary
aim-to provide a site in which student-teachers could practise their skills in Parker's
pedagogy-ran somewhat at cross purposes to Dewey's laboratory school, which was not
in the business of training teachers. According to Mayhew and Edwards (1936), both
schools shared a progressivist vision, but they "differed rather widely in theory, method,
and practice" (p. 13). As the Chicago Institute was heavily endowed by a private donor,
the university would allow the Dewey school to operate as a separate institution on
condition that it raise $5,000 annually on its own. Although some parents were able to
raise this large amount in short order (roughly equivalent to raising $100,000 today-an
indicator of how successful the Dewey school was in the eyes of its supporters) and were
given leave to operate the school under the same administration for another year, the
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pressure to amalgamate with the Chicago Institute increased.69 Through the ensuing
negotiations, Dewey was able to secure a solid footing for his laboratory school, believing
that the school's teaching and administrative staff would remain under his direction.
Unknown to him at the time, as Mayhew and Edwards (1936) discreetly phrased it,
"assurances had been given to the Trustees of the Chicago Institute that certain members
of the administrative staff of the elementary school would be eliminated at the close of
the first year after the merger" (p. 17). To put it bluntly: Alice Dewey, the principal of
the laboratory school, would be fired. According to Westbrook (1991), President Harper
had made this concession in view of the fact that the faculty associated with the former
Chicago Institute had threatened to resign en masse if Alice Dewey remained as principal.
They opposed her "because she had been an outspoken critic of the Parker school and was
not shy about firing teachers she considered to be incompetent" (p. 112). When John
Dewey became aware of this in the spring of 1904, he resigned. Without his direction
and protection, the ideas embodied in the Dewey school soon disappeared within the
different culture of the Chicago Institute.
Educating for Love of Wisdom in Its Connection to Experience
Why didn't the University of Chicago give the Dewey school more financial
support? Was the laboratory school not enough of a success in the eyes of the president
69 Mayhew and Edwards (1936) suggest that this increased pressure to amalgamate had
something to do with Colonel Parker's death in 1903 (p. 14). In reading Westbrook's
(1991, p. 112) account, one gets the impression that Parker's death provided Dewey and
his supporters with an opportunity to take charge of the merger. Did the renewed
pressure to amalgamate originate with Dewey, who was understandably weary of
_ constantly seeking funds to keep his lab school afloat?
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and trustees of the university? What if circumstances had been different and the Dewey
school had established itself for a long run under the auspices of the University of
Chicago? It is beyond the scope of this study to speculate on these questions. Instead,
using Mayhew and Edwards (1936) as our main source,70 we will draw on the historical
record to determine what the Dewey school can teach us about educating for a love of
wisdom, taking into account its connection to experience. In other words, we will
consider how the love of wisdom can be cultivated in the transaction between an
individual and her environment. Although the social dimension of experience is
inextricably linked to this, it will remain largely in the background as we look at this
transaction from a psychological perspective. The journey taken with Dewey and Weil in
the previous chapters will be retaken, but this time we will see how wisdom, or the love
of wisdom, might be cultivated in this transaction, using the Dewey school as a source of
concrete examples.
Both Dewey and Weil agreed that wisdom was rooted in a certain kind of
transaction with the environment, an action intelligently directed towards the environment
in such a way that it rebounded back on the individual in ways that strengthened it from a
moral point of view (Dewey). On the rebound, this activity could unify powerful
70 Using one main source is risky if one is seeking an impartial assessment of a social
experiment. Mayhew and Edwards taught in the school and were strongly committed to
the ideas which undergirded it. The astute reader recognizes a strong bias for the school,
which is unavoidable and understandable: True believers tend to de-emphasize the types
of failures that a more independent observer may point out. The lab school sounds too
good to be true. I have tried to circumvent this problem by treating The Dewey School as
an extension of Dewey's thought. Since he contributed a number of sections to the book
and guided its entire development (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, p. vii), I believe that such
an approach is warranted.
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emotions and clear thoughts, resulting in a truer perception (Weil). This indirect
action-activity diverted from immediate outlet through inward deliberation towards a
measured, mediated expression-was work.
Unlike play in the strict sense of the term-where activity was enjoyed without
regard to where it might lead-work involved setting up ends-in-view and determining
what means or series of steps would result in consequences which most closely
approximated desired ends. Nevertheless, enjoyment was an essential part of work so
conceived. Work was play transformed into something more intelligent. At the mercy of
whim or circumstance in "pure" play, a casual interest could become an absorbing interest
that moved a person to peer into where an activity might lead-the genesis of work. If
play and work did not interpenetrate through this transformation of interest, if they were
isolated from each other, then play would degenerate into "fooling around" and work
would become drudgery (Dewey, 1933, pp. 212-213, 285). Ifplay and work were
seamlessly connected, then the person would probably be in what Csikszentmihalyi
(1990) calls "flow"or optimal experience: "the state in which people are so involved in an
activity that nothing else seems to matter" (p. 4).
How could play and work interpenetrate? First of all, there was "play" in the
flexible relationship between means and ends. Means determined ends as much as ends
determined means. Continuously along the sequence of steps employed as means, ends
were clarified, modified, or even discarded as the consequences of actions became
increasingly visible in deliberation. Second, a person employed in this kind of work
experienced a sense of freedom in direct proportion to the amount of responsibility she
181
had in planning and executing the work. This is what Weil sought to achieve in making
factory work more of a joy and less of a monotonous burden. Rather than having bodies
performing actions on behalf of other minds (as was the case in most factories), or having
younger minds receiving the prefabricated thoughts of older minds distilled through
teachers or textbooks and developing skills without reference to purposes that the
students themselves formed (as was the case in most schools), Dewey and Weil sought to
strengthen the connection between thinking and acting in every working person.
The Dewey school provided an opportunity to try this out. Hence, Dewey placed
work and occupations at the centre of the curriculum. This is all well and good, but how
were young children to be initiated into an "adult" activity without unduly suppressing
their spontaneous impulses as was done in the traditional school? When Dewey
(1899/1990) wrote that experience was "the mother of discipline" (p. 17), was he
advocating that children be forced back to work on farms, in mines, and in factories in
contravention of the child labor laws? Of course not. And yet, having a share in real
work outside of school-being responsible for household tasks or farm chores-had been
more educative for Dewey in his own childhood than the recitation of school lessons
(Tanner, 1997, p. 13). Similarly, despite being the product of an elite school system,
Weil was irresistibly drawn to the labor of the farmer, the fisher, the miner, and the
factory worker whom, she believed, had all wisdom within their grasp (Weil, 1987, p.
85).
In one sense, Dewey attempted to retrieve in his school the vital and implicit
connection between living and learning that generations had experienced for thousands of
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years when most children had been gradually initiated into adult society through on-the-
job manual training. Industrialization and compulsory mass schooling had weakened that
connection. For hundreds of years, European society had taken on-the-job manual
training for granted and had believed that learning-through-books was educationally more
liberating, even though it was not available to all. As the invention of the printing press
made books cheaper to produce, as the Protestant reformers advocated that each Christian
should be able to read the Bible for herself, as the feudal social structure was challenged
by cries for equality of opportunity from a growing middle class, and as industrialization
eventually removed children from an early apprenticeship, educational reformers strove to
make learning-through-books available to everyone. The common school took this model
and refashioned it according to the new principle of mass production. This was achieved
by avoiding a costly variable in traditional education-a low student-to-teacher ratio.
Only the rich could afford to pay tutors in learning-through-books, but a working
apprentice had also benefited from one-on-one instruction, whether from a master
craftsman or from a laboring parent. Even though Dewey was not interested in turning
back the clock of history, he was willing to accept the necessity of a low student-to-
teacher ratio for a different model of schooling. The problem of education had to be
rearticulated in a way which addressed the changing times: How could the practical arts
(on-the-job training) be related to the theoretical arts (learning-through-books) in ways
that strengthened the connections between living, learning, doing, making, and thinking?
In a school which attempted to answer that question with all seriousness, the liberal arts
might regain their soul, since, as Weil (1955/1958) maintained, true freedom was defined
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by a certajn relationship between thinking and acting (p. 85). Dewey's tentative answer
formed the guiding hypothesis for his school. Occupations would be at the core of his
curriculum, since Dewey was convinced that
the best results follow when such a process reproduces on the child's plane the
typical doings and occupations of the larger, maturer society into which he is
finally to go forth; and it is only through such productive and creative use that
valuable knowledge is secured and clinched. (Dewey cited in Mayhew &
Edwards, 1936, p. 40)
Rather than discounting the spontaneous impulses exhibited by a young child and
prejudging them as a potential impediment for instruction, Dewey accepted Rousseau's
thesis that a child's natural inclinations were the foundation stones of education. Rather
than seeking to extinguish them and replace them with a structure built by another mind
that was deemed superior from an adult perspective, Dewey aimed to build an educative
environment in which the child gradually gained power over her native impulses as they
were tempered, reconstructed, and expressed through the discipline of productive work,
co-operative activity, and communal discussion. This demanded a low student-to-teacher
ratio, because teachers had to understand how the native impulses operated in each
student so that these impulses could best be directed and harnessed in activities that were
experienced as educative. For example, a number of boys in Group IX (age 12) were not
interested in the historical approach that seemed to work well with most of their peers.
Rather than labeling these students as troublemakers and adopting punitive measures,
Mayhew and Edwards (1936) report that "these boys were finally taken out of the class
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and allowed to follow their own diverse and individual lines until the general trend of
their interests could be determined" (p. 214). Once their interests were uncovered (shop
work construction of various early scientific instruments), the curriculum for this group
was modified to reflect more of a scientific and less of an historical approach.
How did Dewey identify native impulses? He grouped them in four broad
interdependent categories-two primary and two derivative. These impulses were defined
in such a way that one could already see how the arts and the sciences would proceed
from them. The primary impulses were closely connected: (a) the impulse to construct
was impelled by a child's desire to control her sensorimotor activity in relation to her
environment; (b) the impulse to communicate was social by definition (e.g., a child's
eagerness to share her experiences with a caregiver or a playmate). It was closely
associated with the impulse to construct in that the ability to manipulate abstract symbols
was dependent on having habituated the ability to manipulate concrete things. Although
the impulses to construct and to communicate are primary and interdependent, I have
intentionally placed the impulse to construct first, where Mayhew and Edwards (1936, pp.
40-41) have placed it second. One could argue it either way from a developmental
perspective: On the one hand, learning to speak follows learning to acquire significant
control over sensorimotor mechanisms; on the other hand, an infant's first cries are given
social significance almost immediately. In giving primacy to the constructive impulse, I
am reflecting the Dewey school's emphasis on productive activity as the medium through
which the social impulse was expressed. Learning how to write and read followed the
oral discussions that attended the framing of problems and the testing of solutions in
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occupational work.
The impulses to construct and to communicate were combined in each of the
remaining two broad categories: (c) the impulse to inquire, investigate, and experiment
was at the core of scientific work in which language served as a cognitive tool to extract
meaning (What will happen if I do this?); and (d) the impulse to express was at the core
of aesthetic work in which meaning was constructed and imparted through artifacts. The
Dewey school can be seen as an attempt to use the constructive impulse to repair the
breach that had separated the industrial arts from the fine arts and art from science. As
the art of inquiry par excellence, science was a handmaiden to art understood in the
fullest and finest sense- the possession, expression, and enjoyment of meaning (Dewey,
1929a, p. 290).
How were native impulses to be reshaped and reconstituted in education
conceived along occupational lines? Occupations like cooking, sewing, and carpentry
functioned to integrate these native impulses and to give them a direction and purpose
that both engaged a child's present interests and opened up avenues to, and laid the
foundations for, a child's growing ability to extract meaning from the artifacts of
knowledge deposited by her surrounding society in both the academic disciplines and the
practical trades. It was wise to put occupations at the centre because it helped educators
avoid the extremes of opposing educational paradigms. Without the directing and
restraining influence of occupations, progressive education was liable to indulge native
impulses in ways that dissipated them in the intensity of immediate outlet. By focusing
inordinately on the child, the progressive teacher inadvertently blocked her access to the
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treasures deposited by society in the adult curriculum. In contrast, by force-feeding
society's deposit of knowledge in bite-size pieces, the traditional teacher inadvertently
weakened the child's ability to think for herself. By viewing the child as a tabula rasa,
the narrow empiricism of traditional schooling threatened to denature a child's native
impulses. Without the problem-posing impetus and discipline furnished by occupations,
a child would find it difficult to order her own thinking in ways that promoted intellectual
growth-she was either at the mercy of uncontrolled native impulses, or she was at the
mercy of a logical scheme which someone else had constructed and which threatened to
stifle her native impulse of inquiry. In both cases, the child could only develop a sense of
meaning and a vital connection to the world in spite of her schooling. From an
educational perspective, therefore, occupation and work promised to cultivate the love of
wisdom in a threefold fashion: (a) it avoided the extremes of progressive and traditional
education; (b) it integrated the child with the curriculum in deeper and more meaningful
ways, moving gradually from the psychological (in which the logic of a student's native
impulses and interests were reconstructed through the discipline of work) to the logical
(in which the logic of the academic disciplines reconstructed the student's experience of
work); and (c) as we have seen in Chapter Four, it was the root of wisdom on its own
account.
Before we investigate to what extent the Dewey school was successful in
cultivating a love for wisdom, let us allow Weil to make a comment or two. Would she
approve of a school that attempted to combine thought with action by co-ordinating mind
and hand through occupations with a manual emphasis? As we have hinted so far in this
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chapter and especially in the light of the analysis in previous chapters, it seems clear that
she would have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Dewey school. In a letter to a
former student who had wanted to quit school in order to experience real life by exploring
as many sensations as possible, Weil (1935/1965b) cautioned her with ideas that seemed
to have been lifted straight from Dewey:
For the reality of life is not sensation but activity-I mean activity both in thought
and action. People who live by sensations are parasites, both materially and
morally, in relation to those who work and create .... And the latter, who do not
seek sensations, experience in fact much livelier, profounder, less artificial and
truer ones than those who seek them. (p. 12)
Although Weil encouraged her to stick with a traditional school, she advised her former
pupil to take an interest towards schoolwork by combining it with a critical attitude of
resistance: "Examine the [physics] textbook and the lectures to see how much false
reasoning you'll find. While playing this extremely instructive game, the lesson often
fixes itself in your mind without your noticing" (p. 13). However, the conclusion to the
letter leaves no doubt in my mind that Weil would have embraced the idea behind the
Deweyan experiment, as she lamented the deficiencies of her own education:
I have learnt in the factory how paralysing and humiliating it is to lack vigour,
dexterity, sureness of eye. And in those respects, unfortunately for me, one can
never make up for what one didn't acquire before the age of20. I cannot too
strongly recommend you to exercise your muscles, your hands, your eyes, as much
as possible. For the lack of such exercise one feels singularly deficient. (p. 14)
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As if in response to Weil, the head of the carpentry shop in the Dewey school claimed
that manual training was most effective between the ages of 4 and 14: "Girls profit just as
much as boys from this training in the early grades and are often as expert and more
painstaking." (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, p. 262). Would Weil not agree with Dewey
(1897/1976), who gave the following reason for centering his school around manual
training? "The use of the hand, and other motor organs in connection with the eye, is the
great instrument through which children most easily and naturally gain experience, and
come in contact with familiar materials and processes of ordinary life" (p. 326).
Wisdom was connected to experience through the training of eye and hand. By
keeping the body in mind, education was less likely to isolate body from mind. In citing
Descartes, Weil (1987) was convinced that wisdom-often hidden from those who
considered themselves to be intellectuals-was more likely to be found with those engaged
in physical labor since they "judge things close at hand much more soundly and clearly
than those who have been in constant attendance at schools" (p. 85). Dewey (1933) made
a strikingly similar observation:
Because their knowledge has been achieved in connection with the needs of
specific situations, men of little book-learning are often able to put to effective use
every ounce of knowledge they possess; while men of vast erudition are often
swamped by the mere bulk of their learning, because memory, rather than
thinking, has been operative in obtaining it. (p. 64)
Wisdom was using knowledge or information in grappling with specific, concrete
problems. As much as possible, Dewey wished to avoid the trap of traditional schooling
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in which "amassing information always tends to escape from the ideal of wisdom or good
judgment" (p. 64). Of course, memory and information played a critical role in
education-even rote learning could be useful and helpful-but not as an end in itself, but
in its function as providing, as Weil might put it, matter on which the mind could bite, as
an occasion for thinking.
Wisdom and Manual Training
Dewey did not want manual training in his school to be aimed primarily at
creating skilled carpenters, gourmet chefs, or expert tailors. Of course, graduates of his
school could have chosen those paths, but the school's curriculum was not designed to
provide a series of preplanned lessons to attain a particular trade as quickly as possible.
In manual training as Dewey conceived it, a student worked with raw materials and
fashioned them with tools into objects that she had herself designed. The finished
product usually served a purpose in another area of the curriculum. For example, the
children made their own jute board pencil boxes (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, p. 44),
dumbbell racks and bean bags for the gymnasium, lead weights (shaped and smelted by
the children themselves from ore) and test tube racks for the laboratory (Dewey,
1897/1976, p. 326). In cooking, the groups took turns preparing food for the whole
school weekly luncheon. When Group IV (age 7) traced the development of primitive
tribes they experimented with fashioning pottery from clay through a long series of trial-
and-error activities that culminated with their invention of a crude potter's wheel which
they constructed themselves and subsequently used to make various clay utensils
(Mayhew & Edwards, p. 105). The following description of Group IV's work in textiles
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captures the Dewey school's approach to connecting hand, eye, and mind:
Raw wool was given to the children to examine and decide how the fibres could
be made into yam. When they had pointed out the crinkles which would hold the
fibres together, they spun wool with their fingers and wound it on a stone. The
weighted thread twisted round their fingers, and this, coupled with what they had
observed about spinning, led one or two of them to suggest something that would
spin like a top. They then were shown pictures of a spindle, a spindle whorl, and
so on. Thus the primitive way of spinning and its gradual development became
clear to them as they reconstructed and gradually improved the primitive tools.
(Mayhew & Edwards, p. 109)
Group X (age 13) had formed clubs to pursue "extracurricular" interests (debating,
photography) but soon discovered that few rooms were available for them in which to
meet. To solve this problem, they planned, built, and furnished their own club house
through the guidance of the teachers and the assistance of the younger groups, who were
more than eager to help. As Mayhew & Edwards enthused: "This enterprise was the most
thoroughly considered one ever undertaken in the school. Because of its purpose, ... it
drew together many groups and ages and performed a distinctly ethical and social
service" (p. 232).
Wisdom and Social Occupations
Social occupations provided the conceptual framework within which manual
training was given a purpose and a direction connected to a child's interest. At the
subprimary level (Groups I and II, ages 4 and 5), occupations were connected to the
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child's preschool experiences at home-household occupations. As in many kindergartens
today, these groups operated on their own, with little interaction with the rest of the
school. The morning began with hand-work, followed by songs and stories, marching
and games, a midmorning luncheon in which the children were in charge of setting up,
serving each other, and cleaning up afterwards, and a final period of dramatic play. This
routine was often changed to accommodate outdoor walks or class trips (Mayhew &
Edwards, 1936).
The teachers encouraged the children to talk about their household experiences,
and from these conversations the children came up with ideas that they acted out in
dramatic play or expressed through hand-work. Hand-work included drawing, painting,
modeling in clay, working in sand, playing with blocks, and actual construction with
wood, tin, leather, or yam. For example, the 5-year-olds were able to measure with rulers
and cut their own lengths with handsaws in building scrub boards which were used in the
dramatic play of washing and ironing laundry (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, p. 66).
Group III (age 6) moved beyond the home and explored occupations which served
the household, such as agriculture and lumbering. They constructed miniature farms on a
sand table and planted winter wheat in an outdoor garden. They threshed their own wheat
and ground their own grain into flour with instruments they designed and made
themselves. For example, in solving the problem of threshing, they invented their version
of the flail-two sticks, one twice as long as the other, joined by a leather strap (Mayhew
& Edwards, 1936, p. 82).
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Wisdom and Social History
For Groups IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII, (ages 7 through 11), the study of social
occupations as they had developed in the past provided the overall imaginative
framework and furnished the specific, concrete problems for manual training. For each
student, it provided a chronological thread which bound the educational experiences of
one year onto the next. For those unfamiliar with the Dewey school, it may come as a
surprise to see history given a major role in such a progressive and experimental
institution. The school's curriculum provided a concrete answer to the question that
Dewey posed 35 years later: "How shall the young become acquainted with the past in
such a way that the acquaintance is a potent agent in appreciation of the living present?"
(Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 23).
Why did the Dewey school go to the past? Why did it not continue to journey in
the present along the path begun in the subprimary department, beginning with household
occupations and moving on to the wider society? Contemporary society was too complex
for a direct approach. More promising was an indirect route, a detour through the past,
when associated living was arguably easier to comprehend. By reenacting social
occupations that served the household through the drama of play and constructive
activity, the 7-year-old child was ready to investigate their origins as problems to be
solved.71 Dewey saw that the best way for a child to understand the wider society into
71 While not pointing out its educational value directly, Weil (1941/1968a) had a similar
insight: "Work developed out of play and by imitation of play, an imitation whose trace is
perhaps seen, more clearly than among us in the habits of certain populations called
primitive" (p. 39).
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which he would eventually venture forth was to imaginatively reconstruct that society
along its own history. This was not to be accomplished by feeding the child facts about
inventions and discoveries, but by posing the problems of survival to a child as if she
were living alongside her forebears. Facts about inventions and discoveries were brought
in, but in a way that tried not to spoil a child's appetite for discovery and invention or
weaken her ability to think through a problem on her own.72 No doubt aware of his
former teacher's (G. Stanley Hall) dictum that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, Dewey
nevertheless advocated the genetic approach more as an educational tool than as a
psychological postulate (Wirth, 1966, pp. 111-112). Dewey (1936) was very clear on
this: "In reality, there was no adoption of the notion that the experience of the growing
human being reproduces the stages of the evolution of humanity" (p. 472).
Between the ages of 7 and 11, the students encountered history, but not in a
strictly chronological fashion. Periods and cultures in history were selected to the extent
to which they were "emotionally and intellectually intimate parts of a child's concern and
outlook" (Dewey, 1936, p. 471). Group IV (age 7) encountered the problems of
procuring food, clothing, and shelter from the perspective of primitive tribes. The
benefits and dangers attending such concrete activity were striking. For example, because
he had been taught how to put out a fire, one 8-year-old boy saved his brother from a
72 In my attempt to get upper elementary students to appreciate how Canadian Aboriginals
solved these problems in the past, we would read Hatchet by Gary Paulsen (1987)-a story
about a 13-year-old boy who survives a plane crash in the Canadian wilderness. Hooked
by Paulsen's gripping narrative, my students were in a better position to imaginatively
encounter the problems of survival. The Dewey school went much further-the child's
constructive work attempted to solve these problems concretely.
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severe burning at home. By contrast, because one teacher had not given clear directions
about where a fire should be built, a child went home to start one in a closet (Mayhew &
Edwards, 1936, p. 99)! Group V (age 8) followed the maritime commerce and
exploration of the ancient Phoenicians in order to understand how measuring, bartering,
and keeping records of transactions solved the problems associated with trading and led
to the development of numerals and alphabets. A child who could see those connections,
who was interested in playing the part of a miller not just for its own sake but was
interested in the how and why of her activity, who was willing to defer ends through the
working out of means, was judged to be ready for the drill and practice of reading,
writing, and arithmetic. Working through the problems of sailing and navigation, the
children moved from the Phoenicians on to the European explorers of the 15th century.
Group VI (age 9) followed this up with the origins of the United States, starting with the
history and geography of Chicago, then going back to the first settlements at Virginia and
Plymouth. Group VII (age 10) traced the history of the American colonies up to the
Revolution. Group VIII (age 11) went back to an intensive study of English village life
from medieval times to the beginning of the industrial revolution in order to better
understand the European background of the American colonists and to aid in the study of
English literature.
For Groups IX (age 12), X (age 13), and XI (ages 14 and 15), history became less
of a thread in unifying students around group work. Having become more adept in
thinking abstractly and more confident in her own ability to solve problems, each student
was more likely to follow an individual interest than to join up with others in a common
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pursuit (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, pp. 204-205). The building of the clubhouse was a
notable exception. History receded in the background and took its place alongside the
other subjects in a curriculum that began to look more and more like a collection of
academic disciplines, except that, from the students' perspective, these disciplines were
rooted in holistic experiences furnished through the practical discipline of occupational
work and manual training.
The other disciplines found their place in the give-and-take among students
guided by teachers who kept the specialized subjects constantly in view without
arbitrarily separating them froin each other or from constructive activity. Science had a
prominent place, since the impulse to inquire naturally grew out of the impulse to
construct. For example, the study of chemistry, botany, zoology, and human physiology
developed out of activities associated with cooking as students explored the sources for
food and their effect on the human body. The study of physical matter-wood and
fabrics-developed out of carpentry and sewing. Since art was closely connected to useful
construction, the "finer" versions of art products were not as prominent as they might
have been if the school had specialized in the arts as conventionally understood. Dewey
made no apology for this. It was more important to keep the useful and fine arts in close
association and so develop within the child an aesthetic appreciation that attended all her
activities. He refused to separate them, even if this separation could produce visible art
works which might be judged more successful from an adult perspective. In the Dewey
school, artistic successes may have been comparatively rare as judged by outside critics,
but Dewey believed that they went deeper and left "a more transforming, because more
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completely integrated, impress" (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936, pp. 361-362).
Weil (1949/1952b) would most likely applaud Dewey's decision to go to the past,
since in her words, "we possess no other life, no other living sap, than the treasures stored
up from the past and digested, assimilated, and created afresh by us" (p. 51). No doubt,
Weil would teach history in such a way that school children would not unconsciously
assume an attitude of superiority towards the past. The Dewey school's curriculum might
have engendered this bias because certain periods of history were consciously chosen for
study according to their usefulness in helping the children grasp the propelling dynamic in
technological development. For example, the Phoenicians were chosen over North
American Aboriginals because the latter societies were judged to be too "static" (Mayhew
& Edwards, 1936, pp. 118-119). To say that Weil would not use the idea of progress as a
guiding principle for curriculum development was an understatement: "The dogma of
progress brings dishonour upon goodness by turning it into a question of fashion" (p.
230).73 Yet, by using history as an imaginative backdrop in facing parallel problems of
survival that elicited from the children a constructive experimentation, an attitude of
admiration for their forebears was more than likely to develop. Dewey's insistence that
children work with problems from the bottom up would probably counteract the
73 Dewey would probably agree with Weil's critique of progress-as-fashion. Dewey's
understanding of progress was linked to his idea of growth, by which he meant the
continual reconstruction of experience in a way that opened up wider and deeper avenues
for subsequent reconstruction. If that is not kept in mind, a contemporary reader could
easily equate his idea of growth with the kind of enlargement we see in economic
development (e.g., the growth of Walmart), or in the attempts of a political ruler to
expand his powers (e.g., Chavez in Venezuela, Mugabe in Zimbabwe), or in the attempts
of an aesthete to savor as many experiences as possible (Walsh, 1993, p. 108).
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progressivist bias underlying his curriculum. Perhaps the imaginative reconstruction of
history in association with the direct experience of working with the rawest materials
available was an approach that Weil (1949/1952b) would not necessarily reject: "No
other method exists for acquiring knowledge about the human heart than the study of
history coupled with experience of life, in such a way that the two throw light upon each
other" (p. 232).
Nevertheless, Weil (1955/1958) would endorse the genetic method in helping
each individual child develop an understanding of her own civilization-an understanding
that she identified as a criterion for a free society (p. 20). As we saw in Chapter Three,
she had used the genetic method successfully in teaching the history of mathematics at the
secondary level and had recommended that science be taught the same way in conjunction
with experimentation and the acquisition of a productive technical skill (Weil,
1932/1968b)-ideas which find an echo in the Dewey school's emphasis on manual
training. Furthermore, Weil (1987) would insist (and Dewey would agree) that science be
taught "in such a way that each student, following the same order he would follow if he
were methodically making discoveries himself, may be said less to receive instruction
than to teach himself' (pp. 85-86). In her view, the only hope for a free and democratic
society would be with those who had been able to unite within themselves the intellectual
and manual dimensions of work (Weil, 1955/1958, p. 23). Is this not what the Dewey
school attempted to achieve?
Educating for Love of Wisdom in Its Connection to Thinking
So far, we have emphasized the manual dimension of work or how wisdom could
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best be cultivated by keeping concrete experience and constructive activity in the
foreground. Putting the connection to experience in the background (but still keeping it
in view), we now turn to the intellectual dimension of work-the process ofthinking~and
how to cultivate wisdom with respect to it.
Like Weil, Dewey (1933) identified genuine freedom with the intellectual
dimension of work. This freedom was dependent on cultivating a capacity that each
human possessed~the power to think. This power did not just grow by itself; it needed to
be exercised and made over into a habit. At the core of the metahabit of wisdom, the
habit of reflective activity was developed by training the ability "to 'tum things over,' to
look at matters deliberately, to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence requisite
for decision is at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to seek such evidence" (p. 90).
For Dewey (1933), primary or "raw" experience was a necessary antecedent to
secondary or "refined" experience. The meanings of these terms were relative to each
other. This meant that students had to experience things directly through manual training
or constructive activity as much as possible before they experienced them indirectly
through book-learning. In fact, it was difficult for a child to comprehend what she was
reading unless it had some prior connection to her own direct experience. Secondary or
"refined" experience was more than simply the vicarious experience that reading could
provide: it was the product of thinking. Thinking, or reflective activity, occurred when an
obstacle impeded the flow of primary experience and caused it to fall back on itself like a
wave crashing against a rocky cliff. Whether this obstacle was experienced as a practical
difficulty in one's day-to-day affairs or was experienced as a theoretical challenge to
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understand another person's idea, thinking did not begin until a problem was faced.
Reflective activity, or what Dewey called "complete thinking," followed a certain
sequence: (a) being aware of a disruption; (b) defining a problem as clearly as possible;
(c) deliberating on various courses of action to solve the problem; (d) testing the solution
through action; and (e) if the solution failed the test, returning to step 3 or step 2; or if the
solution succeeded, then one enjoyed the fruits of one's labor. In the final step, the
disruption to experience had been eliminated, but the experience itself had been modified
or refined as a result of thinking. It had been enriched with a deeper and wider meaning.
Strictly speaking, the first and final steps of the thinking sequence outlined above
did not involve thinking per se as Dewey defined it. They were emotional states that
were felt or had. They were the relatively "passive phases" of experience (Weil's term)
or the stage of "undergoing" (Dewey's term) when something was suffered or enjoyed
through the conduit which connected the individual to the environment.74 Thinking was
the relatively active phase whereby the individual attempted to gain some control over the
conditions which produced pain or pleasure, anxiety or serenity. In the primary phase,
one became aware of a discomfort, a disruption which broke through the unconscious
flow of experience and upset the equilibrium of routine activity and stabilized habit.
Even though thinking had yet to be employed, it provided the needed stimulus for
thought.
74 There was still activity going on but it was the act of receiving something from the
environment, or it was the act of information processing (this often happens when we
sleep), or it, was an activity that occurred in an established habit and therefore did not
demand conscious reflection. In thinking, activity was much more conscious of itself.
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Stimulating Thought
Educating for complete thinking meant providing many opportunities for direct
experience with "raw" materials in such a way that a student received a stimulus to think
and an opportunity to try out a solution through activity: How can I clean up this oily
wool? How can I separate the fibres out to spin thread? Can I design a tool that will help
me spin thread more efficiently? To use Piaget's language, thinking had its roots in an
infant's sensorimotor activity and was developed through operations with concrete things.
Operating with abstract forms and symbols depended on this prior development. Dewey
(1933) anticipated Piaget: "Only when thinking is constantly employed in using the
senses and muscles for the guidance and application of observations and movements is
the way prepared for the subsequent higher types of thinking" (p. 88).
In traditional schools, the stimulus to think was often lacking. With the artificial
stimulus of marks and grades, students were more likely to memorize premade patterns of
symbols (so-called thoughts) and recall them for paper-and-pencil tests without
necessarily understanding how the symbols functioned in connection to· the things they
symbolized. For both Dewey and Weil, understanding could be achieved only by
thinking through problems for oneself, especially if the solution to the problem had
immediate practical consequences. For example, a number of boys in the Dewey school
kept making the error of putting the decimal in the wrong place when calculating the cost
of lumber. This mistake disappeared soon after the students were given the responsibility
of purchasing the lumber themselves (Dewey, 1933, p. 100). Even today, how often do
we find elementary students trained to follow recipes or formulas in solving so-called
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problems? In one grade 4 class that I observed, the students were given a series of math
questions that reviewed different problem-solving strategies. The students were lost and
upset because the teacher would not tell them which strategy to use with which problem:
"Do I add, subtract, multiply, or divide?" Problems for them meant manipulating
numbers according to certain patterns. Had they never been given the stimulus to think
through a problem for themselves? Had they not been led to visualize the concrete
situation to which the words and numbers referred? For them, it was a school exercise,
not a real problem. It had no meaning which connected it to their experience; it was part
of that strange and esoteric world called math.
The stimulus to think had to be connected to a student's interest, and this interest
originated in a student's prior experience. The teacher's task was to determine what that
interest was, to find out how it was connected to her prior experience, and to provide an
environment whereby that interest would be engaged in an activity that led somewhere.
This was why the youngest students in the Dewey school began with household
occupations. As this activity proceeded, the student would inevitably encounter an
obstacle or a problem. It had to be a problem primarily for her, not one manufactured on
her behalf by some artificial device imposed from outside her vital experience. For
Dewey (1933), thinking could not be induced by contrived "problems" which ignored a
student's interest:
General appeals to a child (or to a grown up) to think, irrespective of the existence
in his own experience of some difficulty that troubles him and disturbs his
equilibrium, are as futile as advice to lift himself by his boot-straps. (p. 15)
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In the history of the Dewey school, building the clubhouse was the finest expression of
this educational philosophy. From the traditionalist perspective, this would be seen as an
"extracurricular" affair-a lovely pastime or hobby that one could explore as long as the
core curriculum was covered. From the perspective of the Dewey students, this was a
vital and core activity. It proceeded from interests that they were pursuing in various self-
initiated clubs until they bumped up against an obstacle-they lacked the facilities to meet.
Once the problem was defined, the students asked for permission from their teachers to
build their own clubhouse. Instead of running up against resistance from school
authorities ("We do not have time for this. We cannot afford to pay for materials."), they
received encouragement, support, advice, and guidance. It became a symbol of conjoint
constructive activity intelligently pursued on behalf of interests genuinely held in
common. According to anecdotal evidence provided by Mayhew and Edwards (1936),
graduates of this school had certainly developed the ability to think for themselves. The
following is typical of reports received from graduates and parents of graduates:
A mother who had been most critical as to the effects of the school on two of her
children acknowledged many years later that, when comparing the two children
who had had the school experience with those who had not, she believed "the
markedly greater ability of the first two to meet new situations and to attack
problems was due to their early experience in this school." (Mayhew & Edwards,
1936,p.403)
Defining a Problem
Once a student was stimulated to think, she would pay attention to what caused
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the disruption. In Weil' s terms, this action detached a part of herself from powerful
emotions that, in mild cases, tempted her to express a whining helplessness, and in
extreme cases, induced a panic reaction. At least some of the energy bound up in these
emotions had to be released and made available for thinking-and this was achieved by
looking at the conditions which determined the disruption-defining the problem. The
more attention was paid to the problem, the more energy was diverted from immediate
emotional outlets towards delineating the problem and deliberating on various courses of
action.
A wise teacher would know how to encourage those whining grade 4 students
who did not know how to tackle a math problem. She would not give in to the temptation
to tell them, no matter how much they complained. Perhaps she would have them discuss
various approaches in small groups. How many times has it occurred that when a teacher
has asked a student simply to read the problem out loud, the student began to see the
solution before finishing the reading? As Dewey (1933) phrased it: "A question well put
is half answered" (p. 108). Nevertheless, most mathematics textbooks provide predefined
problems. Students are not defining them, they are simply reading them. In the Dewey
school, perplexing situations were more indeterminate. Students had to do the heavy
lifting of defining problems themselves.
Ideally, a child who had been stimulated to think through a problem for herself
took ownership of that problem almost unconsciously. Usually, when one felt conscious
of taking ownership, this awareness was related to an initial unwillingness to tackle it. It
felt more like an imposition rather than an interest which stimulated thinking. As Weil
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(1950/1959) maintained: "The intelligence can only be led by desire. For there to be
desire, there must be pleasure and joy in the work. The intelligence only grows and bears
fruit in joy" (p. 71). The unselfconscious ownership of the problem propelled her
thinking-it mattered to her! Of course, this is not to deny that from time to time one must
consciously force oneself to face a problem and cross the threshold of imposition in order
to make the problem one's own. The temptation to evade a problem is usually stronger
with someone who has not been trained to think. The Dewey school aimed to provide
that training from an early age-to make it an ingrained habit that would become a lifelong
source of strength and joy in the midst of uncertainty and danger. It was the muscle fibre
of character.
The problem and its corresponding solution in relationship to the child had to be
experienced as original, even if this meant that she was reinventing the wheel. In the
Dewey school, originality was defined by its relation to the child, not by its relation to the
deposit of knowledge left by adults or by other children. This was also the best way for
the child to assimilate the treasures of the past. Just as Weil took her own journey of
doubt to understand the deposit left by Descartes, so each child in the Dewey school had
to take her own intellectual journey following interests that mattered to her, and sooner or
later, she would understand the same things that others had understood before her, but
without feeling discouraged that someone had been there first. She would be less likely
to suffer from the mass wised-up-ness and the ennui that afflicted those who had "been
there, done that." Her feeling of wonder would have been preserved because she had
sincerely worked at problems that mattered to her. Yet, because the journey had been
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uniquely hers-and who of us has exactly the same psychological make-up-she would
likely have seen a detail that others had missed, or discovered a side trail that everyone
else had ignored. In either case, she would have contributed her own treasure to the
social deposit of knowledge. And, Weil might add, even if what she hoped to contribute
was already there, she would be more likely to rejoice that others had made the same
discovery rather than feel disappointed that someone else had "beaten her to the punch."
Somehow, in her intellectual journey she had picked up the virtue of humility. How so?
As a product of the Dewey school, she had not been trained to compete with others for
top honors or grades; she had discovered from an early age that the joy of learning was its
own reward and that the experience of constructive activity in collaboration with others
had led her to taste friendship-the greatest of human joys.
The accumulated experience of solving problems for herself not only developed a
growing confidence in her ability to attack new problems; it strengthened her capacity to
make sound judgments, an essential feature of reflective thinking and wisdom. Judging
involved knowing how to select the relevant facts of a situation and how to assess their
importance with respect to each other and with respect to the problem at hand. There
were no fixed rules or easy formulae that could be transmitted from a person with sound
judgment to one who had little experience in exercising it. One could only improve
judgment through practice, using the accumulated deposit left by first-hand experience,
not fearing the inevitable mistakes but seeing errors as opportunities for learning. The
ideas presented in course work were understood and loaded with significance only when
used by a student-teacher in handling the problems of planning for instruction with real
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students. There were no academic shortcuts to developing good judgment gained through
on-the-job training. When a teacher-educator who was motivated by a desire to alleviate
the anxiety of student-teachers on the verge of their first practicum, explained an
instructional technique to those who were hungry for rules-of-thumb and tired of
educational theory, the student-teachers would often misapply it because they had little or
no deposit of experience by which to understand how the technique worked in a specific
situation. For example, I once told a group not to begin a lesson until they had everyone's
attention. One student-teacher applied this so dogmatically with her primary students that
much class time was wasted waiting for each student to be absolutely quiet. This
understandably exacerbated her problems with classroom management. No doubt
thinking of what he had tried to accomplish in his laboratory school, Dewey (1933)
lauded the acquisition of sound judgment gained-through an education which stimulated
students to practise it:
A man of sound judgment in any set of affairs is an educated man as respects
those affairs, whatever his schooling or academic standing. And if our schools
turn out their pupils in that attitude of mind which is conducive to good judgment
in any department of affairs in which the students are placed, they have done more
than if they sent out their pupils possessed merely of vast stores of information or
high degrees of skill in specialized branches. (p. 120)
And sound judgment is synonymous with wisdom.
Testing Ideas
In the ideal classroom of the Dewey school, once a problem was defined, various
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solutions were tried out or tested in three ways that could be used in the following
sequence: (a) deliberating over the elements of the problem and rehearsing various
courses of action; (b) communicating or sharing a tentative hypothesis with the aim of
receiving constructive criticism from others, and finally (c) testing the hypothesis in some
practical activity. Each step in this sequence supported and strengthened the others.
Receiving constructive criticism not only enhanced thinking, it opened up a natural space
for the cultivation of humility and democracy.
In Chapter Two we explored Dewey's concept of deliberation and how it worked
to forestall immediate impulse by imaginatively rehearsing various links in the chain of
cause-and-effect in order to uncover consequences that would otherwise remain hidden
from view. For this to take place in a school, there had to be opportunities to
concentrate without distraction. Periods of quiet, individual work had to alternate with
periods of social interaction and overt activity. Dewey (1933) compared reasoning to
digestion in this regard:
A silent, uninterrupted working-over of considerations by comparing and
weighing alternative suggestions is indispensable for the development of coherent
and compact conclusions. Reasoning is no more akin to disputing or arguing or to
the abrupt seizing and dropping of suggestions than digestion is to a noisy
chomping of the jaws. The teacher must permit opportunity for leisurely mental
digestion. (p. 272)
Once a student felt confident about a hypothetical solution, she might share it with her
classmates and teacher to allow it to be critiqued or modified.
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The process of collaborative deliberation was the ideal to which every democratic
assembly aspired. If this communal approach to solving problems was carefully
monitored by the teacher, lifelong habits would develop in which each student felt
confident to make intelligent contributions and, in turn, follow and judge the
contributions of others (Dewey, 1933, pp. 270-271). Genuine discussion and deliberation
in a group would occur to the extent to which the contribution of every individual was
welcomed by each of the others. Weil would remind us that thinking occurred best in the
context of a group only when individuals did not feel inhibited by the presence of others,
since it was individuals who did the thinking, not a group per see This implied that each
individual would attempt to think along with the one who presented her ideas. This
presupposed a safe and inviting classroom in which everyone felt free to question. The
presenter would be challenged to clarify her ideas, explain her reasoning, and justify her
conclusions. This demanded an artful teacher who knew when to step in and when to
step aside. As Dewey pointed out: "The practical problem of the teacher is to preserve a
balance between so little showing and telling as to fail to stimulate reflection and so much
as to choke thought" (p. 270). Ideally, if a solution required the consent of the group, it
would be acted on only after everyone agreed. No one would be intimidated by the
authority of the teacher or by the fear of ridicule by the group. There would be no "party
whips or wimps." As in the manner of some Aboriginal councils, the virtue of patience
would be exercised in reaching consensus. Once a decision was reached, action was
taken by the group as a whole, with different tasks assigned to specific individuals, or
action was taken by the individual who had modified her suggested solution as a result of
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receiving valuable criticism from the others. Was there a better way to prepare future
participants in a democratic society?
Thinking, Acting, and Contemplating.
For Dewey, thinking was an instrumental activity; it concerned itself with the
relations between events, how one thing could lead to another, how actions implied
consequences. It was stimulated by a problematic situation, a confusion that needed to be
cleared up. In this sense, Dewey valued clarity as much as Weil in its function as the
regulating ideal to which thinking aspired. But the achievement of clarity only partially
fulfilled its aspiration: Clarity of thought had to be judged by the criterion of practice.
Weil (1950/1970) would not quarrel with that. Good intentions or clear thoughts were
worthless daydreams if they were not embodied and expressed in action:
For living man here below, in this world, sensible matter - that is to say, inert
matter and flesh - is like a filter or sieve; it is the universal test of what is real in
thought, and this applies to the entire domain of thought without exception.
Matter is our infallible judge. (p. 364)
As the Dewey school strove to make the test of practice the major tool for evaluation, it
both reflected and challenged the society outside its walls to bring thought and action
together in every occupation. Although surveys and questionnaires could serve a useful
function, the quality of a business operation was not assessed by periodic paper-and-
pencil tests of those who participated in it. The proof was in the pudding of practice-the
quality of its product, the ability to keep customers and attract new ones, and the extent to
which every employee had a share in the ownership, planning, and execution of the work.
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Checking off the correct answers on a quiz only tested a person's ability to recognize
certain patterns of symbols. It was the crucible of practice that truly tested the ideas to
which those symbols pointed, ideas employed in judging the complexity of a real-not
hypothetical-situation and in deciding on a course of action that would affect to a greater
or lesser degree the lives of others. Rather than being burdened by piles of papers to be
marked and graded, the Dewey schoolteachers were challenged to provide the material
conditions whereby students could test their own ideas in the kitchen, the textile room,
the carpentry shop, the science laboratory, the garden, the art studio, the music room, the
library, and the construction site.
Whether or not the solution worked, whether or not the obstacle was removed, a
person's experience had been reconstructed or refined. The activity of thinking had
modified it, however slightly, by illuminating it with a clearer perception and coloring it
with more significant meaning. Unlike Weil, Dewey said little about obstacles that could
not be removed. He was forever hopeful that the discipline of thinking, especially the
refined thinking of science, would find a way. He was wary of labeling a problem
"insoluble" because it so often resulted in a fatalistic resignation that weakened the
courage to persist. According to Gouinlock (2004) this is a lacuna in his system of
thought because what Dewey "dismissively referred to as acts of acceptance will always
have a fundamental importance in our existence" (p. 81). Although Weil appreciated the
Stoics much more than Dewey, she did not lack the courage to persist. In her zeal to
solve seemingly intractable problems, she recognized how struggling with a difficulty
transformed the experience of the struggler, even if no visible progress had been made
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towards resolving it. As we saw in Chapter Three, she gave to adolescent students a
paradoxical injunction: Whether or not a solution was reached was not as important as the
effort required in the attempt, an effort that had to be genuine and wholehearted in the
Deweyan sense-there was no other way. Yet underneath this immediate objective lay a
deeper purpose. If conducted with the fervent wish to solve a problem, despite all
evidence that the labor was in vain, this effort would result in a transformation of
experience that was usually not felt but was decisive. Unaware of its effect, the student
had used her thinking to attack a problem in a way that developed a patient attention
which would be efficacious in some other way. This was how Weil understood the
transfer of learning. It might bear fruit in some other activity or subject unrelated to the
unsolved problem; more important, it would bring the student one step closer to
genuinely attending to a sufferer in her time of need; and it would bring her one step
closer to perceiving the divine wisdom to which the whole universe was subject. Weil
(1950/1959) used mystical language to describe this experience: "Even if our efforts of
attention seem for years to be producing no result, one day a light which is in exact
proportion to them will flood the soul" (p. 68).75
Since Dewey avoided writing about the divine and unequivocally rejected any
75 How can she know this? Is Weil using poetic hyperbole here? One can assume that
this assertion is based on her own experiences, such as the one she had during
adolescence when she felt mediocre in comparison to her gifted brother:
After months of inward darkness, I suddenly had the everlasting conviction that
no matter what human being, even though practically devoid of natural faculties,
can penetrate to the kingdom of truth reserved for genius, if only he longs for truth
and perpetually concentrates all his attention upon its attainment. (Weil,
1950/1959, pp. 30-31)
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notion of the supernatural, he was silent about the use a student could make of
experiencing the insoluble. Because it smacked of "either/or" thinking, he would not
admit into his love of wisdom the idea of contradiction in the strict sense, and therefore
he literally had no use for it. One gets the impression with Dewey that if a problem were
insoluble it was not really a problem worth thinking about because one could not do
anything with it-the fault probably lay with the fallacious reasoning which defined it as
such. As Weil had done with the problem of God for most of her life, it was best to leave
it alone. Nevertheless, Dewey was at home in the pragmatic spirit of modern science in a
way that Weil was not. Unlike the mathematics of ancient Greece, the modern version
was impatient to move past the insoluble, to "bracket" such mysteries as 1t (pi) or 00
(infinity), and push them off to the margins in its mission to solve the soluble. The ratio
between the circumference of a circle and its diameter (1t) is a concrete illustration of the
contradiction that lies at the heart of mathematics, a contradiction pointed out by Zeno
long ago: Neither discrete number nor continuous space can be defined in terms of each
other.76 Yet, number can function as a tool in measuring space, and space can help us
76 One example of bracketing would be the injunction not to divide by zero. When a
divisor approaches zero, the quotient seems to approach infinity (00). According to the
present rules in mathematics, this is not true; it is more correct to say that dividing by
zero is undefined. And this can be shown quite easily when one looks at division as the
reverse of multiplication. Nevertheless, the verb, define, has a double meaning: In one
sense, it means "to fix or mark the limits of'; in the other sense, it means "to determine
the essential qualities or precise meaning of' (Webster'S, 1967, p. 216). In the first sense,
infinity is undefined because one cannot fix or mark the limits of an infinite number. In
the second sense, it is defined because one can point to the meaning of infinity as "an
indefinitely great number or amount" (Webster's, p. 432). Common sense tells us that
there is an ambiguity here, because the definition in the second sense carries within it the
definition of the first sense.
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visualize operations with numbers. It is the instrumental value of the latter, not the
insoluble contradiction of the former, to which Dewey would direct our attention and our
thinking. But if we take Dewey's advice, are we not missing something of prime
importance regarding wisdom and how to love it? As Weil taught her students, the
history of mathematics can be seen as successive attempts to handle the contradiction
between the continuous (space) and the discontinuous (number), with each age
suppressing one side or the other. With the advent of quantum theory a hundred years
ago, the discontinuous has vaulted back onto the scene after 4 centuries of steady
development during which the reigning assumption had been continuity and extension in
space (Weil, 1941/1968a). The digital computer is a powerful testimony of the extent to
which the discontinuous reigns today, and the flow chart schemas of computer
programming is a sophisticated reification of either/or thinking. And we are left with a
duality77 in physics for which we await a unifying theory that Einstein tried in vain to
formulate.
On the other hand, the Greeks were fascinated by the insoluble. Where a modern
math teacher might emphasize how the idea of a perfect triangle can be used to solve a
practical problem, an ancient teacher, while maintaining all the rigor needed to apply
mathematical reasoning to practical problems, would also lead a student to contemplate
the meaning of what seemed like an impossible situation: How can a thing which exists
77 Even though string theory may accomplish a grand synthesis, no one has yet come up
with an all-embracing physical theory to pull together what is happening on the
macrolevel (e.g., gravitational force) with what is happening on the microlevel (e.g.,
strong nuclear force).
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nowhere in the real world (a perfect triangle) have efficacy in solving a real world
problem? It was this type of mathematical training in contemplation which provided a
lover of wisdom with the credentials by which he was allowed to enter Plato's Academy.
Here Plato taught the art of dialectic, the aim of which was to make legitimate use of
contradiction. Weil (1955/1958) explained as follows:
The illegitimate use [of contradiction] consists in combining incompatible
assertions as if they were compatible. The legitimate use consists, when the
human intelligence is faced with the necessity of accepting two incompatible
truths, in recognizing them as such, and in making of them as it were the two arms
of a pair of pincers, an instrument for entering indirectly into contact with the
sphere of transcendent truth inaccessible to our intelligence. (p. 159)
Weil did not like Hegel's dialectic and was critical of Alain, her former teacher, when his
thought seemed to take an Hegelian turn (Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 414): "What is
intelligible in the famous 'dialectic' is nothing more than the idea of relation, which can
be seen much more clearly in Plato than in Hegel" (Weil,1950/1970, p. 18). She
considered the attempt to seek harmony in Becoming to be "a bad union of opposites"
(Weil, 1952-1955/1956, p. 616). In her view, Marx's dialectic was even worse (Weil,
1947/1952a, p. 91). If a thesis could be truly synthesized with its antithesis, then the
contradiction was not real.
The legitimate use of contradiction could proceed once it became clear that the
contradiction was genuine, that is, every attempt had been made to eliminate one of the
terms through a rigorous process of thinking guided by the Aristotelian hypothesis of
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noncontradiction-something cannot be both true and false at the same time in the same
context. Once the incompatibility was clearly established and neither term could be
subsumed in some fashion under the other, then the art of dialectic would end by
contemplating it with a patient and fervent attention. As we saw in Chapter Four, Weil's
dialectic informed her political and social theory: In the least evil society, contrary needs
(liberty/obedience, hierarchy/equality) had to be balanced and held in a healthy tension.
Weil drew no hard and fast line between thinking and contemplating:
Contemplation was thinking transformed by the experience of struggling with extremely
difficult or impossible problems such that its effect on the attitude and action of the
thinker was qualitatively different. This was not navel gazing: If contemplation kept one
frozen and static, if it had no effect in the sphere of action, if it was merely a pleasurable
activity to escape from difficulty, if it did not pass through the sieve of matter, if the
thoughts so contemplated did not produce actions to which they corresponded or at the
very least did not change the accent 78 of those actions, then the so-called thinker had not
been contemplating-she had been daydreaming. For Weil (1950/1970), contradictions
presented a thinker with the opportunity not to daydream but to experience the same
beauty of reality that a laborer found in his work:
Beauty is the manifest appearance of reality. For reality is the obstacle, and the
78 "It is not surprising that a man who has bread should give a piece to someone who is
starving. What is surprising is that he should be capable of doing so with so different a
gesture." (Weil, 1950/1959, p. 104). Through this qualitatively different gesture, the
person on the receiving end, if he was equally attentive, could sense that the giver did not
look at him merely as an occasion for practising charity. In such a case, the receiver
could not help but express a genuine gratitude rather than a servile or perfunctory "thank
you."
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obstacle for a thinking being is contradiction. Incommensurability ...was the first
radiance of beauty manifested in mathematics. What is real in perception does not
lie in the effort but in the contradiction experienced through work. (p. 387)
In addition, like thinking, contemplation was not something exclusively reserved for
those who had managed to pass the entrance examinations of Plato's Academy. Like
originality, the insolubility of a problem was defined in relation to the thinker. Therefore,
contemplation was open to everyone. Even more than this, a person of lower intelligence
would have a greater number of insoluble problems open to her and would therefore have
more opportunities to contemplate.
Weil (1950/1977b) wrote that the only difference between a person considered
very intelligent and one considered less so was that the former inhabited a larger prison
cell. The more intelligent person could move around in her cell without bumping against
the walls and therefore could entertain the illusion that she was not in prison. The less
intelligent person was less likely to be deceived. A love of wisdom which embraced
contemplation so defined would naturally see each human being as having equal status. It
was just that those who were simple-minded had a natural advantage. If educators truly
believed this, then the meaning of "special education" would be turned on its head.
Using the prison metaphor, Weil described how wisdom is beyond intelligence:
A man whose mind feels that it is captive would prefer to blind himself to the fact.
But if he hates falsehood, he will not do so; and in that case he will have to suffer
a lot. He will beat his head against the wall until he faints. He will come to again
and look with terror at the wall, until one day he begins afresh to beat his head
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against it; and once again he will faint. And so on endlessly and without hope.
One day he will wake up on the other side of the wall. Perhaps he is still in
prison, although a larger one. No matter. He has found the key; he knows the
secret which breaks down every wall. He has passed beyond what men call
intelligence, into the beginning of wisdom. (p. 331)
Unlike Weil, Dewey (1929a) made a clear distinction between contemplating and
thinking: "To contemplate is consciously to possess meanings; to behold them with
relish; to view them so absorbingly as to revel in them" (p. 269). Although having a
meaning was a prerequisite for taking it and using it for something else-eontemplation
was the holding phase, and thinking was the instrumental phase. Contemplation was an
aesthetic activity more than an intellectual one. It was the time of perching in which one
found rest and enjoyment, not the time of strenuous flight. For Weil, contemplation did
not entail possession. As Simpson and Johnson (2002) argue, Platonic contemplation
was an eros for wisdom that did not seek to possess indubitable knowledge. It was aimed
at the same object to which thinking was directed-a problem.
To use Deweyan language, Weilian contemplation was a form of attentive
deliberation in which the inner channels of activity kept impulses moving around in
circles, finding nothing around which they could coalesce in order to propel an overt,
linear act. There was no object to which they could attach themselves. Indeed, the
underlying goal resembled the Buddhist quest which sought to detach one's desire from
particular objects. This was not the passive or undergoing phase of experience: It was
the active form of thinking but seemingly deprived of outlet. In the centre of this swirl of
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mental activity was an emptiness, a motionless void which was waiting to be filled by
something outside the realm of sensation, feeling, emotion, thought, and imagination.
This "something" could be the solution to the problem. After concentrating on it for a
time, a person goes to bed convinced that there is no solution. In the morning, the answer
"comes" to her. During the night, her brain had been sorting things out below the surface
of consciousness, and perhaps she recalls dreaming about it.
But what if the answer did not come to her? Was there any use to the seemingly
futile exercise of contemplation? As we have noted above, Weil believed that never was
a genuine effort of attention wasted. To use Deweyan language, struggling with a
problem without reaching a solution still reconstructed the experience of the struggler in
ways not immediately accessible to consciousness. Her ability to think attentively had
been strengthened, and therefore she was in a better position to tackle other problems.
Would this be another way of expressing what Dewey meant by growth in education?
But Weil does not stop there: Contemplating an insoluble problem or a genuine
contradiction with an almost pure attention could put one into contact with "something"
that would make the solution to the problem seem unimportant:
The authentic and pure values - truth, beauty and goodness - in the activity of a
human being are the result of one and the same act, a certain application of the full
attention to the object. Teaching should have no aim but to prepare, by training
the attention, for possibility of such an act. All other advantages of instruction are
without interest. (Weil, 1947/1952a, p. 108)
The contemplative-attentive stance could be present in all mental and overt
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activity. However, if thinking eschewed contemplation, was concerned only with soluble
problems, was anxious for visible achievement of ends judged to be desirable, then for
Weil it was a form of thinking appropriate for practical intelligence but not for wisdom.
Its attitude was no different from that of a student whose main purpose for studying hard
would be to achieve good grades. Of course, thinking directed at soluble problems was
perhaps a necessary prerequisite for contemplation ("We have to accomplish the possible
in order to touch the impossible" [Weil, 1947/1952a, p. 112]), but it could not take one
step in the direction of wisdom which Weil described as beyond intelligence, or (which
amounted to the same thing) the good which Plato described as beyond being.
Noncontemplative thinking could be compared to Luke's (10: 38-42) description of a
distracted Martha who complained that her sister Mary was not helping with the
household chores (Barker, 2002, pp. 1592-1593). An arguably superior version of this
lower form can be compared to the diligent servants of a parable recorded in the same
gospel (Luke 17: 7-10). Exhausted after toiling in the fields all day, they were still
expected to prepare supper for their master and to serve him at his table. Yet, they did
not expect to be thanked for only doing their duty. Hence, Jesus taught his disciples to
regard themselves as unworthy servants (Barker, p. 1605). Doing one's duty profited
nothing and did not make one "worthy," but it was a necessary condition for preparing
oneself to receive the grace of patient attention. It is analogous to the farmer who
ploughs the field, sows the seed, and does all he can to provide the necessary conditions
for the seed to grow. He can only wait for the seed to sprout on its own.
Thinking which embraced the attentive patience of contemplation could be
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compared to a Mary who listened at Jesus's feet or to the watchful servants of another
parable (Luke 12: 35-40). These servants were ready for service and were waiting
patiently in eager expectation for their master's arrival: "It will be good for those servants
whose master finds them watching when he comes. I tell you the truth, he will dress
himself to serve, will have them recline at the table and will come and wait on them"
(Barker, 2002, p. 1597).79 Weil (1950/1970) constructs a bridge from the servants of the
first parable to the servants of the second: "Let the slave await the master until his
physical strength is totally exhausted. The waiting may take the form of some wearying
activity. It is the soul that waits in immobility, which may subsist amid the greatest
external agitation" (p. 177).
This is not to imply that Dewey should be classified with a distracted Martha or an
unprofitable servant. It is also not to imply that Weil is advocating contemplating
mysteries in the religious sense as opposed to solving them in the scientific sense. For
her, contemplation or patient attention serves both functions at the same time. For
Dewey, these functions are separate events. Thinking-in-order-to-define-and-solve-a-
problem was distinct from contemplation-as-enjoying-the-achievements-or-the-process-
of-thinking. Sometimes, in probing a mystery from a different angle, an "insoluble"
problem would dissolve. 8o For example, those boys in the Dewey school were able to
solve the mystery of decimal points because they were forced to use them in the context
79 Weil (19501959) alludes to both these parables in her essay on the right use of school
studies (p. 74).
80 The Deweyan approach to mystery was pointed out to me by John Novak (Personal
communication, September 8, 2007 and April 17, 2008).
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of purchasing lumber. Mysteries were seen as challenges for the systematic thinking and
doing of modern science, even if, when the mystery was solved, another one loomed on
the horizon. For Dewey, this invited growth and further growth within the individual-the
continuous and never-ending reconstruction of experience.
Both Dewey and Weil invite the educator to join them in their quest for wisdom.
Their journeys coincide to a great degree. In my view, Weil would applaud the Dewey
school as far as it went, and it strongly suggests to us that a version of that experiment
needs to be repeated a century later. Combining thinking with acting through productive
work is an intriguing hypothesis that should be tested again. In the final chapter, we will
conclude our comparison by focusing on a question that we have so far neglected: What
is the nature of love in its relationship to wisdom? Finally, we will consider how the
particular love of wisdom which emerged out of this comparison can inform educational
research and practice.
CHAPTER SIX: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO LOVE WISDOM?
What has emerged from the comparison of John Dewey and Simone Weil on the
love of wisdom? What has Weil evoked from Dewey, and what has Dewey brought to
light in Weil? Weil's assertion that the source of wisdom is found in work evoked a
sympathetic echo from Dewey. The Dewey school's curriculum had been centered
around and integrated by occupations. Hence, his laboratory school was examined in
more detail. It was a practical experiment implicitly focused on educating for wisdom
through work-work that attempted to combine thinking and acting through an evolving
curriculum that took a child's natural playfulness and refashioned it through the discipline
of constructive activity. It aimed to keep the drudgery of work and the foolishness of play
to a minimum. This view of work would hit home with Weil, who wondered throughout
her life how the oppressive boredom of industrial life could be transformed into
something more meaningful and j oyful. 81 With one factory owner, Weil (1936/1965a) had
tried the direct approach but failed to convince him to include more employee
81 One would think that things would be different 70 years later-not so, at least not in
some industrial firms. One ofmy son's acquaintances had spent a summer working in an
automobile assembly plant. Even though the pay was excellent and he would have easily
covered his university expenses with money to spare, he could not stomach it. Not only
was the work overwhelmingly monotonous, the drudgery had created a base culture
among the regular employees which disgusted this sensitive young man. He wanted to
leave before he was hardened to it and became a part of it. Weil (1942/1977a) had
observed: "The dreary exhaustion from factory work leaves a gaping void that clamors to
be filled. It can be filled only by rapid, violent gratifications the resulting corruption of
which is contagious for all classes of society" (pp. 71-72).
But factories in the usual sense of the word are not the only workplaces that
exhibit an assembly line structure. Witness the factory farm or the entertainment
industry. Even an independent film maker like Robert Bresson, who pursued his art with
a zeal for meticulous detail, made puppets out of his amateur actors. When asked what it
felt like to act for Bresson, one of them replied that compared to his regular occupation
-stone masonry-acting was mindless work (Dauman & Bresson, 1967).
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participation in the planning of the work. Perhaps both employers and employees had
developed rigid habits of mind that originated in the way they had been nurtured and
schooled. Dewey's educational experiment attacked this social problem indirectly: It was
designed to develop the metahabit of wisdom such that those students who eventually
became employers would invite worker participation as a matter·of course and would see
it not as a concession to workers' demands but as a necessary part of running a good
business; and those who eventually became employees would expect it as naturally as
they would expect to be paid. In both cases, they would have been trained to attack
problems courageously through a social collaboration that became second nature. In
other words, they had been educated in the method of democracy. Similarly, Weil
(1942/1977a) suggested a new type of school, the bare outlines of which correspond to
the general ideas behind Dewey's experiment:
[The school] must be conceived in an entirely new way, that it may shape men
capable of understanding the total aspects of the work in which they will be taking
part. Not that the level of theoretic studies must be lowered; rather, the contrary.
More should be done to excite intelligence to wakefulness, but at the same time
teaching must itself become more concrete. (p. 71)
Dewey's love of practical wisdom-what Garrison (1997) might call an erotic
pragmatism-brought into bold reliefWeil's passionate and unequivocal view of practice:
Bodily action was the criterion for judging the efficacy and authenticity of spiritual
values. Whatever one might think of this strange young woman, no one can dispute her
efforts to keep thinking and acting in line with each other. She is an outstanding example
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of what Freire (2004) would call a coherent teacher. As surmised in the previous chapter,
Weil would wish she had gone to the Dewey school, if only to acquire manual dexterity,
the lack of which she tried so hard in her adult life to overcome.
In this final chapter, a question remains unanswered that needs to be addressed:
What is the nature of love in its relationship to wisdom? Finally, we will suggest certain
lines of inquiry for educational research and practice.
Thinking and Acting: Ontological or Functional Distinction?
Since love is often viewed as a feeling, the relationship between thinking, acting,
and feeling will be explored beginning with Dewey's concept of sympathy. Next, we will
consider how one form of love--er6s-operates in the longing for wisdom. But first, we
need to tie up some loose ends in our analysis of the relationship between thinking and
acting, a reciprocal relationship from which wisdom emerged for both Dewey and Weil.
It aims to clarify their differences in response to an old question: Is there an ontological
distinction between thinking and acting?
A wise person not only thinks before she acts: she is thinking as she acts and after
she acts. For Weil (1955/1958), the skilled craftsperson illustrated this unity of thought
and action in a body made "fluid through habit" (p. 91). Dewey would point out that
thinking, at least thinking that had educative value, was occasioned by a disruption of
habit. A highly skilled sailor would need the challenge of navigating through a stormy
sea in order to think in the Deweyan sense. However, when one achieved the desired goal
-the fusion of thought and action-a new habit would be formed, and thinking in the
Deweyan sense would go dormant until awakened by the next disruption. If wisdom was
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good thinking embodied in coherent action, then a wise person would not wait until the
next disruption arrived in experience; she would go out in search of problems (Arlin,
1990), continually rousing her thought to wakefulness, keeping constant watch through
all her activities, cultivating attentiveness and mindfulness even in the most mundane and
routine work (Miller, 2006). A wise teacher would not be easily satisfied with
"successful" lessons, would not be easily frustrated by "unsuccessful" ones, would go out
in search of "problem" students, and would welcome honest mistakes as opportunities for
growth. A wise teacher would seek to impart this wisdom to her students, both
unconsciously by her own example and consciously by continually reconstructing the type
of learning situations described in the previous chapter.
In this dissertation, I have maintained that the concept of freedom held by both
Dewey and Weil was coeval with their concept of wisdom: Both were derived from the
harmonious union of thinking and acting. Unlike Weil, who saw this harmony as a bridge
to a wisdom in and beyond nature, Dewey described this relationship in the language of
evolutionary naturalism: Far from being ontologically distinct from action, Dewey
understood thought to be an evolving form of intraorganic action increasingly and
deliberately controlling its overt release. Thought was action conscious of itself. Even
though intelligent action was dependent ·on the thoughtful appraisal of various options
imaginatively rehearsed "in the mind," thought was dependent on action for its own
development. Without the test of action, thoughts were liable to become groundless
phantasies. From an educational perspective, this means that overt action should precede
and lay the groundwork for the development of thinking. Manipulating the symbolic
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tools of thought in reading and writing should follow from, and be connected to,
manipulating the physical tools of action in concrete, constructive work.
Although Weil appreciated how natural selection operated through the conditions
of existence, she rejected the idea that excellence could "naturally" evolve out of
mediocrity-"the imperfect cannot give rise to the perfect or the less good to the better"
(Weil, 1943/1962b, p. 44).82 In her view, thought was shaped by action, but it did not
essentially emerge from it. Action was needed to stimulate and test thought, and thought
could be awakened by action, as Dewey had shown in the problematic situation, but it did
not necessarily follow that thought was produced by action Hence, she made a slight but
decisive ontological distinction between thinking and acting even though she
acknowledged their interdependence and would accept Dewey's developmental thesis for
educational purposes, at least, up to a point.
Weil (1952-1955/1956) believed that states were ontologically prior to acts: "Acts
are only the automatic consequence of a state. But we are only able to represent them to
ourselves in the form of acts" (p. 234). If this is true, then we cannot essentially change
who we are by what we do. Therein lies a problem that Dewey would reject as unreal,
since he saw the distinction between thinking and acting as functional not ontological. If
we can only know ourselves through our actions but cannot change ourselves through our
actions, then change for the better is impossible. Dewey would reject this pessimistic
conclusion, root and branch. Of course, we cannot change our habits directly, but we can
change them indirectly by projecting our actions outward, by struggling with existent
82 This assertion is discussed in Chapter Four, footnote 46.
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conditions in problematic situations. And since the self is a bundle of habits,
reconstructing a habit, albeit indirectly, effects a change in the self which, we must
remember, is a series of dynamic events, not a static essence.
Is not Dewey correct? I can think of many instances in my own life and in the
lives of others to show that one can change for the better through deliberate actions that
modify entrenched habits of behaviour. For example, I was horribly shy as a child, and
when I had to give a public speech for the first time in elementary school, I was surprised
to discover that not only could I do it, but I could do it well. As a result, I became very
confident speaking to large groups of people. Someone who holds Weil' s position would
respond that my view of myself-my self-concept-had changed, but my underlying state of
being was the same. My act of speaking well-and subsequent successful performances
-revealed to me that I could handle myself very well in public situations in which I had
some measure of control, but my underlying shyness and social anxiety, particularly in
fluid and unpredictable social gatherings, had not disappeared. On the surface, I had
changed for the better: I had developed a latent ability that has served me well.
Underneath, though, had I really changed? Were there not limits in my self, whether one
called it a state of being or an organized series of events, that could not be changed? To
use Jungian language, an introvert can compensate for shyness, developing a role than
functions well in social situations, but this must be balanced with times of solitude
whereby I can "recharge my batteries." Can an introvert whose energy is depleted in
social gatherings become an extrovert who derives energy from socializing? Or to look at
it from another angle, did not my actions reveal a state which sought to control situations
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so as to lessen anxiety? And would not Dewey be willing to concede that this is my
variation of the human condition which seeks to control the precarious through intelligent
action in existent conditions?
For the sake of argument, let us grant Weil her assumption: If my actions follow
automatically without exception from my state of being, then my actions cannot change
my state. How can my state of being be changed so that the actions which flow from it
reveal that change? As Weil (1987) hinted in her student dissertation, the fact that she is
conscious of the lack of power over herself not only implies an ontological distinction
between thought and action, it offers a glimmer of hope. This echoes the traditional
Christian position which begins with a call to contemplate this miserable condition, a
misery that is easy to ignore when things go well, as Weil (1956) asserts: "Human misery
is not created by the extreme affliction that falls upon some human beings; it is only
revealed by it" (p. 262). Contemplation of my miserable state-which for Weil is "the
only source of supernatural felicity" (p. 232)-involves examining every act "from the
point of view not of the object, but of the impulse" (p. 230). This self-appraisal (which is
careful not to fall into the trap of introspection) initiates an attentive, patient, incessant
desire for a redemptive grace that lies beyond my control. It is a faith expressed in
negative form:
To believe that nothing of what we are able to grasp is God .... that our power to
grasp is not the criterion of reality, but on the contrary is deceptive. To believe,
finally, that what lies beyond our grasp appears nevertheless-hidden. (p. 220)
As noted in the previous chapter, Weil would give the Dewey school's program a
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different accent. The emphasis on solving concrete problems would remain, but the
student's ability to attend to things-whether problematic or not-would be encouraged to
develop in two dimensions at once: increasing the power of manipulating concrete things
and abstract concepts; and, in and through the effort aimed at manipulation, increasing the
ability of attending to a reality that could not be manipulated. In this type of education,
the impulse to grasp would be tempered by, and enfolded within, an awe, wonder, and
love for that which could not be grasped.
This was not character education conceived as an extra- or cocurricular activity. It
was the heart of a school which sought to cultivate an attitude whereby certain actions
would automatically follow. In this regard, Weil (1952-1955/1956) needs to be quoted
again at some length:
The poet produces beauty by fixing his attention on something real. The act of
love is produced in the same way. To know that this man, who is cold and
hungry, really exists as much as I do myself, and is really cold and hungry - that is
enough, the rest follows of itself. The pure and authentic values - truth, beauty,
and goodness - in a human being's activity are the result of one single and self-
same act, a certain application of the attention at its fullest to the object. Teaching
should have no other aim but to prepare, by training the attention, for the
possibility of such an act. All the other advantages of instruction are without
interest. (p. 449)
Notice how Weil describes the application of the attention as an "act." Is she being
inconsistent? No. To repeat, the invisible reality of a "state" can be pointed to only via
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the visible reality of "acts" which correspond to it. Then, is she not defining thought in
Deweyan terms? Yes and no. Weil's thinking is active, but it is a radically different type
of action. Deweyan thinking is an instrumental activity that envisions a chronological
sequence of actions and consequences: It imagines, and aims at, making changes to
existent conditions. Weil's attentive thinking is a noninstrumental, nonlinear activity in
that it focuses on an object without regard to ends or means; it aims at understanding
something without necessarily changing it. From this, Weil believed that certain overt
actions follow which are true, beautiful, and good.
What Is the Nature of Love in Its Relationship to Wisdom?
However, Dewey's instrumental form of thinking was not simply cool calculation
devoid of emotion. Thinking was connected to acting through feeling, affection, and
sympathy. Thought, especially when directed towards making a moral judgment (an
essential part of wisdom) "must at least be colored with feeling if it is to influence
behavior .... Affection, from intense love to mild favor, is an ingredient in all operations
of knowledge, all full apprehension of the good" (Dewey & Tufts, 1932/1989, p. 269).
Sympathy, that is, literally having feelings in common with others, functions to carry
thought beyond self-interest: "It is sympathy which saves consideration of consequences
from degenerating into mere calculation, by rendering vivid the interests of others and
urging us to give them the same weight as those which touch our own honor, purse, and
power." (p. 270). Dewey's concept of sympathy was robust enough that-however
essential it was in coloring thoughts and providing the motive force for moral action-it
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never became an isolated sentimental impulse. 83 Surprisingly, sympathy was the most
effective intellectual tool in solving complex problems (p. 270). Through sympathy, one
could imagine being in the shoes of another person-an essential starting point for
understanding the interests of others in pursuing the common good. Dewey's view
resonates with Ardelt's (2004) concern that the Berlin group of wisdom researchers are
engaged in "cold cognition."
Nevertheless, can sympathy motivate me to stick out my neck for the common
good? Will my sympathy for others and my commitment to the common good be strong
enough to accept any diminution of my "honor, purse, or power"? Dewey (1934/1960)
understood implicitly that a willingness to attend to the interests of others at the possible
expense of one's own required an adherence to an ideal whose actualization demanded an
allegiance which was religious in nature. And nature provided many examples of such
fierce loyalty-a mother bear protecting her cubs, a son defending his father's honour, a
soldier risking her life for home and country, a martyr accepting death rather than
renouncing her faith. How could the energy bound up in these narrower loyalties be
drafted into the service of wider ones? How could one discern when a narrower loyalty
could indirectly serve a wider one? For example, British Prime Minister Chamberlain's
attempt to negotiate with Hitler in 1939 was an appeal to a wider loyalty-world peace.
83 The following illustration demonstrates how employing sympathy in a Deweyan
fashion is difficult. In one of my graduate courses, a professor tried and failed to elicit
sympathy for the plight of African boy-soldiers. Rather than being inordinately callous,
my fellow students were put off by an emotional appeal isolated from any attempt to
rigorously uncover the political and social context in which the abduction of children
occurred. Of course, such "rigor" can be used to explain away a situation and absolve
oneself of any responsibility in the matter.
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Yet, the wiser course of action (in hindsight) was more indirect. World peace without
tyranny meant cultivating a militant Churchillian nationalism that harnessed the energies
of various countries to defeat a common enemy. Nevertheless, the religious fervor of
Nazism serves as a caution to any who think they are immune to the power of collective
force. Plato was acutely aware of this power and defined courage as preserving "the
conviction, inculcated by lawfully established education, about the sort of things which
may be rightly feared" (Cornford, 1945, p. 123). If even the wisest of the Germans
(Heidegger was a party member) were blinded by this fierce loyalty or lacked the courage
to resist it (Bonhoeffer was a notable exception), then what hope is there in cultivating a
love of wisdom which knows what to fear in an age of terrorism?
Collectivities and Communities
Following Plato, Weil believed that loving wisdom involved cultivating a courage
which had a realistic fear of how social collectivities (such as political parties, organized
religions, or even scientific communities) could enslave thinking. The religious symbols
which served to inspire loyalty to a collectivity in the modern age-liberty, equality,
democracy-were so often empty abstractions soaked in blood.84 Even though Weil was
closer to the ideological demons85 that wrapped themselves around modern collectivities
in wartime Europe, Dewey could also perceive a type of absolutism in Marxist thought
and an oppressive dictatorship in the Soviet Union during a time (the 1930s) when many
84 Weil's (1937/1977e) discussion in "The Power of Words" foreshadows Orwell.
85 Grant (1973) defined ideologies as "surrogate religions pretending they are
philosophies" (p. 195).
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American intellectuals could not or would not (Westbrook, 1991, pp. 469-476).
Both Weil and Dewey were committed to the ideal of a society made up of
interlocking communities. Unlike a collectivity which was composed of individuals
bound together by vague abstractions funneled through media propaganda, communities
were bound by concrete, particular, face-to-face ties among individuals who could
experience an unsentimental sympathy for each other. Most of us live in some mixture of
the two. Nevertheless, the number of face-to-face interactions that individual human
beings can experience is finite. When Dewey espoused growth as an experience that
opened up ever-widening connections, did he take this limit seriously enough? If one
pushes beyond that limit while maintaining some semblance of social order, it seems
necessary to let go of participatory democracy (as Lippman argued)86 and submit to the
iron grip of a bureaucracy composed of experts-a "rational" social hierarchy often
cloaked by certain compe~satory feeling-states. Two come immediately to mind: (a) a
pseudomysticism which gives an individual the intoxicating feeling that she is part of a
great and very powerful social organism or (b) an escapist culture which provides relief
from a cold, calculating instrumentalism and seduces the individual with various forms of
entertaining distractions or mind-numbing addictions. Is it possible for democratic
communities to interlock without becoming submerged and fragmented in a wider
collective? It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to consider this question. It is a
variation of the question that Dewey (1927/1954) could not answer: How can the public
find itself in an age of globalization?
86 See Chapter Four, footnote 49.
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The above diatribe against mass society may seem to imply that face-to-face
communities automatically create places where individuals can breathe the air of love,
acceptance, and freedom. Nothing could be further from the truth. For example, the
modern motif of authenticity has become a cliche: In the attempt to escape an overly
restrictive rural community where everyone knows each other, a person embraces the
freedom of finding her true self in the anonymity offered by a large city. Or another
person seeks to escape the face-to-face despair of an urban ghetto where meaning can be
found only in the fraternal bonds of a street gang. And every teacher knows that her
classroom community is vulnerable to the oppression of cliques and bullies.
Nevertheless, even though the problem of democracy in a mass society has not
been solved, Dewey had demonstrated in his laboratory school that intentionally creating
a face-to-face democratic community was possible through a certain type of educational
experience. It was here that a child's social impulses could be intentionally directed
towards developing an unsentimental sympathy for others, instead of being left to chance
and vulnerable to the collective power of her peers. As described in the previous chapter,
the social impulses were directed and nurtured through the discipline of work that
connected thinking with acting.
Plato's Symposium and the Meaning ofLove
If wisdom emerges from the reciprocal relationship between thought and action,
then the feeling that one lacks such reciprocity can supply the motive power for seeking
wisdom. Understood this way, loving wisdom means longing for something which one
lacks. If this is true, then educating for a "Deweilian" love of wisdom entails cultivating
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a longing in the student for the most harmonious relationship between her thinking and
acting. She both longs to test her ideas in action and to make sense of the actions
observed. The wise do not seek wisdom, for they already have it. By the same token,
those who do not know that they lack wisdom do not long for it either. The educator's
job is to maintain and increase this longing in those who already have it and to stir it up in
those who do not. Plato (1942) pulls no punches: "For herein is the evil of ignorance,
that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no
desire for that of which he feels no want" (p. 195). Following Plato, Garrison (1997)
calls this longing or desiring form of love, eros: "Teachers desire to educate the eros of
their students to passionately desire what is truly good" (p. xiv). Obviously, Dewey and
Weil consider wisdom to be "truly good."
Garrison (1997) explicates Dewey's philosophy of eros and shows how it can
operate in education. He begins with a Deweyan critique of the Symposium (Plato, 1942).
As far as we know, the Symposium is the first recorded attempt to think systematically
about the nature of love. Before considering how Garrison uses it to construct a Deweyan
theory of love in education, this ancient dialogue will be reviewed with help from Simone
Weil and others.
In its original sense, a symposium is a dinner party. The young poet Agathon has
invited a number of his friends to his home to celebrate the successful performance of his
first tragedy. It is decided that the after-dinner conversation should focus on love and that
each person should deliver an extemporaneous speech on the topic. Six participants take
turns in the following order: Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryxmachus, Aristophanes, Agathon,
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and Socrates. Except for the first speaker, each oration builds on, and responds to, what
has gone before.
Phaedrus begins by asserting that love is the oldest of the gods. Love is a mighty
god, for "love will make men dare to die for their beloved-love alone, and women as well
as men" (Plato, 1942, p. 167). The next speaker, Pausanias, argues that love should not
be praised indiscriminately: There are basically two kinds of love which are distinguished
by their object: One is transitory, seeking satisfaction in physical appearances which are
constantly in flux; the other is constant, seeking the inner beauty of another's soul. It is
only those loves which are noble and constant which are worthy of praise. For example,
the novelist Jane Austen portrayed this kind of love through the heroine of Mansfield
Park, Fanny Price. This working-class woman spurns the vain affections of a charming,
wealthy suitor even though she has no other hope of escaping her wretched poverty and
her miserable family circumstances.
Taking this idea of two kinds of love, the third speaker, Eryxmachus, uses his
knowledge of the physician's art to point to another love that reconciles them:
Medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of
the body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best physician is he who is able
to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows
how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can
reconcile the most hostile elements in the constitution and make them loving
friends, is a skillful practitioner. (Plato, 1942, p. 175)
Notice how Eryxmachus subtly changes the ontological frame of the discussion. Where
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Pausanias saw two kinds of love that seemed irreconcilable, Eryxmachus sees the
possibility of harmonizing them and claims that this possibility is pursued by every artist
in all branches of knowledge. This idea foreshadows the "well-tempered harmony" of the
just soul described in the Republic (Cornford, 1945, p. 142). It is elaborated by Lewis
(1960/2002), who describes four loves-affection, friendship, eros, and charity. In
Lewis's account, it is under the tutelage of supernatural charity that the three other natural
loves find that for which they are fitted-their good.
Aristophanes (apparently the same person who wrote many comedies, including a
satire of Socrates)87 returns to the power of love and explains the origin of this power in
the myth of androgynous beings. These amalgams of men-women had two faces, four
arms, and four feet and were so powerful that they attempted to attack the gods
themselves. Zeus punished them by splitting each of them into separate genders-male
and female. The power of love is shown by the desire each human has of finding and
embracing the other half: "Human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and
the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love" (Plato, 1942. p. 182). Is not love of
wisdom characterized by an openness to the whole of a situation?
Youthful Agathon is next, and he begins by announcing his disagreement with the
first speaker, Phaedrus: Love is the youngest, not the oldest of the gods. As such, he is
also the tenderest and most flexible,
87 Weil (1951/1957) is intrigued by the fact that Plato includes Aristophanes in this
dialogue: "Plato had the gravest motives for resenting him because of his cruel mockeries
and injustices towards Socrates which were perhaps not without influence upon the
verdict of the trial [of Socrates]" (p. 106).
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for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his
way into and out of every soul of man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility
and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an
especial manner the attribute of Love. (p. 185)
Agathon emphasizes that aspect of love which Weil embraced in Christ: "He can neither
do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man; for he suffers not by force if he
suffers; force comes not near to him, neither when he acts does he act by force" (p. 186).
Finally, Agathon asserts that love is the source of all creative work and that the best art is
inspired and enlightened by love. Weil (1940/1977c) completely agreed with this
conclusion and believed that this love, which was totally inimical to force, inspired the
author of the Iliad, the hero of which, ironically, is force.
Before he begins his speech, Socrates questions Agathon in his usual, relentless
style-pushing Agathon to think clearly about how he is defining and using his terms. Is
love not always a love of something rather than a love of nothing? Yes. Does not this
mean that love desires something that he does not have, because if he had it he would be
content and not desire it? Yes.
Would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?
Certainly not. Then would you still say that love is beautiful? ... I fear that I did
not understand what I was saying .... Is not the good also the beautiful? Yes.
Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good? I cannot refute you,
Socrates .... Say rather, beloved Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth; for
Socrates is easily refuted. (Plato, 1942, p. 192)
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Socrates then goes on to recount how, when he was younger, he had thought about love
much like Agathon and had been subjected to a similar type of questioning by Diotima, a
wise woman who became his teacher on the subject. According to Weil (1951/1957),
"her sex, the circumstances and the words pertaining to initiation and mystery which she
ceaselessly employs, show sufficiently that [Socrates] is talking of a priestess of the
Eleusinian religion" (p. 124).
Diotima defines love not as a god but as an intermediary daimon or spirit who is
neither immortal nor mortal but is a mean between divinity and humanity, wisdom, and
Ignorance:
He is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him
all is ,bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and priest, their
sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their
way. For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and
concourse of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom
which understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and
handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. (Plato, 1942, pp. 193-194)
The last sentence brings us up short: The wisdom of arts and handicrafts is common,
inferior, crude, and coarse?! Here, both Dewey and Weil would point out a basic flaw in
ancient Greek thinking: the disparagement of skilled and manual labour. As we have
clearly shown, neither Dewey nor Weil shared this contempt. On the contrary, as Dewey
put his hopes in the amalgam of thinking and making that he saw operating in
technological development, so Weillonged to see a society whose spiritual core consisted
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of physical work. Nevertheless, our civilization has inherited the Greek attitude, spurring
technological innovation with the aim of eliminating labour and creating leisure.
However, a more congenial interpretation of Diotima's dire pronouncement
comes to mind when teachers-as-mere-technicians are distinguished from teachers-as-
wholistic-educators. Is not the wisdom associated with technical expertise often
denigrated in comparison to the wisdom associated with what Wirsing (1972) has called
wholistic teaching?
In a technological society, where specialized knowledge and skill often serve as
the dominant educational focal points, the world-view that is subtly promoted to
the young tends increasingly to be one of a fragmented world. The student (or
teacher) who beholds the world as fragmented sees as relevant only that
knowledge which is applicable to the field of specialized interest. He views all
else as irrelevant and unnecessary. Therefore, I am proposing that the extent of
educational relevance perceived by an individual student is directly proportionate
to the dimensions of his world-view. In this light, the ultimate function of a
teacher - as distinguished from that of a mere technician - is the progressive
enlargement of the student's world of relevancy. This aim, of course, presupposes
the progressive enlargement of the teacher's own world. (p. 87)
This does not mean that technical expertise should be avoided-far from it. The teaching
techniques essential for mass schooling-elassroom management, instructional planning,
outcome assessment, and so on-need to be taken seriously. They should be appropriately
employed and questioned by a love of wisdom that supersedes specialized knowledge and
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skills and cultivates an openness to the whole of which these particular domains form a
part. A "Deweilian" love of wisdom would question the very structure of a school system
which requires such techniques as behaviour modification and standardized testing: It
would ask whether a better structure could be built which encouraged the development of
different teaching techniques, less dependent on artificial incentives and more
meaningfully connected to the joy and discipline of intelligent work.
Let us return to the Symposium, where we see Diotima explaining the origin of
love with another myth. Love is the child of Poverty and Plenty. Like his mother
(Poverty), he is poor, homeless, and always in distress; like his father (Plenty), he is bold
and resourceful, a keen hunter in pursuit of wisdom. He is in the intermediate position
between having wisdom and lacking it. Like the speakers before him, Socrates in his
youth had confused love of the object with the object itself-wisdom, truth, beauty,
goodness (Plato, 1942).
Through further questioning, Diotima helps Socrates to see that all humans desire
the good which they believe will make them happy. Whatever path they take, whatever
interest they pursue, they do so in the belief that the thing pursued is worth possessing.
But to truly desire the good, one must be open to the fact that the object pursued may not
ultimately satisfy. The good that one seeks may be elsewhere. As Weil (1962/1974b)
explains:
We are well aware that the good which we possess at present, in the form of
wealth, power, consideration, friends, the love of those we love, the well-being of
those we love, and so on, is not sufficient; yet we believe that on the day when we
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get a little more we shall be satisfied. We believe this because we lie to ourselves.
If we really reflect for a moment we know it is false. Or again, if we are suffering
illness, poverty, or misfortune, we think we shall be satisfied on the day when it
ceases. But there too, we know it is false; so soon as one has got used to not
suffering one wants something else .... We have only to imagine all our desires
satisfied; after a time we should become discontented. We should want
something else and we should be miserable through not knowing what to want. (p.
75)
Once this is realized, one is in the position of having desire turned towards something
that cannot be grasped-the soul consents to be oriented towards grace. "We need not ask
ourselves how to have love, it is in us from birth to death, imperious as hunger. We need
only to know in what direction to direct it" (Weil, 1951/1957, p. 109). In her departure
from (or perhaps, her development of) what is taught in the Symposium, Weil
(1950/1970) asserted that, unlike other desires which can be distinguished from their
objects, the desire for good is itself a good:
But whereas all other desires are sometimes effective and sometimes not,
according to circumstances, this one desire is always effective. The reason is that,
whereas desire for gold is not the same thing as gold, the desire for good is itself a
good. (p. 316)
In other words, loving wisdom is not only an intermediary between lacking and
possessing, it is both at the same time. It resembles a Buddhist koan: "This desire is not
fulfilled, since it is itself the good. It is not unfulfilled, since it is itself the good" (Weil,
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1950/1970, p. 317). It is analogous to Weil's (1950/1959) conception of friendship as a
"supernatural harmony, a union of opposites" (p. 154).88 By having eros entwined with a
philia defined as a union of opposites, a philosopher is a loving friend of wisdom.
Diotima concludes by describing how a person can be educated to desire absolute
goodness, beauty, truth, and wisdom. The educator begins with the desire that a young
person already possesses, in whatever direction it is aimed, because "even when it is
wrongly directed it is still the potentiality of good" (Weil, 1950/1970. p. 322). Dewey
viewed these desires as natural impulses that functioned as starting points and building
blocks for education. The end-in-view is "birth in beauty, whether of body or soul"
(Plato, 1940, p. 197). Implicit in this quest is the desire to be remembered long after one
has died. In the body, this is accomplished through one's children, but this memory is
short lived. The hope of "immortality" or having one's name praised for a much longer
time can better be achieved through some memorable deed or work of art which is the
progeny of one's soul. But educating eros will fail if it stops there. If the student
consents, the teacher helps turn her desire away from the fame that sometimes comes with
creating a beautiful artifact, turning it towards beauty itself-first as seen in one particular
thing, then as seen more generally in many things, until finally
he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant
in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, ... but drawing
towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and
noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; ... beholding beauty
88 See Chapter Four for Weil's conception of friendship.
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with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty,
but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth
and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and immortal, if mortal
man may. (p. 202, 203)
And even here, as Weil (1950/1970) maintains, "inspiration is not desired for the sake of
producing beautiful things, but there is a desire to produce beautiful things because
inspiration is the source of the things that are truly beautiful" (p. 308). Although Garrison
(1997) in Deweyan fashion eschews the supernatural and mystical elements of the
Symposium, he nevertheless recommends a similar path: "Determining the difference
between possibilities that one immediately desires and those that are genuinely desirable
is the very essence of educating eros" (p. xvi).
As Socrates ends his speech, the symposium is interrupted by the arrival of a
drunken Alcibiades. After being welcomed and offered a place at the table, Alcibiades is
invited to contribute to the discussion, but instead of praising love, he praises Socrates! It
seems that Plato (1942) included this eulogy to illustrate how the love of wisdom was
embodied in the life of his beloved teacher. So concludes the Symposium.
Interpreting Plato
How should one interpret the Symposium regarding love and its relationship to
wisdom? One way is to focus on the message of Diotima and to view the preceding
speakers as clearing the ground for the climactic and final word on the subject. This
seems to be Garrison's approach. It implies that the other five speakers have nothing of
importance to contribute and that Plato is merely using them to enhance Socrates' oration,
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which is nothing other than a recitation of what he has learned from Diotima. Garrison
(1997) pulls no punches: "Ironically, Plato made his teacher Socrates passively recite
lessons learned from a woman, a deliberate and sinister irony because of the oppressed
status of Greek women" (p. 13). He goes on to explain how Plato was a prisoner of his
sexist times. If this is true, then Plato is making fun of his teacher-Socrates is merely a
mouthpiece for a woman! This makes no sense to me, especially in view of the fact that
Plato could imagine the best state as being one in which no distinction was made between
men and women regarding their natural gifts and competencies. With the obvious
exceptions of child-bearing and breast-feeding, all occupations along with the requisite
training or education were open to both genders in Plato's Republic (Cornford, 1945, pp.
144-155).89
89 Martin (1982) points out that Plato's gender inclusion is problematic, particularly when
one tries to work out the practical details involved in establishing his ideal educational
program: "Even if Plato does provide equal access to education and equal role
opportunity for women, we cannot assume that women will therefore achieve equality of
role occupancy or, if they do, that they will be accorded equal respect and receive equal
treatment" (p. 295). In her view, the main problem is that women would be inculcated
into an educational system that was biased toward developing masculine ways of
thinking. For example, since primary education focused on stories that celebrated heroic
deeds, Socrates neglected to caution his friends about "exposing children to stories which
perpetuate traditional attitudes towards women" (p. 292). It is probably unfair to expect
Plato to have been aware of the dynamics of gender construction as we understand it
today, but ifhe had been, he would not have been forced to create ex nihilo stories about
exemplary women. As Vlastos (1994) observes, "Homer and tragedy present a gallery of
distinguished women who rise as high above ordinary females as do its heroic males
above the mass of men" (p. 18). Weil herself was enamored by Sophocles's Antigone,
and she recounted the story of this extraordinary woman in a factory newsletter, the first
in a projected series of articles which were intended to acquaint workers with the best of
Greek poetry (Petrement, 1973/1976, p. 263).
Furthermore, Martin's claim that Plato's educational program reinforced traits
traditionally regarded as male can be disputed. For example, Brown (1994) argues that
Plato attempted to subvert the masculine discourse of his day: "Those who love and are
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Unlike Garrison, Weil does not make Diotima's teaching the centrepiece of her
reading. In her commentary on the Symposium (Weil, 1951/1957, pp. 106-131), each
speaker is viewed as describing a different aspect of Platonic love. Drawing parallels
with ancient myths, Greek tragedy, and Christianity, Weil takes a dialectical approach in
her interpretation: Love is ancient, yet refreshingly youthful-it is forever young. Love is
both God and the mediator between humans and God, between nature and that which is
beyond nature. Love is the great physician, healing the wounds of evil, restoring harmony
in body and soul, aiding each to find its good-that for which it is best fitted-and
redeeming humanity to its original unity and wholeness. Love is a fluid, graceful spirit
that operates unseen, flowing in and flowing out. At the same time, it is reliable,
trustworthy, and constant. Force cannot overpower love, and love does not suffer force
except through consent. Love will not operate in the human soul without a part of the
soul (however small) consenting to this operation. Unlike force which naturally extends
its domain wherever it has the power to do so, recognizing no limit except that imposed
from without, love always acts with restraint and only by consent. However, except for
the part of the soul which is able to consent to love, an individual is completely
vulnerable to the operation of force in all its forms-physical, psychological, or social.
Love enlightens the intellect and inspires the artist. In its desire for wisdom and
beauty, love is already wise and beautiful. Expressed in the enthusiastic synergy that
deserving of philosophy will not be regarded as real men by their Greek peers. They will
abrogate the 'macho' posturing and much of the misogyny constitutive of Greek
manhood, and they will be disparaged in gendered terms by their peers in doing so" (p.
173).
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unites our thoughts with our actions, love of wisdom is the philia of philosophy. Love
provides the joy which energizes our thoughts, propelling them to be expressed and tested
in practice. Without it, education atrophies and learning cannot take place:
It is not the natural capacity, the congenital gift, nor is it the effort, the will, the
work, which in the intelligence has sway over the energy capable of making it
fully efficacious. It is uniquely the desire, the desire for beauty. This desire,
given a certain degree of intensity and of purity, is the same thing as genius. At
all levels it is the same thing as attention. If this were understood, the conception
of teaching would be quite other than it is. First one would realize that the
intelligence functions only in joy. Intelligence is perhaps even the only one of our
faculties to which joy is indispensable. The absence ofjoy asphyxiates it. (Weil,
1951/1957, p. 123)
Weil's (1952-1955/1956) concept ofjoy is at least as robust as Dewey's unsentimental
sympathy, for it refuses to console itself with comforting fantasies: "Joy is the fullness of
the sentiment of the real. But to suffer while preserving the sentiment of the real is
better" (p. 222). Inasmuch as it created an environment where students confronted real
problems-suffering through the confusion of ambiguous situations and persevering
through the difficult steps of defining and solving problems-the Dewey school nourished
the joy of learning and cultivated a love for wisdom.
By using the Symposium as his starting point for constructing a theory on how to
educate for an eros of wisdom, Garrison (1997) seems to imply a sympathy between
Dewey and Plato. This is certainly not his intention. But before we look at his Deweyan
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critique and supposed reconstruction of Plato, let us examine whether his notion of
educational love can be harmonized with the one described by Weil above. Thus, by this
indirect route we should be able to compare the views of Dewey and Weil on the meaning
of love in its relationship to wisdom and education.
Garrison (1997) explicates Dewey's unsentimental sympathy and shows how it
functions within an erotic education and relates it to certain feminist notions on the ethics
of care. In Dewey's wholistic view of experience, thought was literally unthinkable
without sensing, feeling, intuition, or emotion. Similarly, a work of art expressed a
balance between integrative emotion and discriminating intellect-a balance that was
sometimes difficult to achieve: "Insufficient emotion shows itself in a coldly 'correct'
product. Excessive emotion obstructs the necessary elaboration and definition of parts"
(Dewey, 1934/1979, p. 70). So, too, teachers are called to be artists who balance
calculating intellect with sympathetic feeling, using sympathy as an intellectual tool to
serve each of their students with loving attention-knowing how to "read" their students,
not allowing excessive emotion to obscure clear thinking, nor allowing a cool
professional stance to overrule a warm, personal concern. Like Kestenbaum (2002),
Garrison (p. 56) writes of attentive love, citing Iris Murdoch, who, in turn, was indebted
to Simone Wei1.90 In her description of a mother-in-law (M) attempting to "read" her
daughter-in-law (D) correctly (despite Ms initial disapproval ofD as a mate for her son),
Murdoch (1985) illustrates not only Weil's concept of attention (which is her intention),
but could just as well be describing Dewey's unsentimental sympathy or Garrison's
90 See Chapter One, footnote 13.
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loving bestowal: "What M is ex hypothesi attempting to do is not just to see D accurately
but to see her justly or lovingly.... Freedom is ... a function of the progressive attempt
to see a particular object clearly" (p. 23). And seeing an object or a person clearly
requires loving attention.
Yet, Garrison's (1997) concept of loving bestowal goes beyond understanding a
student as she now presents herself. It is that, but it also imagines what she might
become:
Teaching is a moral art that requires the greatest degree of practical wisdom.
Wisdom is beyond systematic and proven knowledge of actual existing facts and
truths; it is even beyond knowledge of what could possibly exist. Practical
wisdom requires insight into those possible values that ought to exist if we are all
to live the good life. Wisdom demands that we understand not only what we
should call into existence, but how to do it. Finally, wisdom requires insight into
what needs calling out of existence. (p. 78)
Garrison gives teachers excellent illustrations of how to make this love of wisdom
concrete. For example, he uses Cynthia Voigt's Jackeroo to show how an encounter
with good children's literature can cultivate a love for wisdom, because "deliberating on
the consequences of vicarious action is a relatively safe and secure way of educating eros"
(p. 146). More concretely, it means seeing the possibility of growth in a student whom
others have "written off." It is bestowing value on an ll-year-old boy, lovingly attending
to what he presents, and thereby being able to perceive a certain type of intelligence when
all the "scientific" evidence yielded by psychological testing indicates otherwise (pp. 178-
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200).
If Garrison's loving bestowal is based on a radical reconstruction of the
Symposium, it is difficult to see why such a reconstruction is necessary. Aside from
references to the supernatural found both in the Symposium and in Weil's reading of it, he
seems to agree with Weil's interpretation. Bringing into existence good values is a
modern rendering of Diotima's "giving birth in beauty," is it not? Indeed, Garrison
(1997) claims that "for Dewey, unlike for Plato, both prophecy, in the sense of Diotima's
practice, and poetry, in Diotima's sense of 'calling into existence' are parts of the love of
wisdom" (p. 132). But notice, unlike Weil, Garrison employs selective interpretation, for
he pits the author (Plato) against one of the characters of his own dialogue. Since
Diotima corrects Socrates's either/or logic and leads him to see love as an intermediary
between ignorance and wisdom, being more of a "both/and" than an "either/or," Garrison
does not draw the conclusion that seems obvious to me: Plato, like Socrates, has
embraced Diotima's teaching. By assuming that Socrates and Plato had not transcended
either/or thinking, Garrison blames Plato's legacy for modem "technocratic either/or
logic" which often "can block our ability to perceive our students' present needs." (p. 5).
Garrison seems to be using the Plato partially revealed in the Symposium to assail
the Plato portrayed by Dewey. Dewey (1920/1948, 1929a, 1929b) relentlessly attacks the
idea that there exists an unchanging realm beyond nature or experience in which perfect
beauty, truth, wisdom, and goodness dwell. If one has read these diatribes and Garrison's
intensified interpretations of them, one is effectively inoculated against the contagion of
Plato, assuming that one has not read Plato first. How could one be interested in reading
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more about a "static supernaturalism" or a vision which "drowns all uniqueness and
particularity" (Garrison, 1997, pp. 16, 17)? The following passage seems to put the final
nail in the coffin of Plato's corpse:
All values become homogeneous and intersubstitutable on the way to Platonic
perfection. Nothing is irreplaceable. Everything differs only in quantity. Value
judgment becomes simply a matter of calculation. If there are qualitative
differences, they do not matter much since all values are positioned on a hierarchy
that measures values along a common ruler. The values above are greater than
those below. The ruler terminates in "the Good" that exists absolutely and
lifelessly apart from all that suffers change. It may only be contemplated
dispassionately with the detached soul of pure rationality. Philosopher kings have
knowledge of this value ruler; that is why Plato believes they should rule. Few
teachers view their students so dispassionately. (Garrison, p. 17)
Indeed! But if WeiI's reading of Plato has any merit, then Garrison has set up a straw
man that looks more like a Kantian ideal than a Platonic form. Furthermore, to say that
"all values become homogeneous" is to read Plato through the eyes of modern
technological science which, as Dewey (1929b) approvingly noted, "disregards the
qualitative heterogeneity of experienced objects so as to make them all members in one
comprehensive homogeneous scheme, and hence capable of translation or conversion one
into another" (p. 133).91 Grant (1982) has remarked that we moderns find it extremely
91 In The Quest/or Certainty, Dewey (1929b) argues that since the heterogeneity of
experienced objects rests upon a homogeneous scheme that can be manipulated, humans
should be able to secure moral goods as they have been able to secure physical goods.
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difficult to understand Plato's Republic "because most German and English scholars
have, for the last two centuries, read it through Kantian eyes (a great darkening) and
Catholics through Aristotelian eyes (better, but still a darkening)" (p. 108).92 Were
Dewey's attacks on Plato misdirected shots at Kant's noumenal realm which was
inaccessible to experience? In Weil's reading of Plato, the Good is beyond being but not
beyond experience and is accessible through a certain type of education. Later in his life,
as he progressively shook off the influence of Kant and Hegel, did Dewey interpret Plato
differently? How else are we to understand his own admission at the age of 70 that Plato
was his favourite philosopher "whose highest flight of metaphysics always terminated
with a social and practical turn" (Dewey, 1932/1989b, p. 155)? However, a few years
later he seemed to contradict himself: "Plato's ladder is, moreover, a one-way ascent;
there is no return from the highest beauty to perceptual experience" (Dewey, 1934/1979,
p.291). As if in response to Dewey and Garrison, Murdoch (1985) writes:
Plato seems to imply that the road towards the Good leads away from the world of
particularity and detail. However, he speaks of a descending as well as an
ascending dialectic and he speaks of a return to the cave .... This double
revelation of both random detail and intuited unity is what we receive in every
sphere of life if we seek for what is best. (p. 95)
For Murdoch as for Weil, Plato is closer to the Deweyan "both/and" than to the Kantian
92 Simpson and Johnson (2002) support my position that Garrison's eros is very close to
Plato's and that his denigration of Plato is misplaced: "Rather than being unsympathetic,
unimaginative, and unresponsive to the needs of the student, the Platonic teacher must
have an intimate understanding of each student." (p. 239).
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"either/or."
We are far from settling the controversy on how best to read Plato, and it is well
beyond the scope of this dissertation to attempt it. Nevertheless, Dewey and Weil seem
to share a common conception of love. Weil is more explicit, but Garrison has uncovered
Dewey's conception in a way that similarly promises to restore the love of wisdom in
teaching.
Different Directions?
This leaves us with Walsh's (1993) criticism of Dewey.93 Did Dewey hide his
philosophy of love out of embarrassment? Is his desire for wisdom oriented in the same
direction as Weil's? Dewey directs his love towards the existent world, the here-and-
now, so he seems to "love the world" in the way that Walsh argues should form the basis
of the highest values in education. Weil aims her love towards the existent world less
directly-it seems to oscillate between becoming and being, between a here-and-now and a
beyond, between nature and supemature. In doing this, she implicitly claims that desire
so directed is able to love the existent world more truly than one aimed only at the world
as naturally conceived. Yet, Dewey's gaze also oscillates between imagined possibilities
and experienced actualities, between ideal aspirations which can never possibly exist in
their purest forms and real existents which can be refashioned, increasing the possibility
that better approximations of desired ideals may come into existence.
As Garrison (1997) points out, Dewey's love bestows value on the objects of
experience. And if Walsh's (1993, p. 109) view of Dewey is correct, these objects
93 See Chapter One.
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(whether persons or things) have no value in themselves. This seems to be an unkind
characterization in the light of all we have discussed. Nevertheless, there is an ambiguity
in Dewey's natural piety: On the one hand, he is willing to suppose that nature exhibits
moral traits; on the other hand, all of nature is seen to be, actually or potentially, at our
disposal through the methods of modern science: "It is material to act upon so as to
transform it into new objects which better answer our needs" (Dewey, 1929b, p. 100). If
something is seen to be completely at one's disposal, how can one love it? If love is
characterized by restraint and consent, then how could it possibly operate in a
technological science that acknowledges no limits in its incessant drive to reshape a
nature that cannot give or withhold consent?
How can moral traits infuse nature then? Dewey's metaphysics provides the
answer. Since human beings are completely at one with nature, and since they experience
moral traits, then those traits must be present in nature as a whole, finding their most self-
conscious expression in human action: "The intelligent activity of man is not something
brought to bear upon nature from without; it is nature realizing its own potentialities in
behalf of a fuller and wider issue of events" (Dewey, 1929b, pp. 214-215). By the same
token, nature has no independent moral status outside of our experience or potential
experience. Objects of our experience are essentially indistinguishable from our
experience of them. Strictly speaking, objects qua objects do not exist except insofar as
they function as conceptualizations which we construct in our concourse with
experienced events. Outside of our experience of them, they cannot be known "in
themselves." Insofar as we can manipulate these objects through instrumental reasoning,
255
so far do we know them. In seeking to know them, they are at our disposal, like our arms
or legs. We love them because they belong to us and are useful in helping us to grow,
that is, to continually reconstruct our experience of them. They have no value to us
outside of our bestowing value on them, and this value is determined by how these
objects best answer to what we define as our needs. As Grant (1982) pointed out,
whatever our reasons may be for transforming nature into objects which better answer our
needs, no matter how keenly felt or nobly expressed, "it is clear that the love involved in
the modern project here is not given to or received from the objects of the research, but to
other beings who will be the recipients of the goods which result" (p. 112). And since the
objects of the research compose part and parcel of the existent world, Dewey is caught in
a metaphysical bind: If he is aiming his love at fellow human beings apart from
nonhuman nature-and this love is much to be admired and cherished especially as it
works itself out in the field of education-then he has made an ontological distinction that
his philosophy will not allow. If, on the other hand, he holds on to a naturalism that is
inextricably bound to instrumental reasoning, then his love of human beings is
provisional and will eventually disappear in a technological paradigm that allows no
distinction between humans and other beings as objects of research.
If my reading of Dewey is correct, then Weil would reject his metaphysics
because it assumes a natural unity between ourselves and the objects of our experience.94
94 Some would disagree with my interpretation. Boisvert (1998) claims that Dewey was a
pluralist who did not assume or aspire to unity: "Dewey, admitting the irreducible nature
of multiplicity, seeks harmony" (p. 7). Perhaps unity is too strong a term for Boisvert,
but there is a sense in which unity emerges when harmony is sought. For example, when
members of a soccer team act in accord with each other, when their individual actions
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Although we aspire to this unity, we do not have it. In her commentary on
Aristophanes's myth of androgynous beings, Weil (1951/1957) writes:
Our vocation is unity. Our affliction is to be in a state of duality, an affliction due
to an original contamination of pride and of injustice .... That duality which is
our affliction is the division by which he who loves is other than that which is
loved, he who knows other than that which is known, the material of the action
other than the one who acts, it is the separation of subject and object. Unity is that
state wherein the subject and the object are one single and the same thing, the
state of him who knows himself and who loves himself. But only God is thus,
and we cannot become thus except by assimilation into God, which the love of
God accomplishes. (p. 110)
For Weil, love begins by accepting the fact of this duality. As one follower of WeiI put it:
"Love is consent to the fact that there is authentic otherness" (Grant, 1986, p. 38). This is
the desire which is the act of attention. It both propels me towards an object of my
experience (What is this? I am curious, attracted, interested.) and consents to the fact that
I cannot possess it. This object is not an extension of me, no matter how tempted I may
be to view it, him, or her as such. In this tension between attraction and restraint (the
same one which occurs at the heart of friendship), I am opening myself up to
understanding the object in a way that does not seek to interfere with it. Instead of
harmonize so that passers and receivers are in sync with each other, then the team is more
like one entity than a collection of individuals. But more important, how could Dewey
(1929b) see nature as irreducibly multiple, if he accepted what physical science taught
about the homogeneous structure of matter and energy? And furthermore, if his pluralism
goes all the way down, why did he so often refuse to make ontological distinctions?
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attempting to comprehend it (literally, to take it with me), I attempt to stand under it.
Instead of interrogating it like a Baconian scientist, I am waiting patiently for it, him, or
her to speak to me in its, his, or her own peculiar language when it, him, or her is ready to
speak and I am ready to listen. It is the love of beauty (which illuminated much of Greek
science) refusing to surrender to the love of power (which darkens much of technological
science).
This love delights in the heterogeneity of experience and is not frustrated when
objects or ideas do not neatly fit into conceptual categories. This love seeks a unity but
does not assume it or impose it. It accepts the conditions of existence, determines with
utmost scrupulousness whether force is necessary, uses force only insofar as necessary,
and no further. From the arena of politics to the arena of education, wielding power with
this kind of wisdom-to be able to discern when to step in and when to draw back-
requires a deep love. This is Plato's philosopher-king. It is Dewey's ideal educator.
Suggestions for Further Inquiry
1. Does wisdom emerge through work understood as a harmony between thinking
and acting? As far as I know, that question has not been asked, at least not in any
systematic way. Although there are linkages made between thinking, feeling, and willing,
in some of the definitions of wisdom reviewed in chapter one, none have pointed to work
understood as intelligent activity. The Berlin and Sternberg groups come closest with
their emphasis on practical thinking. If the Berlin researchers were to apply their testing
instrument95 to people who have worked most of their lives at jobs that required the
95 See Chapter One.
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solving of concrete problems (such as skilled tradespersons) would they score higher in
wisdom-related knowledge than those who have worked one or two steps removed from
the world of physical labour (such as white-collar workers)?
2. Is it time to duplicate Dewey's educational experiment? If there are lessons
from the Dewey school that have yet to be learned (Tanner, 1997), then they need to be
appropriately reincarnated in an experiment that attempts to revisit and possibly revise the
original aims of the University of Chicago Elementary School. Such an experiment
would begin by carefully reading the school's archives, understanding how the original
school operated on a day-to-day basis, and asking the type of questions illustrated by the
following: Would sewing, carpentry, cooking, and gardening still form the backbone of
the school's occupational curriculum? Given the exponential increase in technological
development in the past century, to what extent should technological artifacts be
incorporated in constructive activities-if at all (e.g., power tools, refrigerators, microwave
ovens, computers, etc.)? Since household work has been transformed over the past
hundred years through various labour-saving devices, how would the preschool children
begin with occupations closest to their home experience? Would it be better to recreate
the more laborious conditions of domestic life a century ago-in the interests of giving
each child the same point of departure in a radically different school curriculum?
3. Could one operationalize Weil's concept of attention such that it could be
tested in an educational setting? Would this involve regular times for meditation as
Pascual-Leone (1990) and Miller (2006) recommend? Would the attempt to "publicly"
observe and test such a "private" experience be liable to fail in a situation where the
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presence of the observer may very likely change the thing observed? Perhaps not. Even a
camera operator filming a class of elementary students over the course of a school year
sooner or later becomes part of the background scenery (Stewart, 2005). What role
should the contemplation of difficult and possibly insoluble problems play in a school's
curriculum? Are these types of problems more developmentally appropriate for older
students?
4. I have not explicitly raised the question of how to educate for wisdom
regarding the "supersensible" or "supernatural." Nevertheless, it cannot be avoided. By
positing the idea of a dialectical engagement with contradiction and by cultivating a sense
of wonder that new mysteries keep emerging, a Deweilian educator would keep this an
open question without necessarily denying her own beliefs on the matter. This would be
handled differently in a "secular" school than in a "faith-based" school, and I am not sure
what that would look like at this point, except to say that a teacher should be less anxious
about acknowledging and celebrating different faith traditions in the former and more
careful with the use of "God-talk" in the latter. Weil (1956) warns: "With those who
have received a Christian education, the lower parts of the soul become attached to these
mysteries when they have no right at all to do so" (p. 238). In other words, it is better to
be an atheist than to have a false conception of God.
Dewey (1934) and Weil would no doubt agree that all of life is "religious."
Nevertheless, that word raises red flags among supporters of publically funded schools.
"Spiritual" seems to be a less offensive label, and Miller (2006) is an example of a
teacher-educator in an ostensibly secular institution who advocates a type of spiritual
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development for students and teachers in the name of wisdom and compassion.
5. How could one reconceive "special education" so that teachers genuinely
believe that students who are in danger of being "left behind" (according to standard
measures) are actually in a privileged position with regard to cultivating Weil' s sense of
wisdom? How can this be combined with a hopeful expectation (a bestowal of value in
Garrison's sense) in order that so-called weaker students may display abilities that can be
developed to meet standardized assessment criteria? Further, students who have trouble
meeting basic literacy standards in current schooling may develop precious self-
confidence earlier in a Deweilian school, where concrete problem solving and
constructive activities precede the learning of reading and writing; by the same token,
some students who breeze through standardized testing in the current system may
encounter challenges working with their hands in a Deweilian occupational curriculum.
6. What can Dewey and Weil offer teachers who work in schools where
standardized assessments seem to constrict educational options? How can a lower
student-teacher ratio-so necessary in the Dewey experiment-be created within an existing
system without putting a strain on budgets? How can we transform an elementary system
based on the generalist teacher and the self-enclosed classroom into one where specialists
work together in teams to develop a more holistic educational experience?
If the primary and junior teachers of an Ontario school (grades K through 6)
wished to adopt some form of a Deweilian curriculum, they might be excused from the
grade 3 standardized assessment in literacy and numeracy, since these skills would be
taught in conjunction with, or follow on the heels of, concrete problem solving. Perhaps
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this curriculum could be modified in such a way that the students could still meet the
provincial standards by grade 6. Individual classroom teachers who do not have the
opportunity to engage in such a school-wide experiment can still adopt Deweilian insights
even as they feel the pressure to follow the provincial curriculum in a lock-step fashion:
How can one create ambiguous situations in mathematics, science, social studies, music,
visual arts, or physical education so that students are challenged to think-define a
problem, consider various solutions, examine them in collaborative discussion, and test
them in concrete activities? For example, in language arts, this can happen vicariously as
students consider the problems faced by the protagonist in a novel study (Garrison, 1997).
Finally, to what extent can student-designed practical tests replace teacher-designed
assessment strategies?
7. How can teacher-education programs adopt a Deweilian approach? Since I
have immersed myself in Dewey and Weil over the last few years, I can see students
begin to roll their eyes when I mention either one. It is not so much talking about Dewey
and WeiI that is effective in my classes, but doing something which reflects their
approach. Three examples follow: First, at the beginning of my curriculum course,
students are required to write a brief, narrative account of an experience that was
significant and meaningful in their lives. These accounts are then shared in small groups,
and each group analyzes the accounts for commonalities as suggested by the following
questions: What makes an experience significant or meaningful? To what extent is such
an experience educational? What makes an experience educational? What does this mean
for curriculum development and instructional planning?
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Second, the subjects of the Ontario curriculum are grouped and put in the
following sequence: (a) Learning through Sensorimotor Channels-By placing this first, I
emphasize how important concrete experience is for genuine learning. Before browsing
through Ontario curriculum for the Arts, Physical and Health education, I take the
students outside for a short walk on campus with the instructions to look, listen, smell,
and not talk. Back in class, we discuss the experience and reflect how we can incorporate
sensorimotor learning in and beyond the confines of the above subjects; (b) Learning with
Words and Communicating with Grace-Language Arts, English, and Core French are
discussed in dialectical engagement with the Dewey school. Should the teaching of
reading and writing be postponed? Is it wrong to teach reading in kindergarten? Should
handwriting be taught anymore? How can we minimize the cut-and-paste temptation in
an information age? How can class discussions and cooperative learning become truly
safe and meaningful forums of learning? (c) Learning to Detect Patterns, Define
Problems, Test Solutions, and Develop Attention-As the title suggests, Dewey and Weil
are both engaged more directly as we look at the Ontario curriculum for Mathematics,
Science and Technology. Here the emphasis is on discussing ways in which teacher
candidates can create problematic situations and develop a scientific habit of mind in all
subject areas. We also talk about striving to achieve a balance in a typical school day for
concrete experience, social interaction, and quiet time.
Third, two major projects are assigned to be field tested in a practicum: (a) With
a partner or two, each student designs and presents a learning centre to the class that
demonstrates an attractive, interactive bulletin board, an exploration of a stimulating
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topic, and a variety of tasks suitable for a defined range of students. The objective is to
have the learning centre used with actual students in the first or second practicum; (b)
Each student prepares a 10-lesson unit during this course in order to teach it during the
first student-teaching placement. After consulting with the associate teacher, a unit plan
is prepared prior to the practicum, developed and fleshed out in the process of teaching,
and revised on-the-go as if it were to be taught again with the same group. The revised
unit is handed in to me after the practicum.
8. One must recognize that the culture of traditional schooling may make it very
difficult for a Deweilian educator. The suggestions above may take more time than the
provincial curriculum allows. In addition, students may be unwilling to break out of a
mindset habituated to working for marks, grades, and the teacher's approval, just as
students who came from a traditional school found it difficult to adjust to the different
learning environment of Dewey's school (Mayhew & Edwards, 1936). Nevertheless, if
an elementary school teacher can take a class of inner-city fifth graders and mold them
into Shakespearean actors (Stewart, 2005), then a Deweilian educator should not be
daunted by institutional and societal obstacles. After all, it is an indeterminate situation
waiting to be cleared up, a problem waiting to be defined and solved.
Summary Conclusions
In this dissertation, we have studied the concept of wisdom and how to educate
for a love of it by analyzing the writings of John Dewey and Simone Wei!. For Dewey,
wisdom was a metahabit that integrated the various dimensions of living, weaving them
together in a spiral of growth-the continual reconstruction of experience. Like all habits
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in Dewey's system, wisdom itself was open to ongoing reconstruction. It was an
assemblage of hypotheses applied and tested in practical experience with the aim of
creating a better form of life. For Weil, wisdom was the ability to make clear and sound
judgments. It was available to every person regardless of their intellectual abilities
insofar as the love of truth was present in each of them. Like Dewey, she saw wisdom
developing more readily in practical activities-especially in physical work-than in
abstract thinking divorced from concrete experience.
For both, wisdom emerged through intelligent work understood as the integration
of thinking and acting. This meant that educating for a love of wisdom entailed creating a
learning environment where children could work with concrete materials, trying out their
own ideas, defining their own problems, and testing their own hypotheses. Educating for
wisdom was aimed at healing the breach between theory and practice, science and art,
fine arts and technological arts. In other words, a school designed to cultivate a
Deweilian love of wisdom would address the following question: How could the practical
arts (manipulating concrete objects with physical tools) be related to the theoretical arts
(manipulating abstract symbols with intellectual tools) in ways that strengthened the
connections between living, learning, doing, making, and thinking? If true freedom was
defined by a certain relationship between thinking and acting-as both Dewey and Weil
affirmed-then educating for wisdom was coeval with educating for freedom. Conceived
this way, a liberal arts education would look very different from the one which goes by
that tag today.
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